Trade liberalisation in small open economies : the case of Kenya by Ng'eno, N. Kipkoech
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/34795
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
TRADE LIBERALISATION IN SMALL OPEN ECCNCMIES: THE CASE OF KENYA
NEHEMIAH KIPKOECH CHESENGENY arap NC'ENO
Thesis Submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
University of Warwick
Department of Economics
February 1990
ABSTRACT
The object of this thesis is to determine the consequences
of trade liberalisation on the Kenyan economy. This is done by
simulating the effects of tariff reduction, devaluation of domestic
currency and export subsidies. In addition, the effects of
quantitative controls and markup pricing are simulated. The structure
of the economy is modelled through the specification of alternative
closure rules.
Policy changes are simulated using a computable general
equilibrium model (CGE). A nine sector model based on a Social
Accounting Matrix is constructed using the TV-approach to modelling
introduced by Drud, Grais and Pyatt (1986). We depart from
neoclassical models, and therefore other CGE models of Kenya, by
assuming product differentiation between domestic goods and imports
and between gross output sales to domestic and export markets. Our
model is essentially Keynesian but for comparative purposes,
neoclassical closures are specified in some simulations.
In general, the basic argument for or against trade
liberalisation concerns its contribution to economic growth. The
neoclassicals argue that by improving efficient allocation of
resources, liberalisation stimulates higher economic growth. The
structuralists, on the other hand, argue that because of structural
rigidities in LDC economies and because of unfavourable international
conditions, liberalisation will have minimal effect on economic growth.
CGE models are useful in sorting out these arguments. It should be
noted however that the assumptions underlying these models often
reflect the modeller's view about the structure of the economy. The
usefulness of CGE models for policy purposes will therefore depend on
how realistic they reflect the structure of the economy being
modelled.
The results of our model show that the gains from trade
liberalisation, in terms of the growth of real GDP, are low. This
applies to both neoclassical and Keynesian closures. However, it is
shown that changes in returns to factors, consumption levels and
aggregate price levels, depending on the closure adopted, are
significant. This is also true for the policy effects on exports,
imports and on the prices and quantities at the sectoral level. These
results reinforce the view that for policy purposes it is important
that the model being used reflects the structure of the economy under
consideration. It also means that it will not make sense to have
tailor made policy recommendations for all LDCs.
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1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the consequences
of economic liberalisation on the Kenyan economy. This is done by
simulating the effects of tariff reductions, devaluation of domestic
currency, export subsidies and the relaxation of quantitative
restrictions. Our interest is not only to determine the effects of
these policy changes on macroeconomic aggregates; but also their
effects at the sectoral level. The empirical results, obtained using
a computable general equilibrium model (CCE), are then compared with
the predictions of trade theoretic models, which normally form the
basis for policy recommendations to LDCs.
Strictly speaking economic liberalisation encompasses more
than the trade policy instruments listed above. In the context of the
current orthodoxy, liberalisation primarily involves a movement
towards less control of factor markets, financial (including foreign
exchange) markets and commodity markets. Less participation of
governments in economic activities, together with lower public
expenditures are also advocated.
Economic liberalisation also involves the use of
stabilisation policies (such as fiscal, monetary and exchange rate
policies) to maintain, or bring the economy in disequilibrium back
into, internal and external balance. Some of the parameters to be
targeted in this case include aggregate demand, public sector
deficits, inflation and the balance of payments deficits.
2In the wider sense, economic liberalisation therefore
involves efforts to move the economy towards some desired equilibrium,
and the removal of distortions in the domestic markets as well as the
external sector. The basic argument for liberalisation is the notion
that it leads to efficient allocation of resources and hence higher
economic growth. It is also based on the belief that the private
sector is a more efficient resource user than the public sector.
The increased concern for economic liberalisation in LDCs in
the last two decades is not accidental. The enormous economic
problems faced by LDCs during this period have dictated the need for
urgent solutions. To evaluate the nature of these problems and the
attempts to solve them requires a historical perspective of the type
of development policies followed. It is also necessary to understand
the underlying structure of LDC economies. This is because the causes
of economic stagnation and the policies necessary to generate growth
in LDCs are highly disputed.
In the 1950s and 1960s, LECs were preoccupied with efforts
to attain fast and sustained economic growth. Spurred on by theories
which emphasised the importance of industry in development, these
countries promoted industrial development through import substitution
(ISI) policies. The instruments used to promote these polices were in
fact trade related; and in particular tariffs and quantitative
restrictions. Industrial policies therefore came to be synonimous
with trade policies. Industrialisation was also promoted through
public investments.
In many instances substantial economic growth followed the
3implementation of import substitution policies. In fact the success
of these policies in the 1960s led to observations that the benefits
of economic growth was not "trickling down" to the poor. This created
a new school of thought which argued for a basic needs approach to
development. This approach called for implementation of development
strategies which directly addressed the issue of income inequality.
The response of LDC governments to these recommendations was
to get more involved in economic activities. Increased public sector
employment and provision of social services were also used in attempts
to influence poverty directly. The increase in public expenditure
associated with these policies was to become a major issue in economic
liberalisation process.
The economic performance of LDCs, together with much of
their concerns for income inequality, were severely negated by the
economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. The oil crises of 1973/74 and
1979/80 adversely affected LDC economies in several ways. Firstly,
the cost push effects arising from higher import prices disrupted
the production process. This was made worse by import compression
which LDCs had to use to deal with the balance of payments deficits.
Secondly, the oil crises also led to a slow down in developed
economies, resulting in the reduction of imports from LDCs. Overall,
non-oil LDCs experienced large deterioration in their terms of trade.
Although non-oil LDCs suffered the most from the oil crises,
some oil exporting countries were also adversely affected through the
so-called "Dutch disease". This phenomenon is used to explain the
negative effects associated with a boom in exports of resource-based
4and/or primary products. For example, an increase in the exports of
such commodities shifts resources from tradable sectors to non-
tradables. The result is not only a reduction in the production of
tradables, but also a decline in export performance. It is similarly
true that the benefits of the commodity booms of the mid-1970s were
mitigated by the Dutch disease effects.
Another effect of the price increases of 1973/74 was to
increase international financial liquidity. This resulted in lower
real interest rates and therefore increased borrowing by LDCs. By the
early 1980s the level of indebtedness was so high that many of these
countries found it difficult to service their debts. When some
countries started defaulting in 1982, access to international capital
by LDCs began to diminish. This deepened the economic slowdown, and
therefore increased demands for the restructuring of LDC economies.
Kenya's development path after independence in 1963 has been
typical of the types described above. It started with a vigorous 1ST
strategy based on private and public investment. The first decade
(1964-73) was marked by rapid economic growth. GDP at factor cost
grew at an annual rate of 7%; with manufacturing and agriculture
sectors growing at 9% and 4% per annum, respectively. The importance
of the public sector is indicated by the fact that it grew by over 10%
per annum over the period. This high growth is attributable to
protection and high domestic and foreign demand.
Like other LDCs, Kenya's economy suffered from the negative
effects of the external shocks of the 1970s. To some extent it is
true that even before the oil shocks, some underlying weaknesses of
5the economy were already beginning to show up. The expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies started in the late 1960s led to a
foreign exchange crisis in 1971. This was dealt with through foreign
exchange and import controls with resulting negative repercussions on
the economy. By the late 1960s the "easy phase" of ISI policies were
coming to an end. As a result economic liberalisation began to be
advocated (see for example, Hoperaft (1972), Power (1972) and World
Bank (1975)) as an alternative method of stimulating economic growth
and export performance. On the other hand, the ILO (1972) concluded
that the economic growth of the first decade had not been equitably
distributed. The report therefore argued for increased government
involvement in the economy to redress the income inequality.
It is without doubt however that the external shocks played
a major role in the deterioration of Kenya's economy in the 1970s and
1980s. The effect of the first oil crisis was so severe that Kenya
was among the first countries to benefit from the extended EMF
facility in 1975. The economic growth declined from the high levels
of 1964-73 period to 3.0% per annum. The commodity boom of 1976/77
helped to moderate the decline in the economy. The second oil crisis
of 1979/80 however led to a further decline in Kenya's terms of trade
and together with international recession depressed the economy.
Between 1980-85, GDP at factor cost declined by 1%, and manufacturing
and agricultural sectors declined by 1% and 2%, respectively.
To deal with external shocks and the accompanying economic
problems stabilisation and liberalisation programmes have been
implemented. These have included restrictive monetary policies,
reduction in public expenditure and a host of trade policy changes
6including devaluation, tariff reductions and relaxation of
quantitative restrictions. Import compression which has always been
used to deal with balance of payments deficits has remained the most
potent component of the control system despite its perverseness. The
most comprehensive policy changes were linked with the 1979/80 standby
arrangements and structural adjustment agreements with the IMF and
World Bank, respectively.
The consequences of these policies have been evaluated in
Killick (1984), Mosley (1986), Van der Hoeven and Vandemoortele
(1987), Godfrey (1987) and Ikiara (1988). None of these studies
however makes an attempt to quantify the policy effects.
There are several CGE models of the Kenyan economy. Roe and
Pal (1986) simulate the effects of the external shocks associated with
the two oil crises, while Bevan et al (1987) and Gupta and Togan
(1984) simulate the consequences of the commodity boom of 1976/77.
These models however only indirectly incorporate trade issues.
Blomqyist and McMahon (1984) is the only study that explicitly
simulates trade policy changes using Kenyan data. The results of
this model are limited by the fact that it is a two sector model; it
also incorporates many classical features which are inappropriate in
modelling LDC economies.
Our model differs from most of the above models because it
concentrates in simulating the effects of trade liberalisation. And
unlike Blomqvist and McMahon we depart from the two sector textbook
type model by specifying a truly multisectoral model. The advantage
of a highly disaggregated model is that it reflects dynamic
7interactions in the economy in a much more realistic way. This is
especially important since we are interested in the effects of trade
policy changes on resource allocation. Our model also incorporates
features which reflect the Kenyan economy in the most realistic way.
This applies to the modelling of factor markets, product markets and
especially the external sector. The consequences of import controls
and markup pricing are simulated. The other novelty of our model is
the assumption of product differentiation between domestic goods and
imports and between the gross output sales to domestic and export
markets.
An outline of the rest of the Chapters is shortly presented.
We first note that the HERCULES representation of our model is
appended to the end of the thesis. This appendix shows how the model
has been specified, parameterised, and then calibrated. It contains
both a base solution and a model solution, with a short summary of
their interpretation. Our model can therefore be easily replicated.
Chapter Two provides a review of Kenya's trade policies,
including their evaluation and implications. A review of the pattern
and direction of external trade is also provided. In the process the
importance of external trade to Kenya's economy is analysed. The
Chapter also analyses the overall growth of Kenya's economy. An
attempt is made to link the performance of economy with trade policies.
A historical review of the trade liberalisation programmes started in
the mid-1970s is provided. This includes details on the
implementation of specific policies and the problems and/or successes
of the programmes.
8Chapter Three reviews the modelling of LDC trade policies.
An attempt is made to compare the implication of the application of
classical trade models to LDCs with the "new" models. New models here
are taken to be those which incorporate product differentiation
between domestic and foreign goods; as compared with the classical
models which assume perfect substitutability. Qualitative analysis of
trade reform is made with the use of a two-sector model with sector-
specific capital. The Chapter also provides a literature review of
CGE trade models applied to LDCs. The few applications to Kenya are
given greater emphasis.
In Chapter Four the model to be used in our empirical
analysis is developed. The Chapter begins with the presentation of
the data. The transformation of the original SAM data to fit our
modelling purposes is discussed. Thereafter, a formal model is
developed using the TV-approach introduced by Grais, Drud and Pyatt
(1986).
Chapter Five presents the base solution of the model.
However, before the model is calibrated the required parameters are
shown, with discussions on how or where they are obtained. The
sensitivity of the model results to these parameters, especially the
elasticities, is carried out. The Chapter also discusses the issue of
closure rules. A model by Sen (1963) is used to distinguish among the
various types of closure rules. The implications of the closures
rules in the determination of model results are simulated. It is
argued in this Chapter that the Kenynesian closure (model) is the most
appropriate for use in our empirical analysis.
9The empirical results of our model are presented in Chapter
Six. Lastly, Chapter Seven contains the conclusions of the thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO
KENYA'S TRADE POLICY REGIME SINCE 1964 
2.0	 Introduction
This Chapter reviews Kenya's post-independence trade
policies. Emphasis is placed on the origin and the evolution of these
policies. This provides the background necessary for the
understanding of the process of trade liberalisation. This line of
analysis also highlights the implication of trade policy changes on
the economy. The link here lies in the long standing debate about
whether trade is an engine or handmaiden of economic growth in
developing countries (LDCs). Those involved in the debate, initially
started by Nurkse (1961) and Kravis (1970), can be categorised into
two camps: namely, the "pessimists" or structuralists and the
"traditionalists" or classicals.
The postulate that trade is an important determinant of
development dates back to the last century. This argument follows
from the classical, Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S), trade theory
conclusion that countries maximise their welfare by trading in
commodities with which they have a comparative advantage in production.
This view however began to be challenged by the pessimists in the
1950s and the early 1960s. This challenge came from the various
strands of pessimists, notably the terms of trade school of Singer
(1950), Prebisch (1950, 1959) and Myrdal (1959); the dependencia
school of Frank (1978); and the unequal exchange school of EMmamuel
(1960). 1/ The main argument against the application of the H-O-S model
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to LDCs is that it implies specialisation in the production and export
of primary products, and hence the reallocation of resources to the
sectors of the economy which are not dynamic. It also implies
continued dependence by the LDCs on imports of manufactures and
essential intermediate inputs from developed countries. Taken
together, the two arguments are used to reach the conclusion that the
H-fe-S model creates and perpetuates the unequal exchange between
developed and developing countries. It is also argued, that LDCs
cannot depend on export-led growth because of deteriorating barter
terms of trade, as well as recessions and increased protectionism in
the North. These arguments have led to such policy recommendations as
greater North-South dialogue, the use of international agencies like
the UN and GATT to negotiate for increased exports of LDC manufactures
to developed countries, South-South cooperation, and development
policies which emphasise self reliance.
The major consequence of the pessimists challenge is that
most LDCs adopted trade policies at variance with the theory of
comparative advantage. These have mainly been import-substitution
industrialisation (ISI) policies aimed at diversifying away from
exports of raw materials. Ironically, to finance ISI projects LDCs
have had to intensify their position as exporters of raw materials and
cash crops.
In most LDCs the first few years of ISI policies were
successful. However, once the "easy phase" was passed the high hopes
of faster economic development, increased export of manufactures, and
less reliance on exports of raw materials began to fade. 2/
 The classic
examples of such phenomena are to be found in Sub-Sahara Africa, where
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economic stagnation and in many instances declining economic growth is
a serious problem. These countries are at the same time burdened with
high external indebtedness and chronic balance-of-payments problems. 3/
With the decline in LDC economies the inward-looking ISI
policies began to be questioned in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Several country studies, summarised in Little, Scitovsky and Scott
(1970), Bhagwati (1978), Krueger (1978), and the studies by Balassa
(1978, 1985) among others, conclude that poor export performance in
LDCs is a result of inappropriate trade policies. In particular,
these studies argue that ISI policies are distortive, anti-export and
hence in the long run anti-growth. This has led to recommendations of
policies which aim to promote domestic economic efficiciency and
increased production for export. These recommendations have in
general called for less government involvement in the economy,
relaxation of trade restrictions and exchange controls, and the
maintenance of "realistic" exchange rates.	 In many respects the
economic decline in many LDCs in the 1970s and 1980s has lent more
weight to the advocacy of these policies. Indeed, the economic
liberalisation policies undertaken by LDCs under the IMF-World Bank
programmes are inspired by the export promotion paradigm.
The current dominance of outward looking trade policies does
not suggest that the debate on the role of trade in development has
been resolved. A series of studies which attempted to address this
problem failed to produce a unanimous conclusion. Michaely (1977),
Balassa (1978), Tyler (1981), and Feder (1983) found a significant
correlation between export performance and economic growth; but Love
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(1984) and Taylor, McCarthy and Alikhani (1984) established the
correlation between exports and growth to be weak. The view that
export-led growth may not be a viable alternative in LDCs still
persists.
2.10	 Kenya's Trade Policies 
Before examining Kenya's post-independence trade policies,
a brief sketch of the colonial policies is provided. One thing that
should be noted is that before and for sometime after independence
tariff policies were under the control of the East African customs
union. This only changed with the collapse of the East African
community in 1977. The loss of the independent use of tariffs as
trade policy instruments by Kenya encouraged increased use of
quantitative restrictions in the 1970s.
The main purpose of colonial trade policies was to raise
revenue and to a lesser extent to protect the domestic consumer goods
industries. For these reasons tariffs and specific duties were the
major trade policy instruments and there were almost no import
controls. In 1962 six types of duties were applicable: (1) a luxury
rate of 66.3% on luxury imports, (2) protective rate of 33.3% on
competing imports, (3) a general rate of 25% whose goal was to raise
revenue although used for protection where domestic production
existed, (4) motor vehicle rate of 15%, (5) a general assisted rate of
12.5% which was a reduction in the general rate with the aim of
stimulating domestic production, and (6) a list of duty-free items,
mainly machinery and raw materials essential for domestic production
(IBRD, 1962, pp.159-160). Specific duties were also used to collect
14
revenue and partly to increase the level of protection of domestic
industry. Suspended duties, which could be used for protection when
necessary, also existed. Other policies used to promote domestic
production and exports included low export taxes and railway tariffs,
and duty drawbacks and remissions.
The period preceding independence in 1963 was one of high
uncertainty. With the economy controlled by European settlers and
foreign firms the reality of impending independence led to high
capital flight and hence low capital formation. This resulted in a
major economic stagnation which began in the late 1950s. As part of a
program to promote industrial growth, limited import licensing began
to be used in 1958.
2.11	 Post-Independence Policies 
The efforts made to stimulate the economy in the late 1950s
proved unsuccessful. Kenya therefore entered the independence era
under depressed economic conditions and urgent steps were necessary to
rejuvenate the economy. The policies initially implemented were
adopted from a 1962 World Bank mission which recommended that Kenya
encourage the growth of the industrial sector by means of tariffs,
duty drawbacks, quotas, and subsidies. 4/
 These ISI type policies, as
outlined in the first Development Plan (1966-1970), had the stated
objectives of raising the standard of living for Kenyans; enhancing
technical progress; increasing the domestic value of domestic products;
and promoting export-oriented industries. 5/
 These policies were
restated in the 1970-1974 Plan which advocated increased protection
"by use of import licensing, quantitative restrictions, and by duty
15
drawbacks on imported raw materials". 6/
The use of tariffs and quantitative restrictions as tools
for protection is discussed in the next two sections. The
perverseness of these policies and their implication on the economy is
analysed. However, no attempt has been made to quantify their
effects.
2.12	 Tariffs
The structure of Kenya's post-independence tariff system has
not been widely examined. The few studies which have been done
confirm that the system has been of the type associated with ISI
policies. While the tariff schedule contained 177 items in 1962
(IBRD, 1962, p.159), these figures had increased to 1416 and 2741
items (Sharpley and Lewis, 1988, p.45) in 1970 and 1984, respectively.
Sharpley and Lewis (1988) also show that from 1964 to the middle of
the 1970s average duties on intermediate and capital goods were
constant and low, averaging about 20%; while those on consumer goods
averaged about 35%. This pattern changed in the early 1980s when the
average tariff rates on consumer goods began to decline rapidly while
those on capital and intermediate goods rose above 20%. The effect of
this change was to create some degree of uniformity. The former
pattern of tariff structure conforms to the governments policy of
trying to promote domestic industry through heavy duties on consumer
goods and lower rates on capital and intermediate inputs. The later
pattern, as we shall discuss later, is indicative of trade
16
liberalisation policies of the 1980s which called for a move towards
uniform protection.
As is now well known, the most appropriate measure of the
protective effect of tariffs is not the nominal rate, but rather the
effective rate. This is the extent to which tariffs protect the
domestic value added. Studies on the effective rate of protection
(FRP) of Kenya's industries are sparce. Some of the studies which
have estimated this measure are Reimer (1970), Phelps and Wasow
(1972), Grosh (1987), and IBRD (1987). 7/
 While the results of these
studies differ in magnitude, their rankings of effective protection
are remarkably similar. For instance, their estimates of ERP for
consumer goods are quite high, while those of intermediates and
capital goods are low and in many cases negative. The average overall
effective rate of protection in 1968 was estimated by Phelps and Wasow
(1972) to be 34.2%. Comparing this figure with the 51.0% obtained by
IBRD (1987), Sharpley and Lewis (p.60) conclude that this suggests an
increased level of protection in the 1980s. Since the two studies are
not comparable the conclusion seems to be far fetched. While it is
possible that the level of protection was higher in the 1980s than the
1960s, this cannot be inferred from the two different levels of ERP.
2.13
	
Quantitative Restrictions 
Import controls have been used as instruments of industrial
protection in a variety of ways. The most common have been quota
restrictions, total bans, approval to import certain products allowed
only to specific agents or after obtaining special permission from
specific government bodies, and a requirement of "non-objection
17
certificate" (basically permission to import) from the producers of
the domestic competing product.
It would appear that despite the intent of the first two
development plans, no serious effort was made to use quantitative
restrictions for protection during the covered periods. The same
licensing system, with only 19 items on it, was in operation between
1964 and 1972. However, with the foreign exchange crisis of 1971
import controls began to be used also for exchange control purposes.
The increased protective nature of the system resulted not only from
the increased number of items under license, but also because import
bans and quota restrictions were imposed on items which were
previously freely imported. The import licensing system introduced in
1972 had five schedules: A, B, C, D, and E; of which D and E contained
items which were freely imported before (IBRD 1975, pp.294-297).
Schedules B and E contained banned items, while items in schedules C
and A could only be imported conditional On approval by commercial
banks after exchange controls and administrative requirements had been
met, and those in D could only be imported prior to obtaining a "no
objection to foreign exchange" certificate from the government. Under
this system the number of licensed items rose to 369.
As the foreign exchange position improved, the controls
began to be relaxed. In 1973 the number of imports under license was
reduced to 205 (IBRD, 1975) and a new licensing system was introduced.
This system remained in place until it was replaced by one introduced
under the structural adjustment programme of 1980. The 1973 licensing
system had four schedules: (I) which listed items which could be
imported subject to specific licenses, but for which foreign exchange
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was readily available; (II) listed imports under quota restrictions;
(III) listed banned imports, some of which however could be imported
after obtaining a "non-objection certificate" from the domestic
producer; and (IV) which listed imports under quota restrictions for
balances of payments purposes. Subsequent changes to the system
before 1980 only involved the shifting of items among the schedules or
changing the number of items in each schedule. For example, the
system was tightened up in response to the external shocks in 1973/74;
resulting in more than doubling of licensed items to 472 in 1975.
Similarly, the export boom of 1976/77 led to the relaxation of the
controls. This generated an import boom in 1978 which in turn led to
a balance of payments crisis leading to the imposition of import
controls in 1979. The structure of the import control system
introduced in 1980, but published in 1981, and those of later years is
shown in Table 2.8. It is clear that as the import licensing system
became a prominent trade and exchange control policy instrument the
number of licensed items increased.
There have been only a few studies on the protective effects
of the Kenya's import controls system. To estimate ERP Phelps and
Wasow (1972) and Grosh (1987) used direct comparisons between domestic
and world prices; where world prices are defined as import prices
inclusive of duties, sales taxes and handling costs. The difference
between the two prices can be interpreted as an implicit tariff
(premium) and hence represents the price effects of quantitative
restrictions. Grosh (1987) estimates the premiums earned by domestic
producers ranging from an average of 13 percent by public sector firms
to 16 percent by the private sector firms. Hoperaft (n.d.) has made
an attempt to quantify the price effects of import controls for a
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number of items. Using firm specific data he found that domestic
producers of paper products earned premiums between 72-113%; while
producers of pharmaceuticals earned premiums between 31-213%. While
the coverage of industries in Hoperaft's study is limited its results
point to the fact that quantitative restrictions generate high
premiums.
The protective effect of both tariffs and import controls
can be examined by looking at the pattern of the end use analysis of
imports. Table 2.1 shows that protection has been very effective in
reducing the proportion of consumer goods in total imports from 34
percent in 1960 to 12 percent in 1986. However, it has had minimal
effect on the imports of intermediate and capital goods. The
dependence on imports of these two types of goods has increased over
time. This is not surprising given the low level of effective
protection given to the industries producing these goods. The
implication of this result is that one of the objectives of the
protection policy; namely, that of increasing the utilisation of
domestic resources was undermined.
2.20
	
The Kenyan Economy
As argued before, the goal of ISI policies was to promote
faster and sustained economic growth. A high growth of the
manufacturing sector was considered essential for increased
employment, domestic value added, and production for export. Below we
briefly sketch the pattern of Kenya's economic growth for the period
1964-85. No serious attempt is made to critically analyse the sources
of the changes in the observed growth patterns.
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TABLE 2.1 
End Use Analysis of Imports as Percentage of Total Imports
Consumption Intermediates Capital
1960 34 39 27
1964 27 58 15
1965 26 61 13
1966 27 57 16
1967 22 56 22
1968 24 58 18
1969 23 60 18
1970 23 58 19
1971 24 56 20
1972 22 55 22
1973 18 62 21
1974 13 72 13
1975 15 67 18
1976 18 63 19
1977 15 61 25
1978 15 55 29
1979 15 63 22
1980 15 70 15
1981 20 58 22
1982 16 61 22
1983 17 61 22
1984 14 64 22
1985 14 64 21
1986 12 55 29
Source: Statistical Abstract (various issues).
2.21	 Sectoral Growth of GDP
As shown by Table 2.2, the Kenyan economy is dominated by
the agricultural sector. The relative importance of this sector has
however been declining over the years. The share of the private
monetary service sector in real GDP is high and has since 1979
supplanted agriculture as the leading sector. On the other hand, the
share of the manufacturing sector has marginally changed over the
years. The World Bank (1962) shows that during the 1950s agriculture
and manufacturing sectors contributed about 40 and 10 percent of GDP
respectively. This suggests that apart from the changes in the
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TABLE 2.2 
Percentage Shares of Real Monetary GDP (1980 Constant Prices)
Agriculture Manufacturing
Private Government
Services Services
1964 45.00 9.64 32.37 12.98
1965 40.20 70.82 35.49 13.49
1966 42.97 10.23 34.01 12.79
1967 41.38 10.51 34.73 13.77
1968 39.10 10.64 35.40 14.86
1969 38.25 11.25 35.02 15.48
1970 37.63 11.30 35.80 15.28
1971 35.36 11.89 35.43 17.32
1972 36.20 12.12 34.46 17.21
1973 36.32 12.78 34.62 16.28
1974 35.46 13.00 36.35 15.18
1975 34.68 12.72 36.37 16.23
1976 38.55 11.92 34.25 15.27
1977 42.79 11.48 31.93 13.80
1978 37.34 12.96 34.88 14.82
1979 34.68 13.35 36.51 15.46
1980 32.54 13.96 37.78 15.72
1981 32.39 13.43 38.19 15.99
1982 32.47 13.33 38.41 15.80
1983 32.66 12.94 39.34 15.06
1984 31.37 13.34 39.94 15.35
1985 30.74 13.29 40.56 15.41
Original Source: Statistical Abstract (various issues) and
Vandermoortele (1985).
agricultural sector the structure of Lhe economy has only marginally
changed since independence.
The development process in the post-independent Kenyan
economy can be divided into three phases; Phase I: (1964-73) can be
called the development decade because it is associated with high
economic growth; Phase II: (1974-79) can be called the disruption
period because during this period the economy experienced external
shocks arising from the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and the commodity
boom of 1976-77; and Phase III: (1980-85) is the structural adjustment
period because it coincides with a period in which stabilisation and
liberalisation policies were used in an attempt to rejuvenate the
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economy.
The growth rate of real GDP (at factor cost) and its various
components for the different periods are given in Table 2.3. Over the
period 1964-85,real GDP grew by 3.17 percent per year, while
agriculture and manufacturing grew at an annual rate of 1.86 and 4.77
percent respectively; the two service sectors grew at about 4% per
annum. These do not appear to be spectacular growth rates for a
country normally considered a success story in Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, a different picture emerges when economic performance during
the different sub-periods is examined. During the development decade
high real GDP growth rates were achieved, with manufacturing and
Government services leading the way at over 9 and 10 percent per
year, respectively.
These impressive growth rates would seem to be in line with
those associated with the "easy-phase" of ISI type policies. The role
of industrial protection is clearly reflected in the high growth of
the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, the increased role of
the government in the provision of social services and infrastructure
explains the growth in public sector services. The 4.1% increase in
the growth of the agricultural sector though relatively lower than
those of other sectors is significant because of its prominence as the
leading sector in the economy.
The second phase (1974/79) exhibits a less rosy picture as
real GDP grew by half the previous rate. This pattern of growth
resulted from external shocks of the period. The balance of payment
problems of 1974/75 and 1978/79 resulted in import compressions which
1964/ 1964/
1985 1973 
	
3.17
	
6.58
	
1.86
	
4.08
	
4.77
	
9.46
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TABLE 2.3 
Growth of Real Total GDP and its Major Mbnetary Components 
(Annual Growth Rate)
1974/ 1980/ 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
1979
	 1985 
CDP
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Private
Services
Government
Services
4.02	 7.05
3.89 10.35
	
2.76
	 -1.18
	
3.16	 -1.61
	
2.99
	 -1.38
	
2.02	 0.93
-3.38 3.49 -6.22 1.01 0.90
-6.77 2.91 -4.52 1.93 -4.52
3.84 -0.34 -6.80 -1.15 2.57
2.80 4.51 -4.55 3.64 0.97
1.70	 -1.31	 0.91 5.12 -6.30 -3.36 1.58
Source: As in Table 1.
tended to retard economic growth primarily because of the economy's
heavy reliance on imported capital goods and intermediate inputs. The
negative effects of the external shocks were to some extent moderated
by the positive effects associated with the commodity booms of 1976/77.
This is reflected by the relatively lower decline of the agricultural
sector.
The economic performance during the adjustment period was
quite dismal. This was largely due to the poor weather conditions in
1980 and 1984 which drastically reduced the growth rate in
agriculture; and the balance of payments crises of 1980 and 1982. The
dominance of the agricultural sector in the economy can again be seen
from the impact of the negative growth of this sector on GDP in 1980
and 1984. The crisis management associated with the balance of
payments crises is also evident from the gyration of real GDP growth
between 1980-84. The negative growth of government services is
attributable to the usual policy of reducing the public sector under
structural adjustment programs.
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2.22	 Pattern and Direction of Trade
In the previous section the performance of the Kenyan
economy was linked to conditions in the international economy. The
assumption behind this assertion is that Kenya is a highly open
economy. This assertion is confirmed by Table 2.4 which shows that
total merchandise trade has over the years averaged above 40 percent
of real GDP. The table also shows that the barter terms of trade
declinded sharply in the 1980s. The openness of the Kenyan economy
leads to the conventional assertion that it is prone to fluctuations
in the international economy. This claim is in fact made by Van der
Hoeven and Vandermoortele (1987) who find a high correlation between
TABLE 2.4 
Exports and Imports as a Percentage of Real GDP (1980 constant prices) 
and Barter Terms of Trade (TOT) 
ICT EXPORTS IMPORTS
1964 147.06 21.03 23.29
1965 141.18 21.77 26.92
1966 141.18 20.75 28.10
1967 141.18 17.31 24.23
1968 147.06 17.47 24.87
1969 138.89 17.71 23.4426.181970 150.00 18.05 29-971971 130.00 16.81 26.30
1972 122.73 17.64 25.87
1973 123.08 20.45 35.44
1974 107.69 21.76 29-811975 96.00 19.55 27.55
1976 112.07 23.35 28.09
1977 148.39 26.53 31.55
1978 118.18 18.88 26.71
1979 109.21 17.80 35.58
1980 100.00 19.13 29.90
1981 85.94 17.36 25-91
1982 81.63 16.27 22.98
1983 77.13 16.55 26.76
1984 89.64 18.65 24.53
1985 75.00 16.38
Source: Statistical Abstract (various issues).
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Kenya's annual growth of real GDP and the terms of trade.
The commodity concentration of exports is shown by Table 2.5.
During the colonial period, as it still is today, coffee was the
major export earner. Together with sisal and tea, coffee contributed
over 40 percent of total export earnings. Commodity concentration has
however increased over the years. While the share of sisal had
declined to about two percent of total export earnings by the middle
of the 1960s, exports of petroleum products began to play a major role.
The contribution of petroleum exports to the economy is however
doubtful as the sector contributes little to domestic value added.
Since Kenya is not an oil producer, the petroleum exports are largely
TABLE 2.5 
Major Commodity Exports as  Percentage of Total Exports
Coffee Tea Petroleum
1950 16.8 6.3
1955 28.1 8.8
1960 21.0 9.0
1964 32.7 12.9 4.6
1965 29.9 12.9 9.9
1966 32.3 15.0 10.1
1967 29.3 13.8 13.8
1968 22.2 17.4 10.8
1969 26.6 17.8 12.0
1970 21.6 12.8 13.4
1971 18.1 13.4 14.1
1972 20.1 13.4 12.4
1973 22.2 10.5 10.0
1974 18.2 9.2 18.0
1975 16.4 10.7 22.6
1976 29.3 10.0 17.9
1977 42.5 14.9 15.1
1978 33.7 17.1 16.3
1979 28.7 16.3 17.7
1980 22.2 11.9 31.1
1981 21.3 11.9 30.7
1982 26.5 14.2 26.0
1983 25.3 19.5 19.5
1984 27.0 25.1 17.4
1985 29.7 24.7 14.0
Source: Statistical Abstract (various issues)
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re-exports of refined products. Nonetheless, by the 1980s tea, coffee
and petroleum accounted for 60 percent of total export earnings.
The geographic concentration of exports is shown in Table
2.6. It is shown that during the 1960s and early 1970s East African
countries and Britain were the main markets for Kenya's exports.
Together, these countries imported over 40% of Kenya's exports. From
the middle of the 1970s this concentration began to decline.
The decline in Kenya's exports to East African markets is
attributable to the collapse of East African Community in 1977 which
reduced exports to Tanzania below 1% of total exports. However, it is
evident that the decline of exports to the East African markets have
to some extent been made up by increased exports to other African
markets.
The high openess of Kenya's economy together with the high
commodity and geographic concentration of Kenya's exports exposes the
economy to fluctuations in international markets. The poor economic
performance of the last two decades can therefore be attributed to
cumulative effects of the external shocks and the deterioration of the
international commodity markets. The World Bank (1983), Roe and Pal
(1986) and Van der Hoeven and Vandermoortele (1987) arrive at this
conclusion. However, it has long been argued, starting with studies by
Phelps and Wasow (1972), Reimer (1971), Power (1972), Hoperaft (1972,
mimeo) and World Bank (1975), that high protectionism also adversely
affected the economy. In fact it can be argued that the debate on the
need for a liberal trade regime generated by these studies stimulated
the movement towards trade liberalisation in the middle of the 1970s.
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TABLE 2.6 
Direction of Real Exports (Percentage of Total by Destination)
United West
USA Tanzania Uganda Rest of AfricaKingdom Germany
1960 11.41 12.09 7.30 14.62 11.41 5.01
1961 12.22 10.16 8.70 25.93 12.22 5.20
1962 11.69 11.97 6.00 16.54 11.69 5.19
1963 13.32 9.65 4.32 15.25 13.32 5.92
1964 15.84 9.13 5.98 17.10 15.84 4.48
1965 18.83 9.05 3.24 17.56 18.83 4.36
1966 17.11 8.88 5.79 14.80 17.11 5.68
1967 17.26 5.72 4.29 13.52 17.26 6.10
1968 14.87 6.49 4.53 14.64 14.87 7.70
1969 16.39 8.07 5.15 13.21 16.39 7.87
1970 15.34 6.26 5.84 13.54 15.34 8.41
1971 17.06 6.26 4.41 13.13 17.06 10.45
1972 12.44 7.13 3.96 12.27 12.44 5.73
1973 12.12 7.50 4.04 9.32 12.12 2.17
1974 12.43 7.57 3.36 8.08 12.43 3.33
1975 10.80 8.05 3.48 8.56 10.80 5.22
1976 7.79 12.19 5.29 6.67 7.79 5.06
1977 8.69 17.06 5.12 1.53 8.68 6.60
1978 7.96 14.27 4.21 0.46 7.96 6.67
1979 7.41 14.66 3.83 0.74 7.41 12.47
1980 10.77 10.78 3.13 0.67 10.77 12.13
1981 8.71 10.86 3.52 0.85 8.71 17.48
1982 9.70 10.59 5.86 0.98 9.70 15.15
1983 10.08 12.56 5.93 0.73 10.08 17.18
1984 8.27 12.55 4.94 1.00 8.27 15.56
1985 8.36 11.63 6.69 1.96 8.36 13.73
1986 7.42 13.89 8.74 2.78 7.42 11.36
Source: Statistical Abstracts (various (issues).
Note:	 All African countries except Tanzania and Uganda
2.30
	
Attempts at Trade Liberalisation
Under the shadow of economic difficulties of the early 1970s
a shift in trade and industrial policies began to emerge. This shift
is apparent in the 1974/78 Plan; and in the introduction of export
subsidies under the Local Manufactures (Export Compensation) Act of
1974.
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The 1974-78 Plan called for an efficient industrial sector
which could produce goods which were competitive both in quality and
price in the world markets. This was to be achieved by the creation
of a liberal trade regime through uniform tariff protection and
relaxation of import controls. Tariffs and import controls were to be
eventually replaced by excise and sales taxes. However, to avoid
discouraging production for export these taxes were to be waived for
the inputs to export oriented industries.
The Local Manufactures Act introduced the most clear policy
on export promotion. The subsidies introduced under the Act were to
replace duty drawbacks which had been deemed costly and unpredictable.
The Export Compensation Scheme was therefore meant to reduce
administrative costs and facilitate prompt payments to exporters. The
Scheme allowed exporters of eligible goods to claim 10 percent of the
f.o.b. value of the goods declared for export or 10 percent of export
earnings received in foreign currency, whichever was less A further
rule for eligibility was that the exported goods be wholly produced in
Kenya; and where imported inputs were used in production, their value
would be less than 70 per cent of ex-factory price of the goods.
The poor economic conditions in 1974 and 1975 and later in
1978 and 1979 however made the trade liberalisation policies difficult
to implement. But because of the economic crisis of the late 1970s
and the fear of a protracted economic slowdown the government had to
seek external funds to finance development and balance-of-payments
deficits. This led to aggreements on structural adjustment
programmes between Kenya and the World Bank and several stand-by
arrangements with the IMF. 8/ 9/ The loans obtained under these agreements
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were conditional on implementation of policies aimed at liberalising
Kenya's economic system. Some of these policies have been articulated
by the 1979-83 and 1984-88 Development Plans, the Sessional Paper No.4
of 1980 and 1982, various budget speeches, and the Sessional Paper
No.1 of 1986.
Under the structural adjustment programmes, trade and
industrial policies were to be actively used to restructure the
economy; and particularly the manufacturing sector. This was seen as
necessary to boost economic efficiency and increase competitiveness.
The growth of the industrial sector was also to be enhanced through
greater reliance on the private sector and foreign investments.
Several specific policies were to be used to achieve these
objectives. These included reforms of tariff and import control
systems and an array of export promotion measures.
Tariff "rationalisation" was to be initially carried out
through reduction of duties on consumer goods and increases of those
on intermediate and capital goods. Thereafter, all tariffs were to be
gradually reduced. The use of quantitative restrictions as a means of
protection was to be reduced. For example, more imports were to be
placed on the OGL (the list with no restriction) and other less
restrictive lists; and the "non-objection certificates" were to be
abolished.
A variety of policies were to be used to promote exports.
These included; review and modification of the export compensation
scheme; maintenance of "realistic" exchange rates; introduction of
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manufacture under bond; establishment of an export credit insurance
and guarantee scheme; encouragement of increased production of non-
traditional exports; attempts to seek new markets in Africa, Middle
East, USA, Japan and Eastern Europe; and increased government support
for a liberal world trading system, including increased participation
in regional and international cooperation.
The extent to which some of these policies have been
implemented, together with their effectiveness, is discussed below.
This is done selectively since a detailed analysis of all the policies
is beyond the scope of this study.
2.31	 Tariff Reforms 
Under the 1980 liberalisation program a 10 percent tariff
surcharge was imposed on all imports; tariff increases were also
imposed on over 200 import items. 10/
 The purpose of the tariff surcharge
was to protect domestic industry from the effects of relaxation of
import controls while tariff increases was a means of rationalisation.
The reforms began in 1980 were continued in 1981 with tariff increases
ranging from 2-90 percent imposed on about 1400 items. There were
also tariff reductions on about 20 import items used mainly by export
oriented industries.
The tariff increases of 1980 and 1981, as shown in Table
2.7, were followed by further increases at an average of 13 percent in
1982. In 1983 tariffs were reduced to about 1981 levels and the
reductions continued in 1984. However, it is evident that the process
of tariff reductions lost steam in subsequent years. With exception
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TABLE 2.7 
Unweighted Average Tariff Rates By SITE Category
1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85	 1986/87
Crude Rubber 37 40 37 32 29
Cork and Wood 47 52 47 39 42
Pulp and Waste Paper 54 60 51 42 36
Textile Fibres 39 42 38 37 37
Metal Ores 35 38 33 28 24
Chemicals 39 43 39 38 30
Medicines 20 22 20 17 16
Chemical Products 37 41 39 34 31
Leather 51 56 50 46 48
Rubber Manufacturers 46 64 55 54 54
Textiles 68 76 67 57 57
Non-Metallic Minerals 47 54 48 41 40
Iron and Steel 28 34 31 27 28
Non-Ferous Metals 42 46 41 32 31
Metals 49 55 49 42 42
Machinery 29 33 29 26 22
Clothing 100 111 102 89 89
Footwear 49 54 45 45 45
Total Average 45 51 46 40 39
Source: Import licensing schedules (various issues).
of a few commodities, there were hardly any tariff reductions between
1984 and 1986. It is also evident that during this period there was
little movement towards uniform tariffs.
2.32	 Import Controls 
Under the 1980 liberalisation program import bans and
requirements for "non-objection certificates" were removed. Import
controls were to be relaxed from 1981 by shifting 20 percent of the
items from Schedule IIA to Schedule I each year. 11/
 This is reflected
in the 1982 import schedule (Table 2.8) which had 11 percent more items
in Schedule I than in 1981.
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TABLE 2.8 
Number of Licensed Items by Schedule Category
Schedule 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85
I 1131 1 1444 NA
2
NA
(42) (53)
IA NA NA 784 803
(29) (30)
IB NA NA 673 961
(25) (35)
IIA 687 398 NA NA
(26) (15)
IIB 867 868 869 903
(32) (32) (32) (33)
IIAS NA NA 84 92
(3) (3)
IIA0 NA NA 314 NA
(12)
Total
	
2689	 2710	 2724	 2759
Source: Import Licensing Schedules (various issues)
Note: 1: Numbers in brackets are percentage of total licensed items.
2: Not applicable.
Schedule I	 : Essential goods imported freely through automatic
licensing and foreign exchange allocation.
IIA : Priority imports for use in industry and agriculture.
Receive regular foreign exchange allocation but less
than of I.
JIB : Luxury imports and goods produced domestically.
Schedule used to protect domestic industry and for BOP
purposes therefore receive residual foreign exchange.
IA	 : Same as I.
IB	 : Same as IIA.
IIAS : Goods imported only by authorised agents or requiring
ministry approval before license is issued.
IIA0 : Non-luxury imports subject to quota and receive only
residual foreign exchange.
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As shown by Table 2.8 the licensing system had to some
extent been liberalised by 1985. More items had been moved to the
more liberal Schedule I. However, the number of items on the more
restrictive Schedule IIB and indeed the total number of licensed items
has remained more or less the same over time.
2.33	 Export Compensation
The contribution of export compensation to the promotion of
exports has generally been considered to be minimal. Exporters have
often claimed that the compensation rate Was too low, and that
payments were not made promptly. The liberalisation program of 1980
set out to deal with some of these claims. Under the program the
basic rate of compensation which had remained at 10 percent since 1974
was raised to 20 percent. However, the scheme was suspended in June
1982 because it was viewed as ineffective in promoting exports. The
government argued that claims were made by only four or five firms
which were already competitive in world markets and therefore required
no incentives. It was also argued that the domestic value added
requirement was often not applied and hence non-qualifying exports
obtained compensation. 12/
lAtlen the scheme was re-introduced in December 1982, the
basic rate had been reduced to 10 percent, but an additional rate of
15 percent was to be paid to exporters whose earnings increased over
the previous year's earnings. But this new system created more
problems than were first anticipated. For example, exporters
regularly changed their names or lagged exports in order to qualify
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for the incremental payments; and in most cases the claims reflected
increases in prices rather than the volume of exports. In 1985 the
incremental rate was abolished and the basic rate was raised back to
20 percent.
Although the Export Compensation Scheme has been in force
since 1974 its effectiveness has not been systematically analysed.
Low (1982) could not establish any definitive relationship between the
scheme and export performance. He found that while most eligible
exporters did not claim the subsidy, those who did treated it as a
windfall gain. The fact that export compensation has over the years
amounted to no more than 0.2 percent of export earnings over the years
suggests that it has had little significant role in export promotion.
The problem with the constant changes in the compensation rate is that
it would affect the credibility and hence effectiveness of the scheme.
2.34	 Exchange Rate Regime 
One of the major planks of the 1980 liberalisation programme
was to introduce a flexible exchange rate regime which could serve as
an instrument for protection and export promotion. Historically, the
Kenyan Shilling had been pegged to the Sterling pound but between 1975
and 1980 the Kenya shilling was pegged to the SDR at a rate of 1 SDR
to Ksh.9.70. This regime ended with the devaluations of February and
September 1981 amounting to 23.7%. There was a further devaluation of
the shilling by 17.7 percent in December 1982. This exchange rate was
in force until May 1983 when the shilling was again devalued by 2.6
percent. After this devaluation the official exchange rate policy
became one of "managed float" in which the shilling, then pegged to a
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basket of currencies, was allowed to fluctuate within certain margins.
Overall, between 1980 and 1986 the shilling depreciated by 98% and
112% against the SDR and the dollar, respectively.
In analysing the impact of exchange rates on exports a more
appropriate indicator is the real effective exchange rate (PEER) index.
This index is obtained using trade weighted average exchange rates
deflated by the ratio of the domestic consumer price index and the
trading partners' (Britain, Germany, Netherlands, Japan, France, Italy
and USA) wholesale price index. 13/ Table 2.9 shows indices of nominal
and real effective exchange rates. By construction, an increase in
the nominal exchange rate index (NEER) implies a devaluation.
Therefore, its increase from 1981 onwards reflects the devaluations of
1981-1983 and the policy of managed float started in 1983. It is also
evident that PEER was not overvalued in the 1960s and early 1970s, but
began to be overvalued after 1972. The PEER began to depreciate in
1978, partly due to a decline in terms of trade after the coffee boom,
and thereafter because of devaluations and a flexible exchange rate
policy. It is however clear that the depreciation of the real
exchange rate has not been consistent since 1978. This would create
uncertainty among the exporters and therefore negatively affect export
performance.
2.40
	
Summary
In this Chapter the development of Kenya's trade policies
since independence is reviewed. It has been shown that although wide
ranging ISI policies began to be implemented after independence, the
trade regime remained relatively liberal in the 1960s. However,
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protectionism and especially the role of quantitative restrictions
began to escalate in the 1970s. An attempt is made to link these
trade policy changes to the pattern of economic development. It is
argued that the high economic growth of the first decade of
independence was associated with the so-called "easy phase" of ISI
policies. The slow down in subsequent years is attributed to several
TABLE 2.9 
Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates 
(1980 = 100)
NMX	 RERX
1960	 86.98	 93.91
1961	 86.57	 94.54
1962	 86.00	 91.86
1963	 87.41	 91.79
1964	 85.26	 96.10
1965	 84.34	 92.40
1966	 85.72	 92.79
1967	 85.23	 83.50
1968	 83.14	 85.39
1969	 82.01	 88.94
1970	 83.37	 94.17
1971	 83.41	 96.97
1972	 86.96	 99.53
1973	 86.53	 103.05
1974	 84.47	 107.98
1975	 89.01	 103.69
1976	 91.83	 108.01
1977	 90.95	 104.61
1978	 94.17	 95.36
1979	 98.11	 99.67
1980	 100.00	 100.00
1981	 102.92	 100.84
1982	 115.05	 99.31
1983	 129.85	 103.73
1984	 124.41	 95.18
1985	 142.87	 98.61
1986	 174.32	 112.53
NERX : Nominal effective exchange rates weighted by exports.
RERX : Real effective exchange rates weighted by exports.
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factors, the dominant of which are the external shocks of 1970s and
1980s, and the poor economic conditions in the world markets. The
bias of ISI policies against exports also played some role in the poor
economic performance after the growth decade.
Although several studies in the early 1970s argued against
the protectionist nature of Kenya's trade regime and called for
liberalisation, the major impetus for trade liberalisation largely
resulted from the economic difficulties of the period. For instance,
while some stabilisation and liberalisation policies were implemented
in an attempt to mitigate the negative effects associated with the
first oil crisis it was not until after the structural adjustment
agreements of 1980 that serious steps were taken towards trade
liberalisation.
No attempt has been made in this Chapter to evaluate the
macroeconomic effects of the liberalisation policies of the 1980s.
Indeed, this will not be the purpose of this study. Our aim will be
to simulate the effects of trade liberalisation using counterfactual
experiments. While the data used will be those of the Kenyan economy,
they will not correspond to those of the years associated with the
liberalisation.
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CHAPTER THREE 
MODELING TRADE POLICIES IN LDCS
3.0	 Introduction 
The disequilibrium in LDC economies during the 1970s and
1980s has been dealt with by stabilisation and structural adjustment
policies. Attempts to assess the effectiveness of these policies have
stimulated increased modelling of MC economies. Some of the studies
have relied on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. The use
of CGE models can be justified on the grounds that, unlike partial
equilibrium models, they explicitly model economy wide resource
allocation and interaction among economic agents. CCE models also, by
endogenising price and quantity changes, are more suited for modelling
the mixed economies common in LDCs than the earlier fix-price input-
output type models. For example, by affecting the agents incentives
and/or expectations, price changes lead to income and substitution
effects in demand and production. In this sense the behaviour of the
agents in the economy is realistically accounted for in the model.
The earliest survey on the application of CGE models is
Shoven and Whalley (1984). This work concentrated on the application
of CCE models to international trade and taxation issues in both
developed and developing countries. While the original applications
of CCE models to developing countries, for example, Adelman and
Robinson (1979) and Taylor et al. (1980), focused on the analysis of
growth and income distribution; the more recent models have covered
wider issues. Devarajan et al. (1986) and Decaluwe and Martens (1986)
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provide bibliographic surveys, including the most recent applications,
of LDC CCE models. Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982) initiated a
vast development and application of CGE models to LDC economies. The
most recent surveys of these models are provided by Srinivasan and
Whalley (1986), de Melo (1988) and Robinson (1989). The importance of
trade to LDCs is evident from the fact that most of these models have
been constructed to analyse trade and/or trade related issues. In
recent years these issues have centred on the structural adjustment
process; and especially the use of stabilisation and trade
liberalisation policies to deal with economic disequilirium in LDCs.
The origins and consequences of economic difficulties which
have afflicted LDCs in the past two decades are now well documented.
The oil crises of the 1970s and the persistent debt crisis of the
1980s together with inappropriate domestic policies and the weak
underlying economic structures in these countries have been the major
contributors to the economic disequilibrium. The disequilibrium has
mainly been in the form of serious balance of payments deficits, low
and in many cases declining economic growth. As stated above
stabilisation and liberalisation policies have been used to deal with
these problems. Although these two types of policies are often
simultaneously implemented, their targets, instruments and time
horizons may differ.
Stabilisation policies are aimed at moving the economy back
to equilibrium. This normally involves efforts to maintain a given
desired level of employment, capacity utilisation and balance of
payments equilibrium. The main instruments in such cases would be
monetary and fiscal aggregates and exchange rates. On the other hand,
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liberalisation polices involve shifts in policy regimes. While such
changes may have stabilising effects in the short-run, their effect is
to shift the equilibrium in the medium to long-term. The main
instruments used for liberalisation include tariffs, subsidies,
exchange rates and changes in import controls. It should also be
noted that policy effects can be negated by the existence of
structural rigidities. This point underlies the elasticity
pessimists' arguments about the ineffectiveness of trade policy
changes in LDCs. The structural adjustment policies, by changing the
institutional structures, are therefore aimed at breaking these
rigidities.
The purpose of the implementation and the expected gains
from trade policies highlight the usefulness of CGE models as tools
for policy evaluation. This Chapter examines the specification of
trade policy models for LDCs. An attempt is made to explain how the
traditional trade models are modified to reflect realistic behaviour
of LDC economies. It will also be shown that the modifications often
generate their own biases. A small sample of the expanding literature
on modeling trade policies in LDCs will also be reviewed, with
emphasis placed on the few CGE models of the Kenyan economy. These
reviews serve as a contrasting background to the model used in this
study.
3.1	 Models of Trade Policy in LDCs 
The conventional pure trade theory models are firmly based
on the theory of comparative advantage; with trade determined by
relative factor intensity and endowments among nations. These models
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are mostly qualitative and have almost exclusively been confined to
the two-factor two-commodity cases. It is now well understood that to
move from these types of models to the multisectoral CGE type models
poses some problems. Samuelson (1953) has shown that free trade
implies specialisation so that where there are more goods than factors
a trade policy change will cause some industries to shut down until
the number of goods produced equal the number of factors.
Furthermore, under the small country assumption foreign prices and
hence external terms of trade are given. This implies perfect
substitutability between domestic and imported goods. In this case,
foreign prices determine the domestic price of tradables; the so
called "law of one price". However, the assumption underlying the
traditional model are often contradicted by real world observations
and/or make empirical application of the model impractical. For
example, although "the law of one price" implies absence of cross-
hauling this phenomenon has been observed as a feature of trade
between countries. Grubel and Lloyd (1975) found two-way trade, even
for commodities with high SITC level, to be high. Moreover Isard
(1978) and Dornbusch (1987) have shown that the "law of one price"
does not always apply even for highly homogenous commodities.
At the empirical level, working with multisectoral models
means that there are always going to be more products than factors. A
change in trade policy would therefore lead to complete
specialisation. Some studies have tried to avoid this problem by
specifying highly aggregated sectors in order to match the number of
primary factors with the sectors in the economy. This is especially
true of the dependent economy models with two or three sectors
classified as traded and non-traded. The problem with such models is
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that they fail to capture the true dynamics of sectorial resource
allocation in the economy. Another alternative method is to assume
decreasing returns to scale by introducing sector-specific factors
such as capital and land. This introduces an upward sloping supply
curve. The most commonly used alternative in recent years, following
Armington (1969), has been to assume that domestic and foreign goods
are imperfect substitutes. This assumption also accommodates the
existence of cross-hauling. Its major advantage however is that
import and domestic prices need not be equal and therefore the problem
of specialisation as a result of trade policy change will not arise.
Furthermore, this assumption allows for higher disaggregation of
sectors; a common feature in multisectoral modelling.
The Armington assumption defines total domestic supply of each
good as a composite commodity (X.) which is a CES function of domestic
(D1 ) and imported (M.) commodities. This aggregation is given by:
—Pi	 -pi -1/p1
X. = B.[Y.M.	 + (1 - y.) D.	 I (3. 1)
whereB.,y.areconstartsand.is
 a parameter that defines thePi
1 elasticity of substitution of domestic and imported goods as a. = 1 + .pi
The demand for domestic and imported goods are obtained as derived
demands by minimising the cost of obtaining the composite commodity
(Xi)
P.X. = PD.D. + PM.M.
11	 ii	 ii (3.2)
D.	 O. P.	 0.1
X. = (1 - Yi )	 (113.) -
1	 1
(3.4)
and
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subject to (3.1) to get (assuming no technical change) the shares of
each commodity in total supply as
	
M.	 0.	 P.	 0.171 = 1
Ti 
(wc)
	
1	 1
(3.3)
From (3.3) and (3.4) import shares are obtained as:
	
N.	 y.	 0.	 PD. 0.
	
1 	 1 	 1 I 1 1
-PM•
Y.1
(3.5)
wherePD.and PM. are the prices of domestic and imported goods,
respectively; and the composite price, Pi , is a CES aggregation of
FEL and PM. ; that is1	 1
1 )
	
0.	 1-0.1	 1	 1	 1P. = -- [ y.	 PM.	 + (1 - Yi ) IPD. 1]1	 Bi 1	 1	 1 (3.6)
It is clear from (3.5) that import shares depend only on relative
pricesand0..In the classical trade theory models, oi is
assumed to be infinite, so that PDi = PMi , and the two goods are
perfect substitutes. To the contrary, by allowing a wider range of 0 i ,
PM. := 413 .(1 + T. } ER1	 1	 um (3.7)
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the Armington assumption implies that PDi
 and PMi need not be equal.
For example, a high ai implies a high similarity between domestic and
imported goods. The share of each commodity in total use will
therefore be very price responsive. On the other hand, low
0. indicates lower substitutability between the two goods.
Where the share of the two goods are relatively stable because of low
0. the two goods become complements. Notice that the
behaviourofP.as represented by (3.6) ultimately depends
on how its components are determined. The domestic prices
PD1 are endogenously determined; while PM. are
exogenously given as:
where V.A/P. is a fixed world price, T.1M is the tariff rate in sector
, and ER is the exchange rate. The assumption behind this
specification is that import supply is perfectly elastic at given
prices. It is clear from (3.7) that trade policy changes affect
composite prices and hence the structure of production. With fixed
world prices, changes in the exchange rate (in a fixed exchange rate
regine ) andtar iffsand hencsal.will lead to changes in
pi.
ToshowhowPD.are formed, we first note that gross output
PD. = PX.(1 +)1	 1	 Tld (3.9)
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prices, denoted by PX i , are given by
PX. = PN. + 7 a. .P.	 (3.8)1	 1	 31
wherePN.are value added or net prices and a.3 . are input-output1	 1
coefficients. Defining commodity tax rates on domestic goods as Tid,
the prices of domestic goods will be given by
From (3.8) the endogenous changes in PDi
 can be traced to the changes
in prices of primary factors (PN i ) and intermediate inputs
Note that with the payment of taxes in (3.7) and (3.9) PMi
andPD.andhenceP.are valued at market prices. It is through1	 1
the agents response to P i
 that trade policy affects the economy. In
particular, it not only affects the structure of production and hence
resource allocation, but also the level of consumption.
Exports can be modelled in a symmetrical way as imports. In
traditional models export supply is treated as a residual after the
domestic market has been satisfied. This assumes that supplies to
both markets are perfect substitutes and that relative prices
determine supply to each market. For example, an increase in the
domestic price of a commodity will reduce domestic demand and
therefore increase export supply. The problem with this approach, as
pointed out by Dervis et al (1982), is that if in fact gross outputs
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supplied to the domestic market are different from those exported
then the responsiveness of export supply to price changes may be
overestimated. This problem is dealt with by assuming *perfect
substitutability between gross outputs sold in the domestic market and
those exported.
Differentiation between exports and domestically consumed
goods can arise from aggregation problems or because of differences in
quality. In our data, for example, agricultural goods are made up of
food crops and cash crops, mainly tea and coffee. Cash crops are
mostly exported while food crops are consumed in the domestic market.
Since cash crops form a small portion of agricultural output, the
price responsiveness of exports will be overestimated under the
assumption of perfect substitutability. Morever, even for homogenous
goods like coffee and tea what is exported and consumed domestically
may differ in quality.
To model exports in a symmetrical way with imports it is
assumed that producers transform gross output into goods to be
supplied to domestic and export markets. This is done using a
constant elasticity of transformation (Cif) function introduced by
Powell and Gruen (1968). The aggregation of the two types of goods
can be specified as
1
8;	 8;	 8;
X. = B.[a.XE. - + (1 - a.) XD] -L (3.10)
where X. is the gross output, XE. and XD 1 are output for export
P.X. = PE.XE. + PD.XD.11	 1 1	 1 1 (3.11)
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and domestic market respectively; B i and ai
 are constants, and ei
isaparameterthatdetern 	 (3	 ). Producers1	 1
maximise revenue,
subjectto(3.11));whereP i ,PE.and PD. are average sales prices,1	 1
domestic currency price of exports, and domestic prices, respectively.
Notice that the average sales price, P i
 , is a CES aggregation of
PE. and PD. in the form similar to the specification of (3.6).1
From the first order optimality conditions of the producer's
optimization problem, the allocation of gross output between domestic
sales and exports is specified as:
	
XE.	 ai	 Vi PE.
1=	XD.	 (1 - a. )	 (P57)
	
1	 1	 1 (3.12)
measures the degree of$1
homogeneity between exports and domestic products and hence relative
priceresponse.Forexample,higher 11.)1 implies higher honogeneity
of the two products and therefore greater price response. With
infinite	 the two types of goods become perfect substitutes and$1
wearebacktotheclassicalcasewherePE.=PD. . On the other1	 1
hand, iji. = 0 implies that the two goods will be allocated to the two
markets in fixed proportions. It is clear however that the use of CET
drives a wedge between domestic and export prices. In particular,
PWE.*ER
PE. =1	 1 + T.ie
(3.13)
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PE:. is defined as:
wherePWE	 ieis 	 the
exporttaxorsubsidy.whenM
	
edand 	 treat as policy
parameters, it is easy to see how changes in PE„ affects export shares
in (3.12). For example, devaluation or export subsidy increases PE,
and therefore the share of exports in gross outputs.
The use of Armington and Lha functions in the modelling of
trade policies in LDCs has been motivated by the unrealistic high .
price responsiveness underlying the classical trade models. Although
these functions introduce some realism, Grais et al (1984), Winters
(1984) and de Melo and Robinson (1985) argue that they also introduce
biases against price responsiveness. By driving a wedge between
domestic and world prices these assumptions imply lower price response
to policy change and therefore underestimate the cost of protection.
This point should therefore be taken into account when analysing the
welfare gains from trade liberalisation.
To examine the effect of trade policy changes on domestic
prices we use a model by de Melo and Robinson (1985). This analysis
will be limited to the effects of tariffs and export subsidies. Our
major concern is to determine how and under what conditions domestic
PD
e
 - 	
e s	 e(1 - 0 ) E	 8 + E + ( a _ Eq)
(iii
	 ES) ee
(3.15)
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prices respond to these two policy instruments.
The change in domestic price due to change in domestic
currency price of imports and exports are, respectively, derived (de
Melo and Robinson, p.104) as:
and
(a Eq) e PD =
m (1 - Be )	 + ee lP + Eq + ( a — Eq ) e
(3.14)
where el and Be
 are import shares in total consumption and export
shares in domestic production, respectively; Es is output supply
elasticity and cq
 is the price elasticity of demand for composite
goods.
From (3.14) and (3.15), it is clear that the effect of trade
policy changes on domestic prices depend, other things being equal, on
0 and V • Increase in tariffs will in general lead to increased
demand for domestic goods; therefore the easier it is to substitute
domestic goods for imports the higher will be the domestic price.
Similarly, higher export subsidies will increase demand for exports
and hence the easier it is to transform domestic goods into exports
the larger will be the domestic price change. Higher trade shares,
el and ee , also imply higher domestic price response to policy
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Eschange. On the other hand, high 	 and 4 reduces the price
response. In particular, a high s
 means that a policy which shifts
resources in favour of domestic production will lower the domestic
price response; while higher Eq (given that 0 is always greater than
E ) reduces the demand for composite goods and hence lowers the
price response.
The devaluation of domestic currency is a widely used and
controversial policy instrument in LDCs. Traditionally, devaluation
has been prescribed as a means of correcting short-term external and
internal imbalances. However, there has been an extensive debate
about the effectiveness of this policy in LDCs. This debate has
become intensive in recent years as devaluation has become a major
policy recommendation in the World Bank-IMF type economic
liberalisation programmes.
In the traditional dependent economy models the
effectiveness of nominal devaluation rests on its expenditure
switching effects. According to these models devaluation increases
the price of tradables relative to non-tradables. By increasing the
price of tradables, devaluation reduces the domestic demand; it also
increases (reduces) the domestic (foreign) currency price of exports
and hence supply (demand) of exports. In other words, higher domestic
prices, by reducing domestic consumption increase goods available for
exports (where exports are treated as residuals after domestic
consumption) not only at lower prices to the foreign consumers but
also at higher prices for the domestic producers in appropriately
51
denominated currencies. Even where increased export supply is not
forthcoming and as long as the usual Marshall-Lerner conditions are
met, devaluation would still lead to higher export earnings. On the
other hand, devaluation increases the demand for non-tradables and
import substitutes. This increases the prices of these goods and
therefore leads to a decline in their production. This results in
resources being released for use in the production of export.
Devaluation also by increasing import prices in domestic currency
reduces import demand which together with higher export earnings,
improves the balance of payments.
The apparent effectiveness of devaluation underlines its
importance as a favourite policy recommendation by the IMF. However,
while the effectiveness of devaluation in improving the balance of
trade is widely agreed on, studies as far back as Hirschman (1949),
Diaz Alejandro (1965) and Cooper (1971) have discussed the possibility
of contractionary and adverse income redistributive effects of
devaluation. The most recent studies to expound these issues are
Krugman and Taylor (1978) and Taylor (1979 and 1983). The conclusions
of these models depend on the possibility that the income effects, due
to devaluation, may be strong enough to offset the expenditure-
switching effect. For example, devaluation which leads to a high
price level might reduce real incomes. This would result in a lower
aggregate demand and hence a lower output. This result could be
reinforced if devaluation redistributes income away from groups in the
society with lower propensity to save to those with higher marginal
propensity to save.
The stagflationary effect of devaluation comes out clearly
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in the Taylor model. This model assumes different savings rates
between wage earners and capitalists and fixed nominal wages. It also
assumes non-competitive imports of intermediate inputs, hence
devaluation will tend to have low impact in the reduction of imports;
but generates a greater inflationary effect. With fixed nominal
wages, a rise in the price level implies lower real wages and hence
income redistribution in favour of the capitalists who are assumed to
be the higher savers. The other redistributive effect of devaluation
is what Krugman and Taylor (1979)• call the fiscal effects. Assuming
that the government is a high saver, the existence of ad valorem trade
taxes, means that a devaluation which redistributes income in favour
of the government reduces aggregate demand. This assumes that
government consumption or income transfers to lower savers does not
increase with the tax receipts. This assumption is in line with the
Taylorian model which fixes government consumption in real terms.
Devaluation may also lead to higher fiscal deficits. Taylor (1979
57) argues that if an attempt is made to reduce the deficits either by
tax increases or expenditure reductions, as is often recommended under
structural adjustment programmes, it will exacerbate economic decline
by further reduction in aggregate demand.
Apart from Krugman and Taylor (1978) and Taylor (1979, 1983)
several other empirical studies have arrived at results supporting the
contractionary .
 effect of devaluation. Using small simulation models,
Cylfason and Risager (1984) and Gylfason and Radetzki (1985) arrived
at such results. Using an econometric model, Edwards (1986) concludes
that devaluation leads to a small contractionary effect in the first
year. The decline in output is, however, reversed in the second year,
while devaluation is found to be neutral in the long-run. Branson
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(1986) using a small simulation model for Kenya obtained results
supporting the contractionary nature of devaluation.
3.2	 Simple Model of Trade Liberalisation
In large multisectoral CGE models it is normally difficult
to keep track of the exact channels through which key parameters
respond to policy changes. It is therefore sometimes necessary to set
up tractable prototype models for elucidatory purposes. Below we set
up such a model using diagrammatic techniques now common in trade
models. This simple two-commodity two-factor model will only be used
to examine the policy effects on factor prices, factor allocation, and
the implied changes in sectoral output. It should be added however
that for empirical purposes the tractability of this type of model
cannot substitute for the realism of multisectoral models.
The sector-specific model, popularly known as the Ricardo-
Viner model, can be represented using a diagram introduced by Jones
(1971) and Massa (1974). This diagrammatic technique is often used in
conjunction with the Edgeworth-Bowley (E-B) diagram introduced into
international trade by Stopler and Samuelson (1941). A combination of
these diagrams has been used by Neary (1978, 1981) and Edwards (1986)
to analyse trade policy issues.
Figure 3.1 represents a two-sector, three-factor model. The
two sectors, manufacturing and agriculture, employ mobile labour and
sector-specific capital. We assume that manufacturing is capital-
intensive while agriculture is labour-intensive. We also assume, for
expositional purposes, that the prices of the two goods are
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exogenously determined in world markets. This rules out the terms of
trade effects.
The top panel of the figure is a sector-specific diagram
proper. On the horizontal axis, QmpA , is the total
labour employed by the two sectors. The use of labour by the
manufacturing sector is measured to the right from Q
M '
while employment in agriculture is measured to the left of
QA
. The panel also encompasses the value of marginal products
of labour employed in the two sectors VMLm and VMLA
and hence their wage rates WM and WA on the
vertical axes. The marginal product curves are downward sloping
reflecting diminishing returns to labour due to the existence of
sector specific capital. In the absence of factor market distortions
the intersection of VMLm and VMLA at A determine
the wage rate in the two sectors as W 0
 . This implies full
employment with QmE and QAE quantities of labour
employed by the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, respectively.
The lower panel of the figure is a traditional E-B diagram
showing the combinations of capital and labour employed by each sector.
Notice that as usual, the origin of the manufacturing sector is
Om
 and that of the agricultural sector is OA . With the fixity of
capital indicated by KmI. RA ; OmRim and CARA represent the fixed
amounts of capital used in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors,
respectively. The fact that all the equilibrium positions mapped onto
the E-B diagram from the top panel lie above the diagonal (not drawn) of
the diagram confirms that the agricultural sector is labour-intensive,
while the manufacturing sector is capital-intensive. In general, factor
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intensities of course depend on the initial commodity prices and capital
allocation.
To derive comparative static results the price of
agriculture goods is firstly set as the numeraire. This means that
the vertical position of VML is dependent on commodity
prices while that of VML
A
 is not. Suppose domestic
production of manufactures are import substitutes and that imports of
this commodity are final consumer goods. Then a tariff-reduction will
reduce the domestic price of the commodity. This will shift the
marginal-productivity curve by the same proportion as the price
reduction to vML	 um*M	quwhere B is the new equilibri . At
B the labour market clears at the lower wage (W*). Note that since
the decline in the price of manufactures is higher than that of the
wage, the real wage in the sector rises. However, the real wage in
the agriculture sector declines. 1/ These two results account for the
decline in employment from QmE to QmF and the increase from QAE
to QAF in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, respectively.
The labour released by the manufacturing sector is fully absorbed by
the agricultural sector.
The changes in employment levels also lead to changes in
capital-labour ratios and therefore returns to capital. For instance,
the increase in employment in the agricultural sector increases the
sector's capital-labour ratio and hence returns to capital. On the
other hand, returns to capital in the manufacturing sector will fall
with lower employment. The increase in employment in the agricultural
sector will also lead to higher output, while manufacturing output
will decline for the opposite reason. It should be emphasised that
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FIGURE 3.1 
Short-Run Effects of Tariff Reductions on Imorts cf Final Goods 
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all these results are peculiar to sector-specific models.
The assumption of flexible wages is unrealistic in LDCs
where wages are institutionally fixed through minimum wage laws or
wage indexation. To analyse the effect of wage rigidities in our two
sector model we assume that the wage in the manufacturing sector is
fixed in terms of agricultural goods.
With a fixed 17/ the intersection of the marginal product
curves does not determine the equilibrium wage anymore. This is evident
from Figure 3.2. The agricultural wage (WA) is now determined by
the intersection of VP/LA and the rectangular hyperbola qq known as
the Harris-Todaro (H-T) curve introduced by Corden and Findley (1975).
The set of wages (17,7M , WA) determine the employment levels clip and
QAF in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, respectively.
Notice that because the nominal wage in the agricultural sector is
flexible, labour is fully employed; whereas wage rigidity leaves DF
as unemployed labour in the manufacturing sector.
The effect of tariff reduction on imports as before, is to
reduce the price of manufactures. This shifts the marginal product
curve to VML* and the H-T locus shifts to q*q*; implying a
reduction in demand for labour in the manufacturing sector to
Qmd and an increase in agricultural employment from
QpiF to Qp,f. With the employment levels of the two
sectors determined, unemployment in the manufacturing sector is shown
as df. However, the change in total unemployment cannot be
nAiA
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FIGJRE 3.2
Short-Run Effects of Tariff Reductions on Im ports on Final Goods with
Nominal Wace Rigidity in the Manufacturing Sector
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determined from this diagram; for example, by comparing the relative
sizes of DF and df .
As before, the pattern of resource (labour) allocation can
be used to determine changes in output and returns to capital in each
sector. For instance, increase in agricultural employment increases
agricultural output while lower employment in the manufacturing sector
will lead to lower output. The increase in labour employment in the
agricultural sector will increase returns to capital in this sector
and profits of the manufacturing capital will decline because of
increased capital-labour ratio due to lower employment. Since the
nominal wage is fixed in the manufacturing sector, a lower output
price implies an increase in real wage. But the real wage in the
agricultural sector (with constant output price) declines.
The clarity of the above results explains the attractiveness
of the Ricardo-Viner model. The problem with the above analysis,
which is typical of the use of the model in the literature, is that it
assumes that the imports are only in the form of final goods. This
assumption also explains why a tariff reduction will lead to a decline
in output in the sector. If imports include intermediate inputs then
the model results will be ambiguous. Under such circumstances the
most natural way of looking at the sectoral effects of trade policy is
through the theory of effective protection.
In a nutshell, effective protection is about the protection
of an activity's value added. To see this clearly we define net price
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by rearranging (3.8) as:
PNi = px. - 7 a.
3.P.	 (3.16)1	 31 
1ncreaseinPN.in (3.16), by raising profitability, implies1
increased protection. This will stimulate increased activity levels
in the sector. It is also clear from (3.16) that a sector can be
protected by imposing tariffs on the goods it produces thereby
increasePX.and/or by providing subsidies for the1
intermediate inputs it uses, that is, lower P.
The effects of tariff reductions, assuming imports are only
intermediate inputs, are shown in Figure 3.3. The policy change
lowers the price of intermediate inputs in the manufacturing sector.
This shifts the marginal product curve to VNL* NV and hence
the H-T curve to q*q* resulting in the new equilibrium points c
and b . At these points, a lower real wage increases employment in
the manufacturing sector from Q IIID to Slid ; while a higher real
agricultural wage (WA) reduces employment in the sector from QAF
to QAf . These shifts in labour allocation affect the sectoral
capital-labour ratios and hence returns to capital. Returns to
capital in the manufacturing sector will go up while returns to
agricultural capital will decline. The increases in manufacturing
employment will also lead to increased output in this sector while the
opposite will happen in the agricultural sector. As before, the level
of unemployment in the manufacturing sector cannot be determined from
the diagram.
A•
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FIGURE 3.3 
Short-Run Effects of Tariff Reductions on Imports of Intermediate
Inputs with Nominal Wage Rigidity in the Manufacturing Sector 
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The two policy changes examined above are extremes in that
they assume that imports are either for final consumption or
intermediate use. In practice, imports are not only used for final
and intermediate consumption, but also for capital formation. Tariff
changeswillthereforeaffectbothPX.and P. in1
(3.16). The effect of policy change will in such event depend on the
elasticities of substitution and the share of imports in each end use.
The result is that the qualitative analysis of the policy effects on
factor incomes, factor allocation and output will be ambiguous.
Another point to be made about the above results is that so
far the model only explains the direction, but not the magnitude of
the changes in factor incomes. The policy effects on the actual
amount of factor incomes depend on factor substitutability and
intensities in each sector. Jones (1971) and Mussa (1974) discuss
these relationships. In particular, Mussa shows that the higher the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour the higher the
wage response to changes in the output price of the sector in which
the factor is intensively employed. A similar result obtains the
lower the share of labour in the value of the sector's output. On the
other hand, capital incomes are determined in each sector as a
residual after payments to labour.
The predictions of the three-factor, two-sector model can be
extended to include many sectors each using a sector specific factor
and one mobile factor. However, once more than one mobile factor is
introduced, the model's results become less clear-cut. In such
circumstances empirical results have to be relied upon to ascertain
the effects of trade policy change.
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3.3	 Literature Review
In this Section we provide a brief review of the literature
on LDC CGE models. Table 3.1 provides a list and summary of the
features of the models reviewed. What is surprising is that although
there is now a sizeable number of LDC CGE models, many of which
incorporate a foreign trade sector as an important component, very few
are on sub-Saharan Africa economies. One would expect that since
these economies have suffered the most from external shocks more
effort would have gone into modeling them. Furthermore, most of these
countries have undertaken or are implementing structural programs.
The use of CGE models would provide realistic assessment about the
impact of such programs.
The selection of the literature reviewed concentrates only
on modelling trade policy issues. This small sample has been chosen
just to highlight the features and implication of models of trade
liberalisation. Of the models reviewed five relate to the Kenyan
economy. The differences in purpose and dimensionality among these
models preclude detailed comparison.
Clarete and Roumasett (1987) simulates the effects of 100
percent tariff and export subsidy reductions on the Philippine economy.
The model is highly neoclassical with production and consumption
functions specified as Cobb-Douglas and prices are assumed to clear
all factor and product markets. The specified seven sectors are
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TABLE 3.1 
Summary of the Characteristics of LDC Trade Models 
Model	 Country	 Base Year Dimension
1. Clarete and
	 Philippines	 1975	 7 sectors, mobile labour and
Roumasset (1984)
	
sector-specific capital
one representative consumer
2. de Mlo and
	 . Columbia
Robinson (1982)
1970	 8 sectors; 3 types of
labour: agricultural labour
and mobile skilled and un-
skilled labour; 3 types of
capital; six consumer groups
3. Devarajan and
	 Cameroon	 1979/	 11 sectors; 3 types of
Offerdal (1989)
	
1980	 labour: rural labour, urban
skilled and unskilled
labour; mobile or sector-
specific capital;
representative consumer
4. Grais, de Melo	 Turkey
and Urata (1986)
1978	 8 sectors; one mobile labour
category; mobile or sector-
specific capital;
representative consumer
5. Levy (1987)	 Mexico	 1975	 10 sectors; sector-
specific capital and
labour; 2 consumers
	
6. Blomqvist and	 Kenya	 1978	 2 sectors; one mobile
	
McMahon (1984) 	 labour category; mobile
or sector-specific capital;
2 consumers
7. Gupta and	 Kenya	 Not	 4 sectors; 3 factors: land,
Togan (1984)	 Specified mobile labour and capital;
3 consumer groups
8.	 Bevan, Collier	 Kenya	 1975	 36 commodities; 46 rural
and Gunning	 and 8 urban households;
(1987)	 mobile labour and sector-
specific capital
9. McMahon	 Kenya	 1964	 4 sectors; 3 factors:
(1986,1987)	 mobile labour, sector-
specific land and sector
capital; 4 consumers
10. Roe and Pal	 Kenya	 1976	 6 sectors; 4 factors:
(1986)	 skilled and unskilled
labour, land specific to
agriculture, sector-
specific capital; 4
households
Final Demand
Cobb-Douglas
(CD)
consumption
functions
LES
consumption
functions
Cobb-Douglas
consumption
functions
LES
functions
for
households;
fixed real
government
consumption;
fixed real
investment
by sector
of origin
LES
functions
for
households;
fixed real
government
consumption
LES
functions
LES
functions
Fixed
nominal
exchange
rate
Savings
driven
Savings
driven
SCA for
imports;
export demand
function
specified
SA
Armington
assumption;
export demand
function
specified
Foreign Trade	 Closure
Classical small Savings
country
	 driven
assumption
(SCA)
Product	 Investment
differentiation driven
for both exports
and imports
Product	 Fixed
differentiation nominal
for both	 exchange
exports and	 rate
imports
Product	 Savings
differentiation driven
for both
exports and
imports
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Model Production
1.	 CD aggregation of labour
and capital; TO
aggregation of
intermediates
2.	 CD aggregation of labour
and capital; 10
aggregation of
intermediates
3.	 CD aggregation of labour
and capital; 10
aggregation of
intermediates
4.	 CES aggregation of value
added; 10 aggregation of
intermediates, but CES
aggregation of domestic
and imported
intermediates
5.	 Mark-up pricing
intermediates
6.	 CES aggregation of
capital and labour
7.	 Nested CRESH for primary
factors; 10 aggregation
of intermediates, but
CES aggregation of
domestic and imported
intermediates
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Final Demand Foreign Trade	 Closure
Savings
driven
Model Production
8.	 CES aggregation of
primary factors
Household	 SCA
consumption
not given;
fixed
government
consumption
and
investment
demand
9.	 CES aggregation of primary LES
factors	 functions;
investment
is a
composite of
domestic and
imported
goods
Armington	 Investments
assumption for driven
secondary and
tertiary goods;
export demand
functions
specified for
secondary and
tertiary goods,
all coffee is
exported, and
exports of
agricultural
goods are
residual
Savings
driven
10.	 CES aggregation for
primary factors; JO
aggregation for
intermediates, but
CES aggregation for
domestic and imported
intermediates
LES
functions;
fixed
investment
and
government
demand
Armington
assumption;
export
demand
functions
specified for
all sectors
except
services and
infrastructure
which are
treated as
residual
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further classified as: exportables (commercial crops, agricultural
foods, and industrial goods); *portables (industrial importables and
import substitutes); and home goods (other agriculture, and services).
The small country assumption prevails, that is, foreign and domestic
goods are assumed to be perfect substitutes, so that domestic and
foreign prices are directly linked. To avoid complete specialisation
that would arise from such a specification the assumption of sector
specificity of capital is used.
The single household earn wage income and profits and
receives lump-sum transfer incomes from the government. The
government does not consume, while the household consumes all its
income. Savings and investments are not explicitly specified. Given
the importance of savings and investments in economic growth process
and ultimately in resource allocation this omission is highly
unwarranted.
The model specifies the real exchange rate as the relative
price of traded and non-traded goods. The adjustment of this relative
price clears the trade balance. Because of the classical nature of
the model the trade balance is obtained as the excess demand of the
composite traded good.
The simulation of the model involves total tariff reductions
from the base values of 23% and 62% on industrial *portables and
import substitutes, respectively; and 5% subsidy rate on commercial
crops and 3% subsidy on both agricultural foods and industrial
exportables. The conventional nature of the model allows for easy
interpretation of its results. It is estimated that the welfare loss
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associated with tariffs and export taxes is equivalent to 3.4% of free
trade income. Trade liberalisation would therefore be welfare
improving. The model also establishes that resource allocation
effects of the policy change would be in favour of importables and
home goods at the expense of exportables.
Clarete and Roumasset argue that their model is a static
Shoven-Whalley type model that can "be used for analysing tariff
policies in small developing countries" (p.258). However, their
estimated welfare gain from trade liberalisation of 3.4% is much
higher than that normally associated with Shoven-Whalley models; which
is usually around 1%. This overestimated result arises from the
assumption of perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign
goods, and also the sector-specificity of capital. Beside the
unrealistic assumption of product homogeneity, the specification of
Cobb-Douglas production functions implies high labour-capital
substitution which is difficult to justify for LDCs. The
specification of CD utility functions also implies the usual
unrealistic unitary income elasticity. We therefore conclude that far
from being useful for modelling LDC trade policy reform, the Clarete
Roumasset model is more suited for illustrative purposes.
The de Melo and Robinson (1982) model analyses the effects
of trade policy on income distribution. This is reflected in the
high disaggregation of consumers and factors. The model has three
types of labour; an aggregate landless labour specific to the
agricultural sector, and mobile skilled and unskilled labour. Capital
is aggregated into three types: agricultural, manufacturing and
services. The six consumer groups correspond to the six factors so
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that the role of the policy change on functional distribution of
income becomes crucial.
Like the previous model, primary factors combine in Cobb-
Douglas form and intermediate inputs combine in Leontieff coefficients
in this model. Consumer demands are however specified as LES
functions. This avoids the restrictive unitary income elasticity
associated with CD functions.
To concentrate on the effects of trade policy de Melo and
Robinson impose several restrictions on the model. Firstly,
government consumption is fixed in real terms. This "neutralises" the
impact of the government on the economy. This is achieved through
proportional income transfers between the government and the
households. For example, when government budget is in surplus, income
transfers to households must be positive. Secondly, private
investment are also fixed in real terms. This reduces the role of
investments in economic growth, leaving trade policy effects as the
major explanatory factor. Lastly, the income effects of changes in
terms of trade is "neutralised" by making the coffee sector
(Colombia's major export earner) exogenous. This is done by setting
coffee tax constant and by setting coffee prices equal to world
prices.
One important feature of this model is that it is one of the
first to use the Armington assumption and to assume product
differentiation between domestic and exported goods. The model sets
composite price index as a numeraire. Therefore, the real exchange
rate, defined as a relative price of imports and domestic goods,
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clears the balance of trade.
Simulations are carried out for three trade regimes assuming
two types of wage formation: (1) flexible wages for all labour groups
and (2) fixed real wages of agricultural labour and unskilled labour.
The trade regimes can be summarised as (1) inward-looking, involving a
50% tariff increase in manufacturing sectors; (2) outward-looking,
with a 50% subsidy to agricultural and manufacturing exports; (3)
direct protection with a 50% subsidy on the value added in the
manufacturing sectors.
The results of the model can be summarised as follows.
Firstly, outward looking strategies by causing net prices to rise
generate higher employment effects and factor incomes than inward
looking strategies. This result is magnified where the real wage is
fixed. Secondly, the relative gains or losses from a policy change
depend on factor mobility. For example, sector-specific factors gain
more in expanding sectors and lose in the contracting sectors relative
to mobile factors. This result is in line with trade theoretic
models, for example, Jones (1971) and Mfussa (1974) which show that
immobile factors gain (lose) relatively more than mobile factors as a
result of expansion (contraction) of the economy. Lastly, the policy
effect of income distribution measured by the Gini coefficient is
found to be stable. This last result confirmed earlier results,
especially Adelman and Robinson (1978) and Taylor et al. (1980) which
showed that the policy changes affect the functional income
distribution but leave size distribution largely unaffected.
The Cameroon model of Devarajan and Offerdal (1989) examines
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the implication of the assumptions about capital mobility; especially
the assumptions of short-run sector-specificity of capital and long-
run capital mobility. This is important because of the implications
for the returns to capital. In the former case capital earns rents
and in the latter case the mobility across sectors equalises returns
to capital. These differences are conjectured to lead to sectoral
differences in output levels, prices, exports and imports.
This model is typical of models now considered more
realistic for modelling LDC trade policy issues. In particular, it
assumes product differentiation between domestic goods and imported
and exported goods; it also specifies an export demand function with
less than infinite price elasticities. However, it maintains
conventional Cobb-Douglas production and demand functions. Like de
Ikl .&_o and Robinson (1982) an attempt is made to concentrate only on the
trade policy effects by fixing government consumption in real terms by
lump-sum taxes or transfer to the consumers. Savings determine
investments; and with foreign savings exogenously fixed, domestic
savings are important.
In keeping with Cameroon's membership to the CFA Franc zone,
the nominal exchange rate is fixed and used as a numeraire. This
means that the real exchange rate is endogenously determined.
Two sets of experiments (involving increase in foreign
savings and tariff reductions) are run under three assumptions
of capital mobility. In assumption (1) capital is sector specific; in
(2) it moves costlessly between sectors; and in (3) capital stock is
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determined by investments undertaken in the previous period.
This model shows that the different specifications of
capital mobility do not have significant qualitative effect on the
results. Tariff reductions lead to higher sectoral output and lower
prices. Where capital is mobile these changes are only magnified.
This is purely because with mobile capital, the expanding sectors will
attract more factors; which lead to higher output and hence lower
prices.
Grais, de Melo and Urata (1986) is unique in that it is one
of very few studies which have attempted to estimate the costs of
rationing and rent-seeking activities. This is done using "virtual"
prices; defined as prices which induce unrationed households or firms
to act as if faced with rationing constraints (Grais et al., p.67).
The model divides imports into three types: those subject to
tariffs only, such as investment goods and government imports; those
subject to tariffs and rationing but do not give rise to rent-seeking
such as consumer goods; and those subject to tariffs and rationing and
give rise to rent-seeking, mainly in intermediate inputs. Households
are assumed to be rationed in their purchases of imports of consumer
goods, while producers are rationed in their purchases of imports of
intermediates. Guestimates of premium rates, assumed to be between 14
and 32% for consumer goods and 25 and 101% for intermediate inputs are
used to determine the premiums arising from the import rationing of
these two goods. Import premiums equivalent to 7 and 60 million
Turkish liras are estimated to accrue to households and producers,
respectively. It is assumed that only producers engage in rent-
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seeking activities. The base values of rents are estimated to be 6%
of GNP.
Trade liberalisation is simulated in several stages: first,
quotas (import premiums) are removed on the imports of intermediates;
secondly, they are eliminated on consumer goods; and after all the
quotas have been removed a 50% tariff reduction is applied across the
board on imports. Each experiment is done with and without capital
mobility.
The welfare gains from trade liberalisation are found to be
about 5.0% of GDP. Most of these gains arise from quota reduction on
intermediates. Little additional gains in real GDP are achieved by
the removal of quotas on consumer goods or reduction in tariffs. This
is because consumer goods form a small proportion of total imports.
The usual result that tariff reductions generate low welfare gains is
also confirmed. The model also shows that while real GDP is higher in
the presence of mobile capital, the result is not qualitatively
different from that of sector-specific capital.
Levy's (1987) model of Mexico analyses the economic effects
of quota restrictions, especially on the balance of trade. The model
assumes fixed nominal wages, a fixed exchange rate, sector-specific
capital and excess capacity in some sectors.
The model has two consumers; workers whose income is only in
the form of wages and capitalists who derive their income from profits
(obtained as markups) and the rents arising from QRs. The two
consumer groups have similar expenditure shares in the LES function.
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Government consumption is fixed in real terms.
On the production side, with the assumption of excess
capacity, the marginal cost is constant. Changes in output will no
longer be associated with a declining marginal product of labour but
will be determined through capacity utilisation. Moreover, returns to
capital are now determined as a mark-up over wages and intermediate
costs. In Levy's model the mark-up rate is endogenously determined by
the level of imports and capacity utilisation.
In the external sector of the model, the small country
assumption is followed in the case of imports. However, since "water
in the tariff" (the possibility of domestic prices being lower than
world prices) is allowed the "law of one price" need not hold. Export
demand functions are specified as less than infinitely elastic.
The model has ten sectors which are further classified into
three groups (1) primary goods : agriculture, and mining and oil
extraction; (2) manufactures : food, textiles, chemicals and oil
refining, glass and cement, metals and manufactures, and other
manufactures; and (3) non-traded goods : electricity and transport,
and services. Non-traded goods are specified along classical lines,
that is, they are neither exported nor imported. The specification of
trade policies differ among the sectors. Export subsidies accrue only
to the manufacturing sectors, while export quotas are imposed on
mining and export prohibition are applied to food and beverages. Non-
uniform tariffs are imposed on imports and there are import bans on
textiles. In the data for the stylised model import quotas are only
applied to other manufactures. However, the simulations are done with
qM. = a.M.o1	 1 1 (3.17)
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two different assumptions about the quotas. The first assumes that
quotas apply to all the sectors while the second assume that there are
no quotas on chemicals and oils. It turns out that these
specifications are significant. The import quotas are specified as a
proportion of base imports; that is
whereM9andM?are import quotas and base imports, respectively;
and ai E[0, 1] is the proportional change of imports from base values.
Hence, for ai
 = 0 there will be no imports and for a i = 1 there
will be no quotas. The specification a i E[0, 11 therefore implies a
continuum of import restrictions where as a i
 declines the volume of
competitive imports decline from their base values.
The mechanism in which the commodity markets are cleared
depends on the tradability of the commodity and the effect of quotas.
The excess demand for non-tradables is cleared by an increase in mark-
up rates, while that of tradables with no quotas is cleared by changes
in the trade balance. On the other hand, tradables with binding
import quotas will behave as non-tradables and their excess demands
will be cleared by price increases through higher mark-ups.
The model assumes excess capacity in the manufacturing and
services sectors. Mark-up pricing technology therefore applies in
these sectors; but the specification of technologies for those sectors
operating at full capacity are not stated.
76
The results of the model are straightforward. In the case
where all the imports are under QRs, as ai moves from 1 to 0
(1) the price level rises as imports decline and this leads to lower
real wages; (2) there is an increase in employment not only because of
lower real wages but also because of increased demand for domestic
inputs as imports are reduced; (3) increase in prices imply increase
in mark-up rates and therefore higher in rents; (4) the balance of
trade initially improves but as a i approaches zero higher
prices lead to lower exports thus worsening the balance of trade; and
(5) a combination of higher cost of production and lower real income
lead to lower real GDP. These results are however mitigated when
quotas are not imposed on chemicals and oils, which are mostly
intermediate inputs.
In conclusion, the model shows that increase in QRs (import
compression) is very stagflationary. The inflation generated by lower
imports lowers real incomes and increases production costs. It is
also shown that the effect of QRs depend on the pattern of excess
capacity. For example, where excess capacity exists in sectors which
supply intermediate inputs, the effects of the quotas will be greater.
The effects of import quotas on the balance of trade will depend on
the level of the quotas. At lower levels the balance of trade will be
improved, but as quotas increase their effect on the trade balance
begins to be reversed and may lead to deficits if exports fall.
There have been few CCE models of the Kenyan economy.
Although most of the existing models in one way or another deal with
issues related to trade, only Blomgvist and McMahon (1984) model trade
policies. Gupta and Togan (1984), Roe and Pal (1986), and Bevan,
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Collier and Gunning (1987) model the consequences of external shocks;
while MoiMahon (1986, 1987) and Dick et al (1983) model commodity
stabilisation programs. Our review of these models will therefore
concentrate on their structure and less on the generated results.
Blomgvist and McMahon (1984) is more or less a textbook type
CGE model. It is a two-sector model with the world prices of the two
goods exogenously given. In the tradition of Harris-Todaro (1970)
model, the two sectors, manufacturing and agricultural, employ two
types of labour, urban and rural; with urban labour mainly employed
the manufacturing sector. There is labour market distortion in formal
sector (manufacturing), where the urban wage is fixed in terms of a
composite of the prices of the two commodities. This assumes that
urban labour unions have power to fix wages or that the government is
interested in ensuring fixed real incomes for the urban workers.
Although the model allows for unemployment in the formal sector,
Blomqyist and McMahon assume that urban labour not employed in the
formal sector would not remain unemployed but would be employed in the
informal sector which produced a commodity similar to that produced in
the agricultural sector. If one can accept the notion that
agricultural goods can be produces in the urban sector, then the
assumption serves the intended purpose of ensuring that the urban
unemployed have non-zero incomes. The allocation of labour between
rural and urban markets is determined by a Harris-Todaro migration
equation.
Production is modelled as a CES aggregation of labour and
capital. There are two classes of consumers: workers who earn wages
and capitalists who earn profits. Both consumer also receive lump-sum
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transfers from the government.
The external closure of the model follows the traditional
small country assumption, hence foreign and domestic goods are assumed
to be perfect substitutes. This assumption implies that the balance
of trade is covered by quantity adjustment. Foreign capital inflows
are therefore allowed to supplement domestic savings.
The model is used to simulate the effects of second-best
tariff policy in the presence of wage rigidity in the labour market
and domestic tax distortions; with and without capital mobility. It
is shown that policy choices depend on whether the urban wage is
fixed in terms of agricultural or manufacturing goods. For instance,
where the wage depends on the agricultural good the second best policy
is an import tariff; whereas a subsidy would be the optimal policy
where the wage is fixed in terms of the manufactured good. In the
latter case a subsidy reduces the manufacturing wage. This induces
return migration and hence increased employment and production in the
agricultural sector. In the former case the effect of a tariff
increase is to raise the price of manufactured goods relative to the
urban wage. This increases employment and output in the sector. The
implication for income distribution is that import subsidy
redistributes income in favour of the workers while a tariff favours
the capitalists. Moreover, import subsidy generates a higher GDP than
a tariff.
It is also shown that the assumptions of capital mobility
does not matter in terms of the efficiency gains of policy change.
This result is in line with those of other studies, for example, Grais
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et al. (1986) and Devarajan and Offerdal (1989). The model also shows
that removal of wage distortions lead to higher gains in real output.
This leads to the conclusion that the optimal policy would be to
remove the wage distortions.
Gupta and Togan (1984) analyse the relative response to
external shocks by economies under different trade regimes using data
for Turkey, Kenya and India. The trade regimes are classified as: (1)
a liberal regime, characterised by flexible wages and exchange rates,
together with 10% tariff reduction; (2) a semi-liberal regime where
wages and exchange rate are flexible; and (3) a semi-interventionist
regime, in which wages are flexible, but the exchange rate is fixed;
and (4) interventionist regime where both wages and the exchange rate
are fixed.
The production structure of the Gupta-Togan model is more
elaborate than that of Blomolyist and McMahon. The four specified
sectors: agriculture, consumer goods, manufacturing and services, are
characterised by nested production functions. At the lower levels
labour types are aggregated by CRESH functions and different land
types combine to form aggregate land in a similar manner. In the
middle level primary factors are combined to form value added using
CRESH functions; while domestic and imported intermediates combine in
CES to form aggregate intermediate inputs. Aggregate intermediate
inputs and value added combine in the top level in 10 functions to
form gross output. It should be noted that both capital and labour
are mobile across sectors.
On the consumption side the model specifies three consumer
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groups: farmers who earn land and labour income from the agricultural
sector, non-agricultural labour which earns wage income, and
capitalists who receive profits. Changes at the sectoral levels
therefore directly affect the households' income and consumption.
Consumption functions are specified in LES form.
The Armington assumption is used to model imports, with
import supplies assumed to be infinitely elastic at given world prices.
Export demand is however modelled as less than infinitely elastic.
The experiments are made by specifying external shocks as
a 4.8% across the board increases in import prices and a 0.39% across
the board decrease in the base values of the exogenous export demand.
The results of the model tally closely with those predicted by export
promotion type models. In particular, it is found that external
shocks lead to higher loss of GDP under inward-looking policy regimes.
Furthermore, functional income distribution favours the capitalists
under these regimes; while the farmers and labour gain more under the
outward-looking regimes. The political economy implication of these
results is that the powerful urban elite will always work against
trade liberalisation.
Bevan et al. (1987) is a dynamic model covering the period
1975-83. Using panel data, it examines the consequences of the coffee
boom on economic growth and income distribution. It is a large model,
with 36 commodities, 46 rural households and 8 urban households. This
high disaggregation of commodities and households is clearly motivated
by the desire to examine the redistributive effects of external shocks.
Although, the study does not provide equations of the model, the
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verbal description of the model is sufficient enough to explain the
results.
The thirty-six commodities are aggregated into four
categories: exportables, mainly cash crops whose prices are
exogenously ' determined in world markets; foods which are subject to
tariffs but not quantitative restrictions; non-food importables,
subject to quantitative controls and; non-tradables. The mechanism
through which the excess demands for these commodities are cleared
plays an important role in the redistribution of income between
households. The pattern of income redistribution is also largely
dependent on the sources of income and pattern of consumption of rural
households. For example, rural households' incomes are generated from
the sale of agricultural products, wage employment, and earnings from
non-farm activities such as trading. These households consume own-
produced foods, imported goods, and urban sector goods. Urban
households obtain their income from formal sector wages or informal
sector self-employment. The government revenue from direct and
indirect taxes finances government consumption and investment.
The model assumes that capital is fixed and fully employed
in the short-run. Changes in output levels therefore depend on
changes in employment levels. Since real wages in the urban sectors
are fixed (in terms of producer prices) they will decline only with
a decline in product wages. The level of investment, assumed to be
determined by savings, also affects output. Households are assumed to
save a fixed share of their incomes; with urban household savings rate
assumed to be higher than that of rural households. Household income
transfers will therefore affect the level of investment. The model
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allows foreign savings to augment domestic savings.
The effects of the commodity boom are determined by
comparing two simulations: (1) a "boom run" in which the export and
producer prices of coffee and tea are kept at their actual values and
(2) a "counterfactual run" in which the prices of the two commodities
are assumed (set) to grow at the same rate as the price of non-oil
imports over the period 1976-1980. Since the rest of the assumptions
of the model are the same for the two runs, the differences in their
results are therefore attributable to the increase in the prices of
coffee and tea.
The model results show that the effect of the commodity boom
was to increase GDP at factor cost by 4.4% in the short-run and 7% in
the long-run; GDP at market prices was 6.6% higher than the base year
values in 1983. The growth of GDP is due to increase in investments
associated with increased savings.
The model results show that the coffee boom increased rural
households' incomes by 21%. However, the relative price changes
generated by the external shock reduced the rural households' real
incomes to about 11.0%. The boom led to the excess demand for
importable and non-traded goods, and therefore increased prices of
these commodities since their markets are cleared by price changes.
Since these goods are produced by the urban sector the price increase
imply a movement of relative prices against rural households and
therefore income redistribution in favour of urban households.
Compared to rural households, the nominal incomes of urban households
rose by 36% and the real incomes rose by 15%. Furthermore, since
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urban households' savings rate is high, the increase in their real
income contributed to higher real investment growth. And with
investment effects heavily biased in favour of the urban sector this
worsens income inequality by increasing wage and profit incomes in the
urban sectors.
McMahon (1986, 1987) model the costs and benefits of Kenya's
membership of the International Coffee Agreement. Although the two
models analyse different problems, the former simulating the effect of
coffee price stabilisation on Kenya's export earnings and GNP and the
latter the path of the economy with and without the coffee agreement,
they are essentially the same. We shall henceforth concentrate on
detailing the 1986 model. The other two studies, Dick et al (1982,
1983), covering the same issues, are not reviewed.
This is a dynamic model covering the period 1964-79. The
four sectors specified by the model: coffee, non-coffee agriculture,
secondary and tertiary, are characterised by different production
functions. The last two sectors are production activities in the
urban areas. Secondary and tertiary goods are produced by a CES
aggregation of capital and labour, while labour and land combine to
produce coffee and all three primary factors are used to produce
agricultural goods. Within periods, labour is intersectorally mobile
but the total supply is fixed. However, the urban wage is fixed in
real terms and therefore unemployment is a possibility in the urban
sector. On the other hand, capital and land are sector specific.
The adjustment equations linking the 16 years allow for the
changes in these factors from year to year. For example, the labour
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force is assumed to grow by the rate of population growth (3%) and
through the migration equation move from rural to urban areas (or vice
versa) only at the end of each year. While land is fixed, the
hectarage under coffee can change from year to year. Changes in
capital stock in each sector are modeled using an investment
allocation equation. It is assumed that investment is a function of
the rate of return and the share of capital stock in each sector.
The model specifies four consumer groups: coffee labourers,
agricultural labour, urban labour and the capitalists. The labour
groups earn wage income and receive transfers from the government,
while the capitalists receive all the profits. Since investment
demand adjusts to available savings the fact that capitalists are
assumed to be the only agents who can save implies that a policy that
affects the income of this group will indirectly affect investments.
This is especially true since the current account is exogenously fixed
so that foreign savings play little role in augmenting domestic
savings. It is also assumed that domestic and *ported investment
goods are *perfect substitutes. This means that investments depend
on the degree of substitutability between domestic and imported
capital goods.
Imports of secondary and tertiary goods, like investment
goods, are assumed to be imperfect substitutes with domestic output.
On the export side, all coffee is assumed to be exported and exports
of agricultural goods are treated as a residual. On the other hand,
exports of secondary and tertiary goods are assumed to be a function
of relative prices and export demand elasticities.
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To simulate the effects of coffee price stabilisation,
coffee prices were allowed to rise by the actual average historical
trend. TWo assumptions are used to simulate the effects of
stabilising the coffee prices around the trend. Firstly, it was
assumed that the hectarage under coffee was restricted during the low
price period, 1964 to 1972, but after 1972 was allowed to rise with
coffee prices. Secondly, it was assumed that coffee prices and output
was exogenously set by leading coffee producers, so that Kenya
minimised on coffee production.
The study concludes that the price stabilisation program
would have stabilised Kenya's export earnings and P. It is also
shown that where the coffee quotas were not binding the gains were
much higher. McMahon (1986, 1987) therefore argues that the Kenyan
economy would have done better in the absence of the international
coffee agreement.
Roe and Pal (1986) uses SAM data to construct a dynamic
model (1972-82). This model is used to analyse Kenya's adjustment to
the external shock associated with the oil crises of 1973/74 and
1980/81. Emphasis is placed on the impact of structural adjustment on
sectoral performance and the pattern of income distribution.
The model has six sectors: agriculture, consumer goods,
capital goods, intermediate goods, infrastructural goods, and services.
Each sector is characterised by a series of nested production
functions. Except for agricultural and manufacturing sectors, the
production functions are specified in a similar fashion in all the
sectors. There are four factors of production: wage labour, self-
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employed labour, land and capital.
In the agricultural sector, land and self-employed labour
combine at the first level to form a composite factor, which combines
with wage labour at the second level to form value added. Domestic
and imported intermediates also combine in CES form in the second
level to form a composite intermediate inputs; which combine with
value added in fixed coefficients in the next level. The resulting
output combine with infrastructural goods in CES form to produce gross
output. This specification of the formation of gross output
highlights the importance of infrastructural goods such as petroleum
and electricity in the determination of sectoral output and hence
incomes and employment. At the top level gross output combine with
imported final goods in Leontief coefficients to form total supplies.
The assumption here is that the two goods are complementary. In the
case of the manufacturing sector domestic and imported capital goods
combine with an elasticity of substitution of 0.5. The remaining
sectors have a production structure similar to that of the
agricultural sector except that at the lowest level the two labour
categories together with capital combine to form value added.
The model assumes a fixed supply of labour, land and capital
inputs with land and capital being sector specific. The two types of
labour (waged and self-employed) are aggregated into urban and rural
labour. All the labour employed in the agricultural sector are
classified as rural, leaving those employed in the rest of the sectors
as urban. It is assumed that wage adjustments clear the urban labour
market, while the possibility of rural unemployment is allowed. It is
assumed that the demand for rural labour is a function of a fixed wage
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differential between rural and urban wages. A major weakness of the
specification of the labour markets, especially since it involves
dynamic adjustments, is that it has no migration equation. While wage
adjustments can reallocate labour in the urban sectors, there is no
mechanism for meeting excess demand for rural labour. This will most
certainly constrain output in the agricultural sector. Furthermore,
the realism of assuming fixed wages in the rural sector is
questionable. Unless one assumes that the agricultural sector is
dominated by subsistence production, so that the fixed wage is a
Ricardian type subsistence wage, there seems to be no other
justification for the model's assumption.
The model specifies four households, a corporate sector and
the government. The incomes of each institution is a fixed share of
factors. Inter-institutional income transfers and payments of direct
taxes are also modeled as fixed proportions of gross incomes. Non-
factor payments to and from the Rest of the World (ROW) are
exogenously fixed.
Household consumption of domestic goods is specified through
the LES functions. On the other hand, consumption of imports is
exogenously fixed. Investment demand and government consumption are
also exogenously fixed.
As discussed above, imports of intermediate inputs and
capital goods are treated as imperfect substitutes with domestic goods.
It is through this specification that trade policy affects the supply
side of the economy. On the export side, less than infinitely elastic
export demand equations are specified for all goods; except
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infrastructural goods and services whose demand are assumed to be
exogenously determined.
It should also be noted that because of import controls and
fixed exchange rates, import prices (through adjustments in import
license premia) adjust to clear the excess demand for imports and
hence foreign exchange. This is therefore another channel through
which the demand for intermediate inputs and capital good imports are
affected. For example, a relaxation of import controls would reduce
premia on import licenses leading to lower import prices and hence a
lower cost structure.
The model is used to examine the effect of increased land
availability, improvement in the terms of trade, increase in
investments and improvement in resource allocation. Since these
issues do not feature in our analysis we only report the model's
results related Lo the experiment on improved terms of trade.
To determine the effects of external shocks, base run
(1976-1982) results are compared with the simulation results. The
simulations were made under the assumption that external shocks did
not exist. The shocks associated with the commodity boom of 1977/78
were neutralised by setting changes in agricultural export prices
equal to the changes in intermediate import prices; and the effects of
the oil shock were neutralised by setting the changes in intermediate
import prices in 1976-82 equal to the changes in 1972-75. Otherwise,
other changes in the model remained the same as those of the base run.
However, two important assumptions were made: (1) foreign capital
inflows were set at $90m, and (2) investments were specified as
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endogenously determined.
The results of the simulations show that economic growth
would have been higher in the absence of external shocks. This is
manifested by the increase in investment by an average of 14% per year
over the period under study. This growth is however mainly
concentrated on the capital goods sector; the major user of investment
goods. This sector grew by an average of 11% while the agricultural
sector grew by 0.8% and the services sector declined by an average of
3.2%. It is also shown that urban households do not benefit from the
increase in output, and that in fact the share of these households'
income in total household income declined by 3.5% in 1982. However,
private consumption rose by 3-13% in all but the last two years. The
model results also shows that because of lower relative prices imports
of all the goods rise. The volume of exports also go up due to lower
export prices and the implied increase in demand associated with the
specified downward sloping export demand function.
It is clear that the simulated growth of output is largely
dependent on the increase in investments. Given lower household
incomes and increased private consumption (and government consumption
exogenously fixed to base values), foreign rather than domestic
savings finances the increase in investments. This is accounted for
by the exogenously determined capital inflow and the increase in
imports. With the SAM data showing that almost all imported capital
goes to the capital goods sector, it is not surprising that this
sector benefits the most from the increase in investment.
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CHAP= El:UR
THE MODEL SAM FOR KENYA
4.1
	
Introduction
This chapter discusses the data and the model used for
empirical analysis in this study. The transformation of the original
data to fit objectives of the study is systematically analysed. The
source of the data is the revised 1976 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
for Kenya. 	 These data are supplemented with data from the 1976
Input-Output Tables of Kenya. 2/ The CGE model will be developed using the
Transactions Value (TV) approach introduced by Drud, Grais, and Pyatt
(1986).
The choice of 1976 as a base year has been dictated by the
availability of a consistent data set. A recent SAM for Kenya is not
available and due to lack of adequate data it has not been possible to
construct an alternative. The use of the SAM data in our general
equilibrium analysis assumes that the economy was in equilibrium in
1976. This assumption while appearing unrealistic may not be so for
two reasons. Firstly, it would appear that by 1976 the Kenyan economy
had recovered from the external shocks associated with the oil crisis
of 1973. Secondly, it can be argued that the effects of the commodity
boom which began in 1976 had not had substantial disequilibrium
effects on the economy by the end of the year. These assertions are
surported by the World Bank (1983) which shows that GDP at factor cost
(1972 prices) was back to 1973 levels in 1976; and by Killick (1984)
which shows that the inflation rate was close to the 1973 level in
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1976 and only increased thereafter.
The 1976 SAM data has been used in a few other studies.
None of these studies however examines the issues we do. Wega (1985)
used the data set to analyse the incidence of taxation in Kenya, while
Roe and Pal (1986), as discussed earlier, used it to study Kenya's
adjustment to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. The data has also been
used by McMahon (1989) to study the income distribution effects of
Kenya's coffee marketing system and by van der Hoeven (1987) and
Vandermoortele (1987) to analyse basic needs issues. Among these
studies Wega, Roe and Pal, and McMahon are CCE based mdels.
Vandermoortele has modified this data set to provide a fuller account
of income distribution among households and the distribution of
benefits from public expenditures. However, his high aggregation of
the manufacturing sector does not allow us to use an otherwise
improved data set.
For the purposes of this study the 77 by 77 original SAM is
initially aggregated into 19 by 19 matrix. This is done by
consolidating various SAM's accounts. 3/
 There are no a priori theoretical
guidelines as to how to consolidate SAM accounts. In practice, the
exercise depends on the type of issues to be addressed. For example,
Wega's interest in the incidence of taxes, especially production
taxes leads him to retain a higher disaggregation of the manufacturing
sector. To the contrary, Vandermoortele's concern for poverty issues
leads him to have a highly aggregated manufacturing sector and a
highly disaggregated service sectors. Since both studies are
concerned with income distribution they have maintained a highly
disaggregated institutional structure. Our concern for the trade
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policy issues is therefore reflected by the way we have aggregated the
SAM. In this respect those sectors directly affected by trade policy
changes are given a more prominent role than in the aggregation. The
fact that we are interested in income distribution issues only in so
far as they arise from trade policy changes has led us to specify a
simpler institutional structure than the above mentioned studies.
	
4.2
	
The SAM
	
4.21
	
Data SAM
The original SAM has five types of labour, two types of
capital, ten types of households, two types of companies and
governments, and twenty eight accounts for production activities. It
also has accounts for indirect taxes, the rest of the world (ROW),
gross fixed capital formation, and assets. Our aggregation and
modification of the data SAM revolve around these accounts. Table 4.1
shows how the 1976 SAM has been aggregated.
The original seven factor accounts have been consolidated
into three accounts; unskilled labour, skilled labour and capital. It
is worth noting that incomes of self-employed labour are recorded in
the national accounts, and indeed in the 1976 I-0 tables, as part of
the net operating surplus. This led to a heated debate in Hodd (1976,
1978), House and Killick (1978) and Hodd, House and Killick (1978)
which culminated with the consensus that the national accounts data
could not be used to analyse functional income distribution. This
shortcoming is corrected in the SAM data so that the incomes of self-
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TABLE 4.1 
The Aggregation of the Original SAM
DATA SAM CLASSIFICATION 1976 SAM CLASSIFICATION
A. Factors
(1) Unskilled labour (1) Unskilled and Semiskilled workers
(ULBR) (5) Self employed and family workers
(2) Skilled labour (2) Skilled workers
(SLBR) (3) Office workers and semi-professionals
(3) Office workers and semi-professionals
(4) Professionals
(3) Capital (6) Operating surplus
(7) Consumption of fixed capital
B. Institutions (Current Account)
(4) Urban Households
(UHSD)
(5) Rural Households
(RSHD)
(6) Companies
(COMP)
(7) Government
(GOVT)
C. Consolidated Capital
(8) SAV-INV
D. Indirect Taxes
(9) ITAX
E. Activities
(9) Household income <Sh6000 P.A.
(10)Household income Sh6000<Sh20000 P.A.
(11)Household income>Sh20000 P.A.
(12)Holding <0.5ha. with little
additional income
(13)Holding <0.5ha. with substantial
additional income
(14)Holding >0.5 but <1.0 ha. with little
additional income
(15)Holding >0.5 but <1.0 ha. with
substantial income
(16)Holding >1.0<8.0 ha.
(17)Holding >8.0 (small farms only)
(18)Other rural
(19)Private companies and non-profit
institutions
(20)Parastatal bodies and public
companies
(21)Central Government
(22)Local Government
Gross fixed capital formation
(8) Indirect taxes
(11)Foods
(FOOD)
(12)Consumer Goods
(CON)
(13)Petroleum
(PEfR)
(14)Chemicals
(CHEM)
(15)Manufactured Goods
(MAN)
(16)Construction
(CONS)
(17)Private services
(PSRV)
F. Rest of the World
(19) ROW
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(10) Agriculture
(AGR)
(18) Government Services
(GSRV)
(23)Traditional economy
(24)Agricultural
(25)Forestry and Fishing
(27) Food and beverages
(28)Textiles, wearing apparel and leather
(29)Wood and wood products
(30)Paper, paper products, printing and
publishing
(26) Mining and quarrying
(31) Petroleum and refineries
(32)Other chemicals
(33)Non-metallic minerals
(34)Metal products, machinery
(35)Miscellaneous manufacturers
(38) Building and construction
(39) Wholesale and retail
(40) Hotels and restaurants
(41) Transport and services allied to
transport
(36)Electricity
(37)Water
(42) Communications
(43) Finance, real estate, insurance and
business
(44) Ownership of dwelling
(45) Other services including domestic
services
(46)Public administration and defence
(47)Education
(48)Health
(49)Agricultural services
(50)Other Services
(51)Goods and non-factor services and
transfers
(52)Factor services and transfers
Source: Kenya (1981), Social Accounting Matrix 1976 (revised).
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employed and hence unskilled workers are fully accounted for.
In the original SAM, households are distinguished by origin,
that is, whether they are rural or urban; and further by income, and
the size of landholding in the case of urban and rural households,
respectively. For our purposes we only distinguish between rural and
urban households. If we were mainly interested in modelling income
distribution then we would have stayed as close as possible to the
original aggregation. However, this aggregation still enables us to
analyse functional and institutional income distribution since it
maintains an adequate mapping from factorial incomes to the
institutions and between institutional incomes.
The government account is an aggregation of local and
central governments, while that of companies is an aggregation of
private and public enterprises. Companies own capital and as we shall
discuss later neither produce nor consume. This avoids the confusing
claim by MWega (1985) that they maximise profits. Such an assumption
leads to the argument as to whether public and private companies
should be aggregated. This conceptual problem does not arise in our
analysis because we assume, like the SAM, that only activities produce.
Furthermore, the Kenya SAM does not distinguish between public and
private activities which reduces the need to differentiate between
public and private companies.
The twenty eight production activities are aggregated into
nine sectors; agriculture (AGR), food, consumer goods (CON),
petroleum (PETR), chemicals (CHEM), manufacturing (MAN), construction
(CONS), private services (PSRV), and Government services (GSRV). The
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dominance of the industrial sectors reflects our concern for the role
of trade policy in protection. The number of sectors have been
limited to reduce computation costs and complications. However, in
aggregating the activity accounts an attempt has been made to satisfy
the so-called Hicks composite theorem. This theorem asserts that a
group of commodities can be aggregated into a single commodity if they
have the same price. A weaker version of this theorem, which states
that goods can be combined into a composite if their prices move in a
fixed ratio to each other, would be sufficient in most cases.
Table 4.1 also shows how other accounts, namely, indirect
taxes, combined capital (savings and investments), and the rest of the
world (ROW) have been aggregated. The model used in this study, like
most CGE models, is Walrasian in the sense that it only models the
real side of the economy. This means that the aggregated SAM does not
include the financial sector.
Table 4.2 is the data SAM obtained by aggregating the
original 1976 SAM. This SAM (like other SAMS) has several important
characteristics. Firstly, it is a square matrix. Notice that each
corresponding row and column is identically labelled. Let the cell
elementt.bethe intersection of the i
	 row and the j	 columnij	 th	 th
in any account; by convention i and j represent the receipts and
payments to the account, respectively. The column and row vectors
(Y1 ) are obtained by summing over the rows and the columns in each
account; that is
Et.. = y. = Et.. = y.i 13	 . i,j=1,2,...,n	 (4.1)
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where n is the dimension of the SAM. Equation (4.1) therefore shows
that for each account income always equals expenditure. Furthermore,
since a SAM is a snapshot of the country's economic activity during
an accounting period (in our case one year), then summing over all
accounts (Eyi = Eyi ) , (4.1) represents equality between national
i	 j
income and national expenditure.
Although Table 4.2 is balanced and is therefore a true
representation (model) of the Kenyan economy in 1976 it has limited
modelling capabilities. This limitation arises from the way the
original SAM was constructed. In particular, some of the accounts are
aggregated in a manner that does not represent realistic behaviour and
the constraints faced by agents in the economy. It is therefore
necessary to transform this data SAM before it can be used for
modelling purposes. This process is started initially by
disaggregating Table 4.2 in such a way that not only makes more
economic sense, but also makes later disaggregation easier.
The activity accounts (columns 10-18) combine the two types
of labour and capital (rows 3-4) with domestic (rows 10-18) and
imported (row 19) intermediate inputs to produce gross output (row 20).
After paying indirect taxes (row 9) the activity accounts sell their
output in the commodity markets (rows 11-18) for final consumption
(columns 4, 5 and 7), capital formation (column 8), intermediate
consumption (columns 10-18), and exports (column 19). The fact that
activities can sell in the commodity markets implies a one-to-one
correspondence between activities and commodities. This assumption is
unrealistic for two reasons. Firstly, there is no a priori
justification that activities should equal commodities. For instance,
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if some imported goods were non-competitive then the number of
commodities would be greater than activities. Secondly, the scope for
modelling producer and consumer behaviour is limited where activities
are not separated from commodities. The modelling of producer
behaviour, for instance, is best done along the activity accounts;
while consumer behaviour is modelled through the commodity accounts.
To separate gross output from commodities, commodity
accounts are created. The activity accounts would then sell gross
output to these accounts at producer prices; which in turn would
supply the goods to the appropriate users at market prices after
paying indirect taxes and imposing mark-ups for trade and transport
margins. The advantage of this specification is that it allows
commodities which command different prices to be sold in different
markets. For instance, it is common to separate the domestic and
export markets for gross output because their prices will diverge
unless they are perfect substitutes.
Another weakness of Table 4.2 as a model SAM can be seen by
examining the relationship between domestic agents and ROW. Along row
19 ROW receives factor income transfers (columns 2 and 3), payments
for goods and services and income transfers from households (columns 4
and 5), and income transfers from government and companies (columns 6
and 7). It also receives payments for imports of capital goods
(column 8) and intermediate inputs (columns 10-18). The way these
transactions have been recorded is not amenable for modelling
purposes.
To start with, notice that the receipt of KE20.3m and
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KE89.7m by ROW from rural and urban households, respectively,
represent payments for goods and services and income transfers. This
mixture of payments and income transfers assumes that households'
decisions concerning commodity consumption and income transfers are
similar. This is not theoretically justifiable. In our model we
assume that while commodity demand is a function of relative prices,
households transfer a fixed share of their income to ROW. For this
reason households' income accounts should be separated from
consumption accounts. The table also shows that households import
consumer goods directly from ROW. This assumption makes it difficult
to model tariffs and also the substitution between domestic and
imported goods. As will be shown later, we assume that all imports
are bought by the commodity accounts which pay import duties before
releasing the goods to the domestic market.
To accommodate the changes in the assumptions, imports of
goods and services and transfer payments are first separated; and then
imported consumer goods are combined with domestic consumer goods to
form total household consumption. The original SAM shows that rural
and urban households transfer income to ROW amounting to KE1.8m and
KE11.4m., and import goods worth KE18.5m and KE78.3m, respectively.
The income transfers are recorded in the income accounts of each
household. The SAM however does not show how much of each imported
commodity is consumed by each household. Imports of consumer goods
are obtained from the end-use analysis table of the I-0 tables. The
consumption of these goods by each household is then crudely estimated
as a proportion of total consumption.
The intersection of row 19 and column 8 shows that goods
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for fixed capital formation worth KE95.5m are imported. As in the
case of consumer goods we also assume that the combined capital
account does not buy directly from ROW. This assumption is satisfied
by distributing these imports along the rows of the combined capital
account. The end-use analysis table of the I- 10 tables shows that 99
percent of these imports are manufactured (capital) goods. They are
therefore all allocated to the commodity manufactures.
The activity accounts obtain intermediate inputs from
domestic and foreign sources. Notice that while domestic
intermediates are recorded by sector of origin, the imports are
recorded as a composite commodity. Modelling aggregation of
intermediates with these composite imports would force us to assume
that domestic and imported intermediates are complementary. Although
frequently used in structuralist models, this would be a highly
restrictive assumption. In our model we want to allow for the
possibility of substitution between these inputs. This specification
would still allow us to assume complementarity of some inputs if we so
choose. The change in assumption requires further modification of the
data in Table 4.2. This is done in two stages. First, imported
intermediate inputs are disaggregated by sector of origin using the
information contained in the import matrix table of the I-10 tables.
The values of each imported intermediate input are then distributed to
their corresponding rows and columns in the activity accounts so that
the absorption matrix is now a composite of imported and domestic
inputs. This is done simply by superimposing the input-output matrix
of imported intermediates to the I-0 matrix of the SAM which
previously only contained domestic intermediates. With this change
the activity accounts will no longer be importing directly from ROW;
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hence in the second stage a commodity account which deals directly
with ROW is created. This new account will not only import
intermediate inputs, but also goods for final consumption and capital
formation. However, total imports of each commodity are not given by
the SAM. These data are again obtained from the input-output table.
Table 4.3 is a result of the disaggregation of Table 4.2.
It is called a partial model SAM because it is not disaggregated
enough to be useful for modelling purposes. It will be shown in
Section 3.22 that modelling trade issues requires further
disaggregation of this table. The more fundamental weaknesses of the
original SAM have however been corrected.
Table 4.3 shows the new income (columns 4, 6 and 9) and
consumption (5, 7 and 10) accounts of the households and government.
The separation of the monetary and real accounts facilitates a more
meaningful modelling of the agents behaviour. The activity accounts
now sell gross output to the new commodity accounts at producer prices
(as shown by the intersection of columns 22-30 and rows 13-21). The
fact that the make-matrix is diagonal implies that each activity
produces only one good; that is, there is no joint production. The
commodity accounts then prepare these goods for the market by paying
commodity taxes in row 12. These accounts also import commodities
(row 31) at c.i.f. prices. These commodities are then valued at
market prices through the payment of import duties which, for the
moment, are recorded together with the indirect taxes on domestic
products. This eliminates the KE66.5m recorded in Table 4.2 (row 9
and column 19) as payments by ROW to the indirect tax account; and
therefore corrects the misconception that ROW met the tariff charge.
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The intersection of columns 13-21 and rows 1-3 of Table
4.3 shows the generation of value added by production activities. The
value added accrues to the three factors of production as factorial
(functional) income. Unskilled labour, skilled labour, and capital
earn KE543.4m, KE357.7m, KE395.0m, respectively. These add up to
total GDP at factor cost of KE1296.1m. The table also shows that
skilled labour and capital earned KE1.8m and KE12.5m from the ROW,
respectively, which combine with GDP at factor cost to form total
factor incomes of KE1310.2m.
The factorial income is distributed to domestic institutions
and the ROW in columns 1-3. Unskilled labour account pays KE412.2m to
rural households and KE131.2m to urban households; while the skilled
labour account pays KE95.5m to rural households and KE249.6m to urban
households. As would be expected the major source of rural
households' income is unskilled labour and that for urban households
is skilled labour. To be more precise 75% of total unskilled labour
income accrues to rural households while over 69% of skilled labour
income accrue to urban households. Skilled labour account also pays
KE12.4m to the ROW for imported labour services.
The table also shows that 79% of the returns to capital
accrues to companies (KE320.9m) and over 11% accrues to foreigners
(KE70.0m) as distributed profits. The remainder goes to rural
households (KE14.6m) and the government (KE2.0m) with urban households
apparently not owning any capital. This distribution of capital
earnings shows the importance of foreign capital in the Kenyan
economy.
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Institutional transfer and income distribution are shown in
the intersection of columns and row accounts 4-11. These accounts
also show institutional allocation of income to consumption. Rural
households transfer KE5.6m of their income to other rural households
and allocate KE538.9m to consumption. They also transfer KE3.2m to
companies, KE1.8m to foreigners and KE37.6m to the government as
direct taxes, contributions to pensions and social security fund, and
fines and fees. Similarly the government transfers KE8.9m to both
households as pensions, scholarships, etc., KE12.3m to companies,
KE3.2m to ROW, and KE7.3m to government mainly as grants to local
governments. Income transfers and distribution by urban households
and companies can be interpreted in a similar fashion. Apart from
transferring income abroad, domestic institutions also receive
transfers from abroad. For example, both households receive a total
of KE5.3m from the ROW as remittances, while companies receive K28.0m
and the government receives KE16.5m as grants. Row 12 shows that part
of the institutional income is saved. Rural households, urban
households, companies and the government save 7.6%, 4.2%, 26.7% and
21.3% of their incomes, respectively. All the savings are collected
for investment by the combined capital account (SAV .-INV). This is
shown in column 11 where the capital account buys investment by sector
of origin. The SAM however does not allow us to disaggregate
investments by sector of destination. This means that modelling of
investments in our model will be rather simple.
The link between payments to factors by activities and the
subsequent functional income distribution and institutional income
transfers is important for policy purposes. This is because a policy
which affects production activities will also affect the returns to
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factors. This in turn will affect institutional income and
consumption. The implication of all these for modelling purposes is
that the mapping from activities to factors should be explicit and
realistic.
On the production side, activities combine (column 13-21)
value added with intermediate inputs to produce domestic gross output.
For example, the agricultural sector combines KE542.1m of value added
(made up of unskilled labour, skilled labour and capital valued at
KE374.6m., KE7.6m., and KE159.9m., respectively) with KE83.7m
intermediates to form KE625.8m worth of gross output. This is sold to
commodity agriculture account (column 21) at producer prices. This
account then prepares the commodity for sale by paying an indirect tax
of KE2.4m on it. However, before the commodity is sold it is combined
with imported goods to form a composite commodity. In our example,
agricultural goods worth KE11.5m are imported. Like domestic
agriculture, imported agriculture is prepared for the market through
the payment of import duty of KE0.7m. The total indirect taxes on
agriculture then add up to KE3.1m. The domestic and imported
commodity are then combined to form total supply of the agricultural
goods (valued at market prices) worth KE640.4m. Commodities are sold
in rows 22-31 to meet demands for final consumption (columns 5, 7,
11), investments (column 12), intermediates (columns 13-21), and for
exports (column 31). Notice that in Table 4.3 unlike in Table 4.2
households now buy imported goods from the commodity accounts.
Accounts for final consumption display interesting patterns
of institutional consumption. Companies do not consume commodities
and the government only consumes government services. The pattern of
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the government's consumption reflects its role as a major provider of
services. It is also evident that while urban households consume a
lower proportion of agricultural goods they consume a large share of
private services, manufactures and government services. On the other
hand, rural households consume a large proportion of foods and
agricultural goods.
Kenya's economic transactions with ROW are shown on column
and row 31. Exports are shown as the intersection of the column
account and the commodity rows 21-30. Total exports of goods and
services amount to KE471.7m which when compared to payments for
imports of goods and services worth KE461.1m leaves a balance of trade
surplus of KE10.1m. However, when capital transfers are taken into
account the result is a KE51.9m balance of payments deficit. This
deficit is recorded as savings from ROW (intersection of row 11 and
column 31) and therefore acts as a balancing item in the system. This
is shown by the fact that total investments in column 11 amounts to
KE294.2m, while institutional savings amount to KE242.3m. This leaves
a deficit of KE51.9m. Since the macroeconomy is closed when savings
equal investments foreign savings act as the equilibrating mechanism.
4.22	 Model SAM
The complete model SAM is represented by Table 4.4. This
table with 78 accounts is a blown up version of the partial model SAM
which has only 31 accounts. It is worth mentioning however that no
new data has been used for this disaggregation. New accounts have
been created simply by separating and relabelling some elements of the
old accounts and/or by combining some of the old accounts.
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Most of the new changes relate to production activities and
the commodity accounts. The income accounts, real consumption and the
savings-investment accounts have remained the same. The only new
change in the income accounts involve those of factors which have been
split into domestic and foreign factors. For example, new accounts
showing labour and capital incomes as the sum of earnings from
domestic and foreign sources have been created. This change is
important for modelling purposes. The distinction between domestic
and foreign factors is particularly important because it allows us to
concentrate on modelling the domestic factor markets; leaving the
foreign factor markets as exogenous.
The intersection of columns 17 to 25 and rows 1 and 2 shows
that domestic unskilled and skilled labour combine to form an
aggregate labour. The aggregate labour then combine with capital in
accounts 35 to 43 to form value added; which combines in the same
accounts with intermediate inputs to form gross output. Notice that
each type of capital has its own account (row 26 to 34). This is the
assumption of sector specificity of capital. This specification
accords with the convention that factors or commodities sold at
different prices (markets) should have different accounts. The
implication of the specificity of capital is that returns to capital
may differ among the sectors.
The activity accounts now only represent the technology
employed in each sector. The differences in factor intensities shown
in Table 4.5 represent differences in sectoral technologies. For
example, it is clear that the agricultural sector is highly unskilled
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TABLE 4.5 
Factor Intensities (Percentage Shares)
Labour Shares
LABOUR
Total Factor Shares
ULBRD SLBRD CAPITAL	 INTERMEDIATES
AGR 98.1 2.0 61.0 26.0 13.0
FOOD 38.0 62.0 7.0 10.0 83.0
CON 45.0 56.0 17.0 10.0 74.0
PLIR 30.0 70.0 2.0 4.0 94.0
CHEM 24.0 76.0 11.0 18.0 71.0
MAN 34.0 66.0 17.0 10.0 73.0
CONS 37.0 63.0 24.0 4.0 72.0
PSRV 40.0 60.0 32.0 21.0 46.0
GSRV 21.0 79.0 68.0 1.0 31.0
labour-intensive. Only 2.0 percent of skilled labour is employed in
this sector. The fact that aggregate labour represents 61 percent of
total factor shares in the sector underlines the importance of labour
in agricultural production. The private and government services also
have relatively high labour intensity; but this reflects the high
skilled labour intensity in these sectors. For most sectors, except
AGR, CHEM and PSRV, capital intensity is relatively low. It is also
evident that all the industrial sectors and the construction sector
have high intermediate input ratios. The significance of this
pattern of the technological structure is that it is through it that
trade policy affects production. The effect of trade policy also
depends on the relative shares of domestic and import intermediates.
Table 4.6 shows that the shares of imported intermediates in the
industrial sectors, especially PEAR, is high. As it turns out, these
sectors are also the most protected. Therefore any trade policy
change will have the most significant impact on them.
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TABLE 4.6 
Intermediate Shares (Percentage)
Domestic IE122E.
AGR 82.2 18.0
FOOD 91.0 9.0
CON 68.0 32.0
PETR 11.0 89.0
CHEM 64.0 36.0
MAN 62.0 38.0
CONS 87.0 13.0
PSRV 88.0 12.0
GSRV 92.0 8.0
The model SAM has more commodity accounts than the other
SAMS. Each sector has four commodity accounts; representing
consumption of domestic goods, exports, imports and composite goods.
The exception is the construction sector which neither exports nor
imports any commodity. The activity accounts (row 35 to 43) supply
gross output to the domestic (columns 44-52) and export (columns 53-
60) markets. The domestic commodity markets pay commodity taxes (row
16), but there are no taxes on exports. However, for policy
simulations it is possible to exogenously introduce export taxes.
New commodity accounts (61-68) import goods (row 78) and also pay
duties (row 16). Domestic and imported commodities are combined to
form composite goods in the column accounts 69 to 77 and the row
accounts 46-52 and 61-68. Notice that it is from these accounts that
consumer goods, capital goods and intermediate inputs are bought. On
the other hand, export demands are shown by the intersection of ROW
(column 78) and the export commodity accounts (rows 53-60).
The commodity accounts of the SAM can be used to determine
the tradability of domestic output. It is common in trade
liberalisation models to distinguish between traded and non-traded
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sectors. As discussed in Chapter Three this dichotomy is commonly
associated with the dependent economy models normally used to analyse
the expenditure switching effects of policy changes. In these models
the prices of traded goods are assumed to be exogenously determined so
that their markets are cleared through quantity changes in the
domestic economy. This is the most common way of treating exports and
imports. On the other hand, prices of non-traded goods are assumed to
be determined endogenously; hence their markets are cleared through
price changes.
The problem with the former assumption is that the
widespread use of import restrictions in LDCs leads to the excess
demand for imports being cleared by price changes. Moreover, the
sectoral tradability characterised by the dependent economy models
imposes a particular model structure. The assertion that excess
demand for traded goods is cleared through quantity adjustments rests
on the assumption that exports and imports are perfect substitutes for
domestic goods. It was argued in Chapter Three that this is not
always a realistic assumption; and that the Armington (CET) functions
could be used to specify product differentiation between domestic and
imported (exported) goods.
The problem of tradability can be dealt with by appealing to
the suggestion by Dervis et al (1982, p.240) that the degree of
tradability need not be confined to traded and non-traded. The
alternative is to distinguish between non-traded, exportable and
importable sectors. Under this classification a commodity is non-
traded if its share of exports in total production and its share of
imports in total domestic supply is small. On the other hand, a
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commodity is exportable if its share of exports in total production is
high and importable if the share of imports in total supply is large.
Table 4.7 shows the shares of domestic supply and imports in
total supply and the shares of domestic demand and exports in gross
output.
TABLE 4.7 
Sectoral Tradability (percentage) 
COMPOSITES GROSS OUTPUT
DOMESTIC IMPORTS DOMESTIC EXPORTS
AGR 97.5 2.5 75.4 24.6
FOOD 93.8 6.2 88.7 11.3
CON 71.5 28.5 86.8 13.2
PEER 41.9 58.1 64.1 35.9
CHEM 57.8 42.2 71.9 28.1
MAN 44.6 55.4 90.4 9.6
CONS 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
PSRV 90.9 9.1 74.4 25.6
GSRV 96.6 3.4 99.6 0.4
It is clear from the table that the construction and government
services are non-tradables. Private services sector (with 26 percent
of its gross output exported) does not come out as a non-tradable.
The high export share of this sector is explained by the fact that the
exports include tourism which is a major foreign exchange earner in
Kenya. Manufacturing is an importable sector while petroleum and
chemicals are tradable sectors with a bias for the domestic market.
The foods and consumer goods sectors have low import and export
shares. They therefore behave as non-tradables although this may not
be particularly true for consumer goods sector whose imports make up
29 percent of total supplies. The agricultural sector with 25 percent
of its gross output exported would appear to be tradables. However,
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this tradability is reduced by the fact that imports to this sector
only account for 2.5 percent of the total supply of agricultural
goods. This result arises from the fact that the agricultural sector
is dominated by the subsistence production. A more appropriate degree
of tradability of this sector could be obtained by separating cash
crops from subsistence crops. But the SAM does not allow for this
differentation.
The disaggregation of the 19x19 data SAM to a 78x78 model
SAM has profound implications. In the model SAM the interaction among
the various agents (accounts) are now much simpler and direct. This
allows for a more explicit modelling of agents behaviour than would
have been possible with the data SAM. The next section formalises the
model implied by what we have called the model SAM. This is done
using the TV-approach to modelling.
4.3
	 The Model 
4.31	 Mbdellinq : A TV-Approach
The TV-approach to modelling involves specifying the
functional forms of the equations which determine the cell values of
the model SAM. In the usual way, this amounts to specifying agents
behaviour and the technological constraints and therefore an economy
wide general equilibrium model.
The functional form of the cell values can be specified in a
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generalised way as: 4/
tij = tij (p, y; 8, Q)	 (4.2)
where p and y are vectors of endogenous prices and incomes
(expenditures) respectively; 8 are exogenous variables and
parameters which can be calibrated from the SAM and Q are parameters
that cannot be calibrated from the SAM and therefore have to be
exogenously provided. What is noteworthy of (4.2) is that the
independent variables are expressed in prices and values only. This
appears raLher unusual because in most models quantities are
explicitly specified. The TV-approach specification however does not
lead to any loss of information because quantities are nested in the
system. For example, the values of y can be expressed as
171 =
hence	 (4.3)
Yi
— = a.
•	 '1Pi
This shows that from the values of the SAM data, quantities can be
obtained through (4.3), as the real value solutions.
The advantage of this approach is that by pushing quantities
to the background, it allows for modelling in values. This property
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underlies the advantage of using the TV-approach to model with SAM-
based data. Indeed it is this modelling with prices and values which
distinguishes the TV-approach from conventional CGE models which model
with prices and quantities.
The cell quantities can be expressed in a similar fashion.
If p.1 . and q„ are the price and quantity relations in each cell then3	 13
cell value can be expressed as
(4.4)t. 3. = p..q.. = p.q..1	 lj 13	 13
Hence the cell quantity is simply obtained as t..13/p.1 = q.. ; where 13
pi = pij . As noted by Drud, Grais and Pyatt (1986) the restriction
that pi = pij in (4.4) is based on the assumption that commodities or
factors sold in the same market must command the same price. This
also formalises the assumption that differentiated products or sector-
specific factors must be assigned different accounts in the SAM.
Modelling of agents' behaviour using the SAM data is done
through the column accounts. For example, activity accounts are used
to model producer behaviour and the consumption accounts are used to
model consumer behaviour. Other accounts are used to model income
distribution and transfers, commodity supplies and demands, taxes and
so on. In what follows we develop the model to be used for empirical
analysis. Our main aim is to model agents behaviour, the
determination and distribution of the national product.
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4.32	 Technology
The model SAM (Table 4.4) shows that the underlying
technology of the model is basically a two-level production process
whereby aggregate labour and capital combine to form value added in
the first level; and in the second level value added and intermediates
combine to form gross output. This aggregation takes place in the
columns of the activity accounts.
Totallabour(L.)employed in each sector j is an aggregation
ofskilled(SL.)and unskilled (UL.) labour. These labour types
are aggregated using a (IS function of the form
1
-p.	 -p. -p.
L. =
J 	
+ (1 - 6j.) uL. 3 ]	 3J	 J J 	 J (4.5)
WhereV,(5.areeffiaiencyanddistribUtionparalllatersand Pj.isj	 J 
a parameter which determines the elasticity of substitution as
a.
= 1 	 The derived demand for each labour category can beJ	  + .p3
obtained from (4.5) under the usual cost minimisation problem. If
and w . are wages for aggregate, skilled and unskilledj ' sj	 Uj
labour, respectively, and assuming no efficiency gains; then the first
order conditions for cost minimisation gives the demand functions for
the two labour categories as:
1
a. w. —
SL. = 6. 3 (-/-) 0j L.
J	 J	 W •	 JJ
(4.6)
t.
o_
a. -ij	 .Y3 (4. 9)
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1
•
UL = (1 - 61 ) 3 (-1 -11) 0.3 Lwi 
(4.7)
Note that (4.6) and (4.7) are specified in prices and quantities.
We use (4.3) and (4.4) to convert these two equations into TV-form. Let
L.. = t. ./w. and L. = y./w. where i is now an index of labour13	 13 1	 3 J
type so that wi is the wage of labour type i in each sector. Then
substitutingfornd after some manipulations,
(4.6) and (4.7) can be expressed as
w. 1-0.
o	 1t.. = a. .	 3.13	 13 w.	 Y3 (4.8)
showing the demand for each labour type in each sector in value form.
Note that Y3.is the column sum, in this case the total labour costs of
sectorj.Theparameter alj is the base value share of each factor
cost; derived as
While the price of each labour category is obtained from
marginal conditions, it can be shown using (4.8) that the returns to
aggregate labour is a CES aggregation of the wage payments of the
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various sectors. Notice that summing over i in (4.8) implies
w. 1-0.
Y. =Et. = E[ac.).( _1)	 3 ]	.
wi	 Y3 (4.10)
Hence
1 
1-11'
wi =( Ea.o . w.. J) 1 — a ii 13 13 (4.11)
This confirms that the wage in sector j is a CES aggregation of the
wages of the two labour types. Since a sector's wage is weighted by
the labour shares in the total wage bill, it should be directly
related to labour type intensively used in that sector. This means
for example that a sector which employs a high proportion of unskilled
labour should have an aggregate wage close to that of unskilled
labour.
In the first-level of the production process the activity
accounts combine aggregate labour and capital in (IS form to produce
net output (value added). The specification of the cell value of this
output is of the form
=
	t..	 a?.(p./p.)	 3	 .
	ij 	 113 (4.12)
where pi is the price of aggregate labour or capital and pi is the
net (value added) price. The net price is a (IS aggregation of input
121
prices pi in the form of (4.11); that is
1 
13.p. = (y a..p	 3)(I. 13 1 (4.13)
When modelling the formation of net output assumptions about
factor mobility are important. Models aimed at analysing long-run
economic adjustments generally assume perfect factor mobility between
sectors. However, for short-run models such an assumption would be
unrealistic. In the short-run, capital once installed, cannot be
easily moved from one sector to another. Since our model is mainly
concerned with short-run effects of policy changes we assume mobile
labour and sector specific capital.
Some studies, for example Roe and Pal (1986), introduce land
as a factor of production. Given that the SAM does not break down
capital into land and other forms of capital Roe and Pal assume that
all the capital attributable to the agricultural sector is land. With
our assumption of sector-specific capital, substituting land for
capital does not change the interpretation of the generation of
agricultural output; hence we see no advantage in specifying land as a
factor of production model. Gunning (1979) uses land by farm size as
a factor of production. Again, our SAM data only maps farm size to
households and not to activities and therefore cannot be used as a
factor.
Within the first-level of production intermediate inputs
t.. = a?.(p./P.)13	 13	 3	 j (4.14)
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also combine according to Leontief technology. The assumption is
that these inputs are complementary. Leontief technology implies a
specialcaseof(4 . 14whereck
.0 . Hence
where!p . is the price of intermediate input i and p, is the compositei
price determined as a CES aggregation of pi .
In the second-level of production, aggregate intermediates
combine with value added according to Leontief technology to form
gross output. This is modelled in the same way as (4.14) where
. 11014 are net prices; and p, are the gross prices, determined as aPI
CES aggregation of	 . .pi
4.33	 Demand and Supply of Commodities 
In Chapter Three, the formation of composite goods from
domestic and imported goods and the transformation of gross output
into domestic goods and exports was discussed. The Armington
functions were used to model the formation of the composite goods;
while CET functions were used to model the transformation of gross
output. Below we discuss the modelling of the cell equations of these
functions.
The cell values of the composite goods are specified, by
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converting (3.3) and (3.4) into TV-form as
p. 1-0.
	
t .	 ac.) .(-1L)	 J
	
.
	
j
.	
YPj (4.15)
wherep . is the domestic or import price and p, is the composite
i
price of commodity j formed as a CES aggregation of domestic and
import prices. The parameter	 as defined before, is the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods.
The cell equations for the cEr functions are specified by
converting (3.12) into TV-form as
pi Ipi-1
t.. = a?. (---)	 .	 ( 4.16)
Pj
where pi.are domestic or export prices and p, are the average sales
price.TheparameterV.is
 the elasticity of transformation and
yi is the gross output.
In specifying the trade functions we follow the small
country assumption on the import side; and supply is assumed to be
perfectly elastic so that all the desired imports can be obtained at
the going world price. Payments (import supply) to ROW for imports
is therefore specified as
	
t.. = a?. 1-4-13 .
 *ER (y . /p . )	 (4.17)13	 ij	 .	 J
17E3 . 11._;
X., =a?.(T„.72 ) 1Jij	 13 r.D.1
(4.18)
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where y./p. are import quantities based on import prices inclusive
3 3
ofdutiesanda. j is a factor which converts the import quantities toi
those based on prices exclusive of duties. In our model the parameter
o i
a .. is calibrated from the base SAM.13
The introduction of product differentiation to the export
side as shown earlier implies less than infinite elastic demand for
exports. This leads the specification of export demand functions as
where X.	 is the quantity of exports, a 1.	 is base quantity ofij	 1
exports, and flij is the price of elasticity of export demand; while
WP. and FE. are defined as before.1	 1
As noted by Dervis et al (1982), while export prices (and
hence terms of trade) are no longer fixed, (4.18) does not imply
that a country can affect the world price. All it means is that
policies that affect the foreign currency price of exports can affect
the demand. For example, policies that aim to make a country's
exports competitive in world markets such as subsidies or devaluations
by lowering PEi can stimulate export demand.
The model SAM shows that gross output is valued at producer
prices. However, the commodity accounts pay indirect taxes when they
. = (1 + T.) y.Y3	 J	 J (4.20)
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buy these goods. Indirect tax revenue is modelled as a percentage of
comoditiesvaluedatmarketprices.Forinstance,letT.bethe
indirect tax rate and y j be the market value of commodity j then
T.
t.	 = ( 	 3	 ) y.kJ	 (l 1- T.)
	 3 (4.19)
is the cell value of tax revenues. Hence T. can be calibrated from3
the base values of y. and t. .lj
Alternatively, tax revenues can be viewed as a mark-up on
the pre-tax value of gross output. In this the value of commodities
can be expressed as
wheTeY. is the gross output value of commodity j . This equation3
showsthatcommodity.is inclusive of indirect tax T.y. , andY3	 3
therefore is valued at market prices.
The formation of composite goods determines the total supply
of each commodity to the economy. These commodities are used up as
final consumption by households and the government, as intermediates
by the activities, and for capital formation. Hence
XS. = C. + G. + I. + K.1	 1	 1	 1	 1 (4.21)
t.. = c..Y.13	 13 j (4.22)
t.. = t..lj	 13 (4.23)
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where :XS. are total supplies of sector i ; C. are household1
household consumption; Gi are government consumption; I i are
intermdiatedemands;andK.are investment demand by sector of1
origin. Intermediate demands are specified by (4.14); while
investment demands are modelled in fixed shares as:
where c.. are the shares of sector i in total investments. This13
defines investment by sector of origin.
In our model the government consumes only one commodity,
government services. It is usually assumed that this consumption is
fixed in the budget, either in real or nominal terms. Given the
severe budget constraints normally faced by developing countries it
would be unrealistic to model government consumption in real terms.
We therefore model government consumption in nominal terms. This is
specified in TV-form as:
where t.
	
the base quantity of government consumption. The realjl t.
values, estimated as Y. = -11 , will change with change in the
government consumer price index. This specification therefore allows
the government to use the budget as a policy instrument by manipulating
p. or t.
	 .1	 1j
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Household consumption is specified using the linear
expenditure system (LES). The utility function underlying this system
is a Stone-Geary type. The consumer problem can be stated as follows:
max Uh = .E Bih log(Cih - aih)
1=1
(4.24)
1 <	 < 0 , E gi = 1
s.t. E P.C. h = Yi	 hi=1
where!.Clh is the consumption of commodity i by household h
yh istheincomeofhouseholdhandB.and.are the
al
parameters of the utility function. From (4.24) demand functions are
obtained (suppressing index h) as:
Bi
Ci = ai +	 (Y - EPkak)
or
PiCi
 = Pi ai
 + Bi (Y - EPkak )	 (4.25)
which shows that the total expenditure on the i th commodity is made up
of the "subsistence" expenditure (p iai ) and "supernumerary"
expenditure (Y - EPkak) . The parameters gi , the marginal budget
shares, show how consumers allocate their discretionary expenditures.
BY
E. = 	  > 0ly	 P.C.
11
(4.26)
PkYk
E .	 =	 C. [13	 117 Y	 < (4.28)
and
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It is also evident from (4.25) that total expenditure is a linear
function of prices and income.
The structure of LES equations, mainly as a result of their
foundation on additive utility function, generate rather unusual
results. Differentiating (4.25) with respect to income (expenditures)
and prices gives:
Y - EPkYkP.Y.
,
= - E.	 ( 	 )] < 0E .li	 ly Y (4.27)
where E.	 E..ly ' 11 ' and E.. are income, own price, and cross-price13
elasticities, respectively. Equation (4.26) shows that there are no
inferior goods, while (4.27) and (4.28) show that all goods are
substitutes for each other. However, this substitutability between
goods arise mainly from the additive nature of the utility functions
underlying LES. The absence of complementarity between goods is also
a result of the restrictiveness of the Stone-Geary utility function.
This property implies that the marginal utility of each good is
independent of other goods.
t . = a0
 .y.fJ	 fl J (4.29)
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4.34	 Income Generation and Distribution
Having modelled producer and consumer behaviour in the
previous sub-sections we now specify sources of income and how they
are redistributed among the institutions and ROW. The institutions
are defined here as the households, companies and government income
accounts. The determination of factorial and disposable income,
savings and tax payments are also modelled. The model takes into
account the fact that factorial and institutional incomes are obtained
from two different sources; domestic and the ROW.
Payments to factor type f by sector j are specified as
This shows that the payment to the fth factor is a fixed share of total
factor payments in the j th sector. The total income of the fth
factor from domestic and foreign sources is therefore specified as
n 0
yf
 = E afjyj + t7j ER (4.30)
where t. j. ER are the exogenous payments from abroad converted toi
domestic currency values using exchange rate ER. Domestic payments
are now total payments to the factor from all the sectors. The
exogeneity of foreign payments reflects the fact that we are not
concerned with modelling foreign factor markets.
Yh = Eahfyf + Eahh yh + t.. ER13 (4.31)
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The formation of institutional income can be modelled as
In our SAM (4.31) determines only incomes of households and companies.
This equation shows that the h th institution's income is made up of
receipts from factors, income transfers from other institutions (Eahhyh)
andtherestoftheworld(t7J ER) . Institutions receive a fixed
proportion of factor income, reflecting their factor shares. Notice
that as before the transfers from ROK are exogenously fixed in
foreign currency values.
Household disposable income is specified as
Yh = (1	 th sh	 Eahh ) Yh
	 (4.32)
where th and sh are tax and savings rates, respectively. This
equation shows the disposable income as gross income net of direct
taxes, savings and transfers. The transfers include those to the rest
of the world which are modeled in fixed shares. The disposable income
is allocated to the institutions' consumption account in the SAM.
The distribution of company incomes differ from those of
the households in that companies do not consume commodities. This
means that company incomes are exhausted by direct taxes, savings and
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transfers. Hence
Yh (1	 th	 sh	 tEl'ahh ) = °	 (4.33)
The treatment of government income is a lot more elaborate
than those of households and companies. This can be seen from the
following equation.
Yh = Eahgh +" + Ethyh + Et.X. + Et.M. ERf "' 	 j	 j	 3
+ t.. + t.. ERij	 lj (4.34)
which shows that government revenues (yh) are made up of transfers from
institutions, fixed shares of factor incomes, direct taxes on
institutions' incomes, and indirect taxes on the domestic goods
(X.)and on imported goods (M.). It also includes exogenous transfers
(t.)from government and ROW. As discussed before Governmentij
consumption is fixed in the budget.
In our model, given government income and consumption,
government savings are specified as a residual. In TV-form this
specification has no equation.
The income account of ROW is modelled as
Yr = Earfyf
 Ea
rgh Ewp.M.ER + t?.
h	 jJ J	 13
(4.35)
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showing payments to the rest of the world as transfers of factor and
institutional incomes in fixed shares, payments for iffports, and
exogenous government transfers.
On the other hand, receipts from ROW are in the form of
export earnings and exogenous transfers to factors and institutions.
Hence
yr = EPE_.ER + t?. ERj	 13
•
(4.36)
shows total payments from abroad to Kenya.
4.35	 Balance of Payments, Savings and Investments 
Having established the payments to and receipts from ROW,
the balance of payments (foreign savings) is simply specified as their
difference. Hence
ES = Yr - Yr
	 (4.37)
The way the current account is modelled plays a crucial role in the
determination of the closure of the economic system. For example, if
the country is not constrained in foreign capital markets the account
can be specified as a residual. In this case foreign savings
equilibrate the current account. If on the other hand the supply of
foreign capital is inelastic then foreign savings is fixed.
S = ES y +
. h h	 13 (4.38)
I= Et.. = c..Y.i 13	 13 3 (4.40)
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If foreign savings clear the external balance then (4.37) is not
specified; otherwise it is specified as FS = t?.ER .13
Total savings can now be specified as
showing total savings as being made up of institutional savings and
fixed exogenous transfers from ROW. Foreign savings are equal to the
balance of payments in domestic currency.
With total savings determined, they have to be equated with
total investments. Hence
S = I	 (4.39)
where total investments (I) are determined from (4.22) as
The equalisation of S and I determines the macroeconomic closure.
For example, with fixed I and exogenously determined
foreign savings, the domestic savings will have to adjust to meet the
desired investment demand. This is the so-called investments driven
model. However, if investments is endogenous then it adjusts to
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available savings and we have a savings driven model.
4.4	 Summary
In this Chapter we have introduced the data that will be
used in the empirical analysis. The reasons why the data were not
useful for modelling purposes in the original form has been discussed.
This was followed by a step-by-step review of the modifications which
have been made to transform the original SAM into a model SAM. It
should be stressed that the model SAM (Table 4.4) is so named because
it contains most of the information needed to model the Kenyan economy.
This unique characteristic is reflected by the fact that the model
developed in Section 4.3 is actually a formalisation of how the values
of each cell and account in the SAM are determined. The functional
forms of the cell and account equations are shown in the specification
table in the Appendix. It is evident from this table that each cell
value of the SAM is in effect superimposed by an equation showing how
it is determined.
Modelling through the cells and accounts of the SAM means
that for the system to be determined each cell and account must be
balanced. The high dimensionality of the SAM however makes it
difficult to establish the determinancy of the model in the usual way
of counting variables and equations. For example, with a 78 by 78
SAM, the number of cell elements (although many will take zero values)
and hence variables and equations will be so high as to make counting
a tedious process. Drud and Kendrick (1986, Chapter 9) provides a
simpler method of counting equations and variables. In this method
degrees of freedom are assigned to the cell specifications; where the
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degrees of freedom equal the number of variables less the number of
equations. A cell is therefore balanced if it has zero degrees of
freedom and has more or less variables than equations if it has
positive or negative degrees of freedom. The determinancy of the
system is therefore established by counting the degrees of freedom
associated with the specification of each cell and account. An
alternative method is provided by Drud et al (1986).
The program we use for our simulations (HERCULES) provides a
summary table showing the number of variables and equations of the
model. In our base model there are 792 equations and variables.
However, it should be noted that a change in closure rules and/Or
experiments changes the number of equations and variables in the
model.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MODEL PARAMETARISATION, CLOSURE RULES AND BASE SOLUTION
5.1	 Introduction
Chapter 4 introduced the data and the model we shall use for
policy analysis. A SAM which was otherwise not useful for policy
purposes was transformed into a model SAM. A model underlying the SAM
was then specified. The aim of this chapter is to parametarise the
specified model before it can be used to simulate policy changes. The
parameterisation of the model ensures the model can reproduce the base
year data, the so-called "benchmark" equilibrium, as its solution.
This is achieved through "calibration"; a process Mansur and Whalley
(1984 p.86) defines as "the ability of the model to replicate base
year data as a model solution". This ability of the model to
replicate the benchmark equilibrium data has two significant
implications. Firstly, it confirms the consistency of the data set;
and secondly, it establishes that at least one solution to the system
exists.
In the context of the CGE framework the consistency of the
data implies zero excess demands in all the markets. It also implies
that incomes and expenditures satisfy the budget constraints of the
agents in the economy, and that firms earn normal profits. Although
calibration confirms the existence of an equilibrium solution to the
model it does not guarantee that the solution is unique. However,
there are no known cases of non uniqueness in the literature, but this
is not enough to rule out the existence of multiple equilibria. In
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the absence of alternative methods of determining uniqueness we assume
that the solutions obtained from our simulations are unique. Another
weakness related to the use of calibration is that because of its
deterministic nature the robustness of the model results cannot be
statistically tested. Lau (1984) suggests that this problem can be
dealt with by stochastic estimation of CGE models. The problem with
this argument is that it fails to appreciate that it is precisely
because of the difficulty of applying econometric estimation to CGE
models, particularly because of their high dimentionality and the poor
quality of available data, that calibration is used.
In this chapter no attempt is made to provide a detailed
analysis of the issues associated with the numerical specification and
solution of CGE models. These issues are given a thorough treatment
in Shoven and Whalley (1984), Mansur and Whalley (1984) and Manne
(1985). The parameterisation of the model is done in the next section
and the resulting base solution is given in section 5.3. In section
5.4 the sensitivity of the models results to parameter (elasticities)
changes is analysed. The last section of the chapter discusses the
macroclosures of the model. Some experiments are carried out to
determine the implication of different closure rules for the model
results.
5.2	 Model Parameterisation
To calibrate the model requires estimates of several
parameters. These include the share and scale parameters of the
production functions, the share parameters of the income distribution
and consumption systems, and elasticities. However, where the base
Y1
o	 .1t..	 a.
(5. = a?. -
J	 lj
(5.3)
138
SAM is established as a solution to the model some of these parameters
can be endogenously determined. For example, B, and 6, can be
determined from (4.5) and their first order conditions (4.6) and (4.7).
The variables L., SL. UL., w. and w.. can also be parameters
J	 Jr	 J	 J	 1j
uniquely determined from base year data; and with these parameters,
. can be obtained from (4.6) or (4.7) as:03
1
w.	 SL.	 a.
6. =	 („J)	 J
3	 'w.	 .3
(5.1)
Since prices are set to unity in the base solution (5.1) becomes
1
SL.	 0.
I
=	 11	 j
uj	 'L. ' (5.2)
Equation (5.2) can be converted to value-form by setting SL i = tij/Wi
and L
3
. = y./.14.
3
 to obtain
Wheret. i
 and y. are base valuesi
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Withthevalueof 633. determined	 B. is obtained from (4.5) as
L.
1
B. =	
-1).	 P.
[6. SL.3
	+ (1 - 6.
3
)UL
3
. 3 ]	 J
3
(5.4)
Where SL , UL , and L are base quantities of labour.
Noticethat6.can be obtained from values only while B.
are obtainable from quantities. The same procedure is also used to
estimate the share and distribution parameter values for the Armington
and CEA functions. Notice also that since (5.3) and (5.4) are derived
from a CES function and given the base prices and quantities, 6 and
B can be determined only after 6 have been exogeneously
1/
supplied.	 This problem does not arise in the cases where Leontief
or Cobb-Douglas functions are used because their a are zero and
unity, respectively, hence their parameters are uniquely determined
from base data. The elasticities required for calibration include
those for production and Armington functions, export demand
elasticities, and the elasticities for CET functions.
As in other studies we rely on literature search for these
elasticities. The problems associated with the use of elasticities
derived in this manner have been widely discussed. 2/
Among the most serious shortcomings of extraneously obtained
elasticities is that they are in most cases from different sources.
This means that they are often estimates for different commodities
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than those being considered, or are based on economies or periods
different from those being investigated. Moreover, they may not
exist at all in which case "guestimates" are used. The robustness of
these parameters is tested through "sensitivity" analysis.
Table 5.1 contains the elasticities we use for calibration
and sensitivity analysis. They are the elasticities of substitution
between unskilled and skilled labour (Ei xi ) , aggregate labour and
and capital (ELk ) , domestic and imported goods (Edm) , export demand
elasticities (Ex) ' and the constant elasticities of transformation
(Et) . Each type of elasticity has been divided into low, medium and
high values to establish the sensitivity of the model results. Except
for (ELk ) the estimates of the rest of the parameters using Kenya data
could not be be found. Most of the elasticities in Table 5.1
therefore are elasticities from studies of other economies.
Estimates of the elasticities of substitution between labour
categories are sparse and fraught with inconsistencies. Estimates for
developed countries cited in Dixon et al. (1982) show that they range
from 0.0 - 1.0. Adelman and Robinson (1978) and Dervis et al. (1982)
assume unitary elasticities for Korea and Turkey, respectively.
Taylor et al. (1980) use elasticities ranging from 4.0 to 7.0 for
their Brazillian study; while Bowles (1970) argue that it would be
appropriate to assume infinite elasticities of substitution among
various labour categories. For short-run LDC models such an
assumption, especially where labor types are classified by skill,
would be difficult to justify. The elasticity values we have used for
sensitivity analysis are from Taylor et al. (1980). The high values
recorded in Table 5.1 are half the original values. In simulating
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policy experiments we assume low substitutability between skilled and
unskilled labour; and hence use the low elasticity values.
There is little disagreement in the literature about the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Dixon et al.
(1982) suggest the values of these elasticities obtained from time
series estimates are about 0.5 while those obtained from cross-section
estimates lie at about 1.0. They also argue that the time series
estimates are more appropriate in analysing short-run issues. Most
studies of Kenya have used values of olk between 0.5 and 0.75.
Bevan et al. (1987) estimated 0lk for the manufacturing sector of
0.5 and imposes it on all other sectors. Blomqvist and McMahon (1986)
use 0lk of 0.75 for the two sectors (manufacturing and agriculture)
in their study and McMahon (1984) uses a lk which range from 0.5
to 0.75 for several sectors. Maitha (1973) estimates 01k for
various Kenyan manufacturing sectors using cross-section data. His
results range from 0.5 to 1.00 which is consistent with the
observations by Dixon et al. We use Maitha's estimates in this study;
with the original estimates treated as the medium case in Table 5.1.
However, it should be noted that Maitha does not estimate the
elasticities for the construction sector, private and government
sectors and so they have been obtained from Dervis et al. (1982).
There are no estimates of trade elasticities for Kenya.
McMahon (1984) uses export demand elasticities ranging from 2.0 - 6.0
and Armington elasticities ranging from 0.14 - 1.0. We obtain these
elasticities from Dervis et al. (1982) which we record as the low and
142
TABLE 5.1 
Elasticities Used for Sensitivity Analysis*
LL
1
ELk
2
dm
3 4E
X
5
Ha
mb H
Lc M Hc Lc M Hc IF
AGR 0.88 1.75 3.50 0.38 0.75 1.50 2.0 4.0 6.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 0.38 0.75 lE
['COD 0.69 2.85 0.38 0.75 1.50 0.75 1.5 2.25 2.0 3.0 4.0 0.38 0.75 lE
CON 0.69 1.38 2.85 0.38 0.75 1.50 0.75 1.5 2.25 3.0 4.5 6.0 0.38 0.75 lE
PEAR	 	 0.63 1.25 2.50 0.38 0.75 1.50 0.33 0.66 1.0 3.0 4.5 6.0 0.13 0.25 OE
CHEE 0.50 1.0 2.0 0.25 0.50 1.0 0.33 0.66 1.0 3.0 4.5 6.0 0.13 0.25 OF
MAN 0.56 1.13 2.25 0.35 0.70 1.4 0.33 0.66 1.0 3.0 4.5 6.0 0.13 0.25 OE
CONS 0.63 1.25 2.5 0.25 0.50 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 OD
PSRV 0.69 1.38 2.85 0.30 0.60 1.2 0.25 0.50 0.75 2.0 3.0 4.0 0.13 0.25 OE-
GSRV 0.69 1.38 2.85 0.25 0.50 1.0 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.5 0.75 1.0 0.13 0.25 05
*:Recause of differences in aggregation the parameter-sector mappings may not
correspond to those in the original sources.
Source: (a) Taylor et al (1980), P. 197, Table 8.9
(b) Maitha (1973), p. 47, Table 2.
(c) Dervis et al (1982), p. 263, Table 8.2.
(d) Grais et al (1986), p. 75, Table 5.
Note:	 (1) Low and medium values are i and 4 the high values, respectively.
(2) Low and high values are 4 and twice the original values, respectively.
(3) Medium values are 4 the original high values.
(4) Medium values are i the original high values.
(5) Low and medium values are 4 and 4 the original values, respectively.
B. = E. V.1	 ly 1 (5.5)
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high values in Table 5.1. Estimates of elasticities for the CET
functions are a recent phenomenon. Powell and Gruen (1968) and Dixon
et al. (1982) have estimated these elasticities for some commodities
in the Australian agricultural sector. We obtain these elasticities
from Grais, de Melo, and Urata (1986); the same elasticities are also
used in Condon, Robinson and Urata (1985).
The other parameters required before the model can be solved
are those of the consumer demand system (LES). 3/
 The elasticities of
these functions are derived using equations (4.26) - (4.28). While
the marginal budget shares (B i ) can be calibrated from base SAM
data given the minimum level of consumption of commodity i (a1);
a cannot be calibrated from the base SAM. Both parameters are
therefore obtained through indirect estimation. To do this, first
note that (4.6) can be written as
where V ,
	is the average budget share of the ith commodity
• in the consumer's total expenditure. Hence, given Eiy and vi
can be easily computed from (5.5). The values for v i are obtained
from household budget surveys reported in Kenya (1988). Expenditure
elasticities are obtained from Massell and Heyer (1969), Gunning
(1979),andOkunade(1985).Theoriginalv.and E.	 were hand-
adjusted to satisfy the adding up condition (E v. = 1) andi
the Engel aggregation condition (E v.E.l = 1) .y
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• To estimate a. we still need to derive total committed1
expenditure. To do this we assume that the share of committed
expenditure in total consumption is 75 per cent and 70 per cent for
rural and urban households, respectively. This amounts to assuming a
Frisch parameter value of -4.0 and -3.3 for the two households,
respectively. These values are in line with those obtained from
various cross country studies by Lluch, Powell, and Williams (1977).
With the given base prices and incomes and the estimated
values of B. and E poi(
al can now be computed from (4.25).
For instance a. for urban households is calculated as1
(1 - 0.70)Y
ul
a.
	 = C.	
- B.	 [lu	 iu	 Pi
(5.6)
Hence, given that all prices are set to unity in the base case (5.6)
becomes
(5.7)a. = C. 
-B1 (1 - 0.70)Yulu	 lu	 lu
The estimated LES parameters and the associated elasticities
are shown in Table 5.2. Both the expenditure and own-price
elasticities are within the expected ranges. For both households
iy
are greater than unity for luxury goods (manufactured) and less than
unity for necessities (foods). Notice that government services is a
necessity for rural households, but a luxury for the urban households.
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This result reflects the fact that urban households consume a large
share of GSRV so that E	 was inflated when being hand adjusted to
iy
satisfy the Engel aggregation condition. This also explains the high
E	 for agricultural goods for both households. Notice also that the
iy
own-price elasticities are close to half of the income elasticities
for all commodities implying a constant ratio
TABLE 5.2 
Parameters of the Linear Expenditure System (LES)
Rural Households
*
Urban Households
*
E. E.. B. V. E. E.. Bi V.
_ 11 11 1 _I-Y 11 1
AGRC 1.168 -0.771 0.570
_
0.488 1.003 -0.541 0.080 0.080
FOODC 0.509 -0.283 0.100 0.196 0.722 -0.438 0.120 0.166
CONC 1.422 -0.612 0.100 0.070 1.784 -0.912 0.180 0.101
PETRC - - - - 1.922 -0.962 0.020 0.010
ID 0.966 -0.411 0.040 0.041 0.871 -0.464 0.05 0.006
NANC 1.456 -0.599 0.040 0.027 1.125 -0.606 0.10 0.089
CONSC- - - - - - - -
PSRVC 0.917 -0.455 0.140 0.153 0.875 -0.622 0.400 0.457
GSRVC 0.634 -0.261 0.01 0.016 1.301 -0.668 0.050 0.038
*Source: Kenya Economic Survey (1988), Table 3.3
between the two elasticities. This is a result of the additive nature
of the utility function underlying LES.
146
5.3	 Calibration
Having specified all the parameters of the model in the
previous section the model is then calibrated. This is done using
HERCULES software developed by Drud and Kendrick (1986); a sub-system
of the GAMS package of Kendrick and l‘leraus (1986). HERCULES is a
Newton type algorithm and was developed to implement TV-Approach type
models.
Table 5.3 shows the base solution of the model; with base
values given by YBASE. From the GDP summary part of the Table we can
see that the base values of GDP at factors cost, indirect taxes,
exports, imports and balance of trade (resource gap) are all
replicated. Given that base prices (PSOL) are set to unity, the
quantity (QSOL) and incomes (YSOL) solutions are equal to YBASE. As
discussed before, the quantity solutions of the model are derived by
deflating YSOL by PSOL. Such solutions (QSOL) are also real values
and hence are compared with YBASE to determine changes in real values
resulting from a policy change. For example, the changes in the real
values can be used to infer the welfare gains or losses and/Or the
change in the structure of the economy. Some of these issues are
further discussed in the appendix.
Notice that some accounts have no price and quantity
solutions. These are mainly the income transfer accounts for non
market factors, institutions and indirect taxes. The non market
factors SLBRF and CAPITALF receive factor payments from abroad and
transfer to accounts which receive total factor incomes (institutions)
ULBRT, SiRRT and CAPITALT. Because factor payments from abroad are
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TABLE 5.3 
Base Solution
GDP Summary 
Base
Solution
Price
Index
Current
Prices
Constant
Prices
GDP at factor cost 1296.100 1296.100 1296.100 1.000
net indirect taxes 175.500 175.500 175.500
income effect 0.000
Final Use 1461.500 1461.500 1461.500 1.000
Exports 471.700 471.700 471.700 1.000
Imports -461.600 -461.600 -461.600 1.000
GDP at Market Prices 1471.600 1471.600 1471.600 1.000
Terms of Trade 0.000
Gross Domestic Income 1471.600 1471.600 1471.600
Resource Gap
-10.100
-10.100 -10.000
Solution Summary
PSOL QSOL YSOL YBASE
ULBRD 1.000 543.400 543.400 543.400
SLBRD 1.000 357.700 357.700 357.700
AGL-AG 1.000 382.200 382.200 382.300
AGL-POD 1.000 21.800 21.800 21.800
AGL-CON 1.000 22.900 22.900 22.900
ACT-PTR 1.000 2.700 2.700 2.700
AGL-CEM 1.000 12.800 12.800 12.800
AGL-MAN 1.000 23.900 23.900 23.900
AGL-CNS 1.000 39.100 39.100 39.100
AGL-PSR 1.000 212.900 212.900 212.900
AGL-GSR 1.000 182.800 182.800 182.800
CAP-AGR 1.000 159.900 159.900 159.900
CAP-FOOD 1.000 31.600 31.600 31.600
CAP-CON 1.000 13.100 13.100 13.100
CAP-PETR 1.000 5.800 5.800 5.800
CAP-CHEM 1.000 20.800 20.800 20.800
CAP-MAN 1.000 14.400 14.400 14.400
CAP-CONS 1.000 7.100 7.100 7.100
CAP-PSRV 1.000 140.400 140.400 140.400
CAP-GSRV 1.000 1.900 1.900 1.900
SLBRF 1.800 1.800
CAPITALF 12.500 12.500
ULBRT 543.400 543.400
SLBRT 359.500 359.500
CAPPIALT 407.500 407.500
RHSDY 635.000 635.000
RHSDC 1.000 538.800 538.800 538.800
UHSDY 464.700 464.700
UITSDC 1.000 374.700 374.700 374.700
COMPY 364.400 364.400
PSOL QSOL YSOL YBASE
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TABLE 5.3 (Contd.)
GOVTY 363.000 363.000
GCVTC 1.000 253.800 253.800 253.800
SAV-INV 1.000 294.200 294.200 294.200
IND-TX 175.500 175.500
ACT-AGR 1.000 625.800 625.800 625.800
ACT-FOOD 1.000 320.600 320.600 320.600
ACT-CON 1.000 138.300 138.300 138.300
ACT-PEER 1.000 133.300 133.300 133.300
ACT-CHEM 1.000 115.600 115.600 115.600
ACT-MAN 1.000 142.900 142.900 142.900
ACT-CONS 1.000 162.300 162.300 162.300
ACT-PSRV 1.000 656.200 656.200 656.200
ACT-GSRV 1.000 269.200 269.200 269.200
CO4-AGRD 1.000 474.300 474.300 474.300
CO1-FOOD 1.000 326.900 326.900 326.900
COM-COND 1.000 131.900 131.900 131.900
COM-PETRD 1.000 92.100 92.100 92.100
CO1-CHEMD 1.000 91.000 91.000 91.000
COM-M1\ND 1.000 151.200 151.200 151.200
COM-CONSD 1.000 162.700 162.700 162.700
COM-PSRVD 1.000 502.900 502.900 502.900
COM-GSRVD 1.000 268.500 268.500 268.500
COM-AGRM 1.000 12.200 12.200 12.200
COM-FOODM 1.000 21.600 21.600 21.600
COM-CONM 1.000 52.700 52.700 52.700
COM-PETRM 1.000 127.500 127.500 127.500
COM-CHEMN 1.000 66.400 66.400 66.400
COM MANM 1.000 188.000 188.000 188.000
COM-PSRVM 1.000 50.200 50.200 50.200
COM-GSRVM 1.000 9.500 9.500 9.500
CO1-AGRC 1.000 486.500 486.500 486.500
COM-FCODC 1.000 348.500 348.500 348.500
COM-CONC 1.000 184.600 184.600 184.600
CO4-REiRC 1.000 219.600 219.600 219.600
CO4-CHEMC 1.000 157.400 157.400 157.400
CO4-MANC 1.000 339.200 339.200 339.200
CO4-CONSC 1.000 162.700 162.700 162.700
COM-PSRVC 1.000 553.100 553.100 553.100
CO1-GSRVC 1.000 278.000 278.000 278.000
COM-AGRX 1.000 153.900 153.900 153.900
COM-FOODX 1.000 36.200 36.200 36.200
CO4-CONX 1.000 18.200 18.200 18.200
COM-PETRX 1.000 47.900 47.900 47.900
COM-CHEMX 1.000 32.500 32.500 32.500
COM-MANX 1.000 13.700 13.700 13.700
COM-PSRVX 1.000 168.100 168.100 168.100
COM-GSRVX 1.000 1.200 1.200 1.200
RES-WRD 1.000 567.700 567.700
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modelled as exogeneously fixed YSOL will be equal YBASE. However, in
the case of RHSDY, UHSDY, COMPY, and IND-TX accounts YSOL and YBASE
will differ depending on the income and price effects arising from
policy change. The rest of the world account (RES-WRD) has no
quantity solution, but its price (exchange rate) is defined. This is
explained by the assumption of exogeneously determined foreign capital
inflows.
5.4	 Sensitivity Analysis 
Three experiments have been run to test the sensitivity of
the model results to the elasticities given in Table 5.1. These
experiments involve a 10 per cent exogeneous increase in the prices of
those imports with high intermediate content; namely, CONM, PETRM,
CHEMM and MAIT4. The results are shown in Table 5.4. The
model used is a neoclassical type with fixed factors and fixed nominal
exchange rate, endogenous investments and exogeneous foreign savings. 4/
The initial impact of the increase in *port prices is to
increase composite prices. Since intermediate inputs are bought from
the composite accounts this increases the cost of production; leacing
to higher activity (gross) output and commodity prices. However,
Table 5.4 shows that with low elasticities increases in import prices
lead lower activity and commodity prices; with the exception to
petroleum. This suggests that with low elasticities domestic and
imported goods act as gross complements. However, as the elasticities
rise domestic and imported goods behave as substitutes, and the prices
of the activities and commodities also rise.
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These results can be explained in several ways. Firstly,
note that composite goods are a CES aggregation of domestic and
imported goods with the elasticity of substitution (0 ) determining
the degree of substitutability. With low 0 , higher import prices
by raising composite prices will reduce the demand for the composite
goods. This in turn leads to lower demand for the domestic goods and
TABLE 5.4 
Percentage Price changes (from base levels) due to 10% increase in
import prices 
Low Medium High
Activity -AGR
-5.7 -4.0 -3.0
Activity -FOOD
-4.6 -2.8 -1.7
Activity -CON
-1.9 0.3 1.3
Activity -PETR 7.8 8.6 9.0
Activity -CHEM
-2.6 0.3 1.5
Activity -MAN
-1.8 1.1 2.5
Activity -CONS
-1.0 1.1 2.3
Activity -PSRV
-4.7 -2.9 -1.7
Activity -GSRV
-4.4 -3.2
-2.3Commodity-AGR
Commodity-FOOD
Commodity-CON
Commodity-Pk-Lk
Commodity-CHUM
Commodity-VAN
Commodity-CONS
Commodity-PSRV
Commodity-GSRV
Composite-AG
-7.1
-5.1
-2.2
11.3
-3. 7
2.2
-1.0
-6.3
-4.4
-4.9
-3.1
0.3
12.4
0.5
1.2
1.1
-3.9
-3.2
-3.5
-1.8
1.5
12.8
2.1
2.7
2.3
-2.3
-2.3
Composite-FCOD -6.9 -4.8 -3.5
Composite-CON -4.8 -2.9 -1.71.2 2.9 3.8Composite-PET
Composite-CHEM 10.5 11.0 11.2
Composite-MAN 2.0 4.4 5.3
Composite-CONS 4.5 6.0 6.7
Composite-PSRV -1.0 1.1 -2.1
Composite-GSRV -5.7 -3.6 -2.1
-4.3
-3.1
-2.2
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hence lower prices. However, as imported goods become more
substitutable with domestic goods prices rise not only because of high
pass through of the higher import prices, but also due to increased
demand for domestic goods. Secondly, the share of imports in the
composite good also determines the domestic price response to changes
in import prices. The lower (higher) the share of imports the lower
(higher) will be the price effects. The share of petroleum imports in
total petroleum intermediate inputs is about 90 per cent. This
explains why the increase in the price of the imported component of
the petroleum sector is almost fully reflected in its price change.
However, for non-petroleum products low import shares limit their
price increases to smaller magnitudes. The prices of those sectors
whose import prices do not change decline in all the experiments.
This can be traced to the decline in aggregate demand arising from the
deterioration in the terms of trade. The exception is the
construction sector which benefits from higher increased savings due
to lower consumption.
To summarize, it is evident from the above results that the
choice of elasticities crucially affect model results. The changes in
the sign and size of activity and commodity prices differ
significantly with elasticity changes. This means that in choosing
these parameters for use in empirical analysis the structure of the
economy being modelled must be appropriately reflected. Because of a
general lack of elasticity estimates for Kenya, we have used the best
available estimates; and in some cases what we consider the most
realistic values. More specifically, for our simulations we use the
low values of the elasticities of substitution between the two labour
types (ELI) and the medium values for the rest of the elasticities
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( Elk' E	 E ' and Et ) given in Table 5.1.dm ' x
As discussed in Section 5.2, the choice of Els, follows
from our assumption of low substitution between skilled and unskilled
labour. The choice of the elasticities of substitution between
aggregate labour and capital (EL K) is less problematic because the
values used are based on estimates derived from Kenyan data; and,
moreover, these estimates fall within the expected values for LDC8.
Because of high sectoral aggregation trade (Armington) elasticities
(E) are by convention assumed to be low, usually around unity. Ourdm
choice of these parameters reflect this assumption. The exceptions
are agricultural commodities, foods and consumer goods which, because
they are assumed to be highly homogeneous, have been assigned
elasticities greater than unity. Our choice of the export demand
elasticities follow the widely accepted assumption that these
elasticities range from 2.0 to 6.0 for TIC products. The choice of
the elasticities of transformation (Et) is problematic because there
are no estimates for LDC8. The high values of Et in Table 5.1, and
used in models for Turkey by Crais et al. (1986) and Condon et al.
(1985), are guesstimates. Tarr (1989) uses relatively high values in
a model of USA quantitative restrictions; specifying Et of 1.6, 2.9
and 4.2 as low, medium and high values, respectively, for various
manufactured commodities. These are reasonable estimates for a
developed economy but for LDCs, where it is more difficult to shift
resources from the production for domestic to export markets, lower
estimates are more realistic.
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5.5	 Closure Rules 
Our basic model has 780 cell equations and 791 variables
which means that the model is underdetermined. To make it fully
determinated eleven variables have to be fixed. Which of these
variables are to be made exogenous leads to the problem of closure
rules. "
 The widespread application of CGE models in the late 1970s
and 1980s has led to a long running debate as to the appropriate
macroclosures. This debate is a result of the realisation that the
choice of macroclosure determines model results. The original work on
this issue is Sen (1963); while the initial debate started with Bruno
(1979), Taylor and Lysy (1979), Lluch (1979), and Bell (1979). The
issue is also extensively discussed in Taylor (1983), Rattso (1982),
Dervis et al (1982), Robinson (1989), and Adelman and Robinson (1988)
In the context of economy wide models the macroclosure
debate is basically about how aggregate investment is to be equated
with aggregate savings. The debate however has been expanded to
include how different markets are cleared. When the economy is
opened the issue of "external closure" arises. The debate about
"external closure" revolves around whether the exchange rate is fixed
or flexible. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, Whalley and Yeung
(1984) and de Nelo and Robinson (1986) have extended the debate to
include assumptions about the specification of export demand functions
and product differentiation of traded goods.
To understand the implication of closure rules on CGE
results it is useful to set up a small model. We use the now famous
Sen's (1963) model for this purpose. This is a one-sector model
= s
11)K + s (r)
r p	 w p L (5.11)
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producing one good under constant returns to scale. Capital and
labour are the only factors production, and are assumed to be
available in fixed supply. Firms are assumed to distribute all
incomes to households; and that consumption out of wage income is
greater than that from profits. Investments are assumed tobe financed
by savings. The model is specified as:
Y = F(K, L)	 (5.8)
= F (K
'
 L)
	 (5.9)
Y = ( r-)K +	 L
	 (5.10)
I = I	 (5.12)
L = 17,	 (5.13)
K = R	 (5.14)
where w, r and p are wage rate, profits and commodity price,
respectively. Returns to factors are therefore given in real terms.
Y, K, L and I are output, capital, labour and investment,
respectively; F is the production function and FL is the marginal
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product of labour; and lastly, s r and sw are savings out of
profits and wage incomes, respectively. With all the variables
defined, the equations are self-explanatory. The model has seven
independent equations and six variables (Y, K, L, I, w/p, r/p) and the
system is therefore overdetermined. The choice of closure rule is
therefore about which of the seven equations should be dropped.
Sen (1963) distinguished four different macroclosures;
namely, the Neoclassical, the neo-Keynesian or what has come to be
known as Kaldorian, the Johansen, and the General Theory (Keynesian).
The debate among the modelers concerns the theoretical justification
for the choice among these closures. Models of LDCs have used several
variants of the Keynesian closure. Such models, especially Taylor and
Lysy (1979) have expanded the debate to include the issues of what
constitutes a true Keynesian model and the interpretation of its
results. 6/
A typical neoclassical closure drops (5.12) and investments
are endogeneously determined. This means that planned investments
adjust to available savings; with the two variables being brought to
equality by a mechanism outside the system, for example, the interest
rate. In addition, the neoclassical closure assumes full employment
and flexible exchange rate under open economy model. The model
therefore specifies a system in which prices clear the markets. The
significance of this closure is that with resources fully employed
and factors paid their marginal products, output is determined only on
the production side. The demand side plays little role. Moreover,
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because the model retains most Walrasian features, it is easy to
follow the channels through which the system is brought into
equilibrium. Neoclassical assumptions however do not reflect
realistic structures of LDC economies; hence the neoclassical closure
is rarely used to model these economies.
The neo-Keynesian closure drops (5.9), the condition that
the real wage equals the marginal product of labour. The exogeneity
of investments means that savings must adjust to meet planned
investments. Given that labour can be paid less than its marginal
product and with full employment, income will be redistributed from
wage earners to the high saving capitalists. The resulting increase
in savings serves to attain investment-savings equilibrium.
Under the Johansen closure (5.11) is dropped so that savings
and investments are not explicitly equated in the model. With full
employment and exogeneous investments, the system is closed by a
mechanism outside the model, One possibility is through the
endogeneous change in consumption induced, for example, by taxes or
subsidies. For instance, an exogeneous increase in investments
increases disposable income and hence consumption. To maintain
equilibrium higher taxes can be used to equate private consumption and
output and hence implicitly savings and investments. Alternatively,
where government consumption is fixed in nominal terms or is
endogeneously determined, active fiscal policy can be used for the
purpose.
The Keynesian closure assumes that (5.13) is dropped. The
relaxation of the full employment condition leads to the deviation
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between investments and savings being mediated through changes in
employment and output. For the example, increase in investments will
lead to increase in real output, which must be preceded by increase in
employment. Higher employment will generate increased incomes and
hence savings.
The most widely used Keynesian model may be called the
Taylor model after its major proponent. A typical Taylor model
[see Taylor (1979, 1983) and Taylor and Lysy (1979)] assumes exogenous
investments and endogenises the level of employment. It also fixes
the nominal wage as the numeraire and assumes different savings rates
between wage earners and the capitalists. The specification of this
model implies rather unorthodox equilibrating mechanisms. The
unemployment assumption means that the wage rate is no longer the
equilibrating mechanism in the labour market. Firms are assumed to be
always on their demand curves so that labour supply adjusts to meet
demand. With investments fixed exogenously there is a need for some
variable to equate aggregate savings and investments. In a typical
Taylor model this variable is the price level. The equilibrating
process takes the following route. Given that wages are fixed in
nominal terms a rise in the price level lowers the real wage. This
induces firms to increase employment which leads to greater output and
therefore increased savings through higher incomes. An open economy
Keynesian model with fixed exchange rates complicates the
equilibrating mechanism. In this case foreign capital inflows
complement domestic savings. Some Keynesian models, notably the
Taylor type models also include the Kaldorian features in their
specification, so that increase in savings partially results from
income distribution.
158
The choice of closure in CGE models depend on the
characteristics of the economy being modeled and the type of issues at
hand. The prominence of macro structuralist models of the Taylor type
lies in their attempt to capture the realities of LDC economies.
The realism of the macro structuralist models however has to be
weighed against the fact that some of their assumptions undermine the
microfoundations of Walrasian theory. On the other hand, as discussed
above, neoclassical models while remaining closely faithful to
Walrasian system are at variance with the realities of LDC economies.
Below we simulate the effects of a 10% increase in import
prices under the Neoclassical and Keynesian macroclosures.
Experiments are carried out under assumptions of fixed and flexible
exchange rates. This means we have four experiments which we have
named models 1-4. We also assume product differentiation between
domestic and imported goods (Armington assumption) and between
domestically consumed and exported gross output. As discussed in
Section 5.4 the low values of elasticities of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labour and the medium elasticities in the other
cases shown in Table 5.1 are used in the simulations.
Model 1 is a typical neoclassical model with full employment
and flexible exchange rates. The urban household consumer price index
is used as a numeraire. The current account is exogenously fixed in
foreign currency and hence should balance. Model 2 is a Keynesian
closure with the urban wage fixed as numeraire; investments are also
exogeneously fixed. 7/
 Model 3 is a variant of the neoclassical closure
However, unlike model 1 its closure includes fixed nominal exchange
rates and exogenously fixed investments. With a fixed nominal
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exchange rate the current account is endogeneously determined.
Foreign savings will therefore adjust to close the aggregate savings-
invesments gap. Model 4 is a variant of Model 2, but has a fixed
exchange rate. However, like model 2 the urban wage is used as a
mumeraire; the real exchange rate is therefore fixed.
The model we shall use for our empirical analysis is a
modified version of model 4. It follows (though not too closely) the
Keynesian macroclosures along the Taylor tradition. The supply of
unskilled labour is fixed so that its market is cleared by wage
adjustments. The SAM data shows that 70% of total unskilled labour is
employed in the agricultural sector; and furthermore, 90% of total
labour employed in this sector is unskilled. Existing evidence
suggests that there is a shortage of labour in rural Kenya (Collier
and Lal (1986), Fallon (1986)), especially in the most productive
areas. Collier and Lal (p. 92) show that because of high labour
demand, the real wage increased by 32% between 1968-78 in the small
holder agricultural sector.
The wage for skilled labour is assumed to be fixed in
nominal terms. This follows from the fact that wages in the formal
sector are in most part institutionally fixed. apirical evidence
show that real wage adjustments have been on a downward trend since
the mid 1970's. 8/
 Collier and Lal (p.93) show that the real wage of
skilled labour declined by 18% between 1968-77 and by a further 10% in
1977/78. Most of these wage adjustments occured from the mid-1970's
out of deliberate government policy. This would seem to support the
assumption that skilled wages are fixed in nominal terms.
160
Most of the studies on Kenya have specified only one
(aggregate) labour category and have assumed a variety of wage
determination mechanisms without convincing justification. Dick et
al. (1983) assumed fixed nominal wages, while Gupta and Togan (1984)
assumed fixed real and flexible wages in various experiments for an
aggregate labour category. The assumption of fixed or flexible
economywide wages is unecessarily too general. Blomqvist and McMahon
(1986) assume fixed real wage for urban industrial labour which is
unrealistic for the reason stated above. Roe and Pal (1986)
categorise the labour markets as rural and urban and assume that wages
clear the urban labour market, while unemployment is assumed to exist
in rural areas. Again these assumptions are not supported by the
existing evidence on Kenya's labour market.
Because of the short-run nature of our model we assume fixed
and sector-specific capital. Most of the models of Kenya use the same
assumption. The assumption of mobile capital by Dick et al (1988) in
an essentially short-run model is not justified. For external closure
we assume a fixed exchange rate regime; which in fact prevails in
Kenya. However, unlike most Keynesian models we do not allow foreign
savings to fill the gap between domestic savings and planned
investments; hence we assume exogeneously fixed foreign capital
inflows. This basically means that Kenya is constrained from
borrowing in foreign capital markets. The main difference between our
model and the Taylor type models is that we do not exclusively assume
exogeneously fixed real investments. In the absence of sound analysis
of investment behaviour in the Kenyan economy there is little
theoretical justification in favour of any of the two savings-
investment closures. The argument that investment is exogeneously
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fixed in the short-run seems reasonable. However, in the face
external shocks and the resultant structural adjustments it is
difficult to justify the assumption that planned investment is always
realised.
Table 5.5 shows the changes in the macroeconomic aggregates
of the model resulting from a 10 percent increase in import prices.
The aim of the experiments is to determine how the alternative
closures affect model results, and therefore the importance of the
assumptions we make about the structure of an economy.
To begin with, notice that the increase in import prices
lead to a deterioration of terms of trade by between 35-40%; the
effect of which is to depress the economy. This is clearly manifested
by the decline in real GDP and household consumption in all the models.
To analyse the implication of each closure we start with
model 2 which exhibits the most interesting results. The first thing
to note is that even with a depressed economy this model leads to
higher prices. GDP deflators at factor and market prices go up by
3.0% and 4.3% respectively; while consumer price indices rise by a
range between 3.7% and 7.1%. Export prices go up by 10.4% and import
prices rise by 20.7%. This inflationary phenomenon is a result of
the increases in the wage rate of unskilled labour, the high
devaluation of the exchange rate, and the increases in imported
intermediate input prices.
The high prices of model 2 leads to lower aggregate demand.
This is typified by the decline in rural household, urban household
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TABLE 5.5 
Percentage Change (from base values) in Macroeconomic
Aggregates Due to 10% Increase in Import Prices 
(A) Prices Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
GDP at factor cost -3.7 3.0 -3.1 -2.3
GDP at market prices -2.7 4.3 -2.2 -1.4
Exports 1.6 10.4 0.0 0.2
Imports 10.4 20.7 8.1 8.0
Unskilled labour wage -3.2 4.4 -2.8 -2.8
Skilled labour wage -3.9 0.0 -2.8 0.0
Capital - AGR -2.7 5.9 -2.6 -2.8
Capital - FOOD -3.3 1.9 -4.2 -3.7
Capital - CON -2.0 5.6 -2.5 -2.5
Capital - PhiR -22.5 -14.5 -21.3 -21.4
Capital - CHEM -0.6 11.3 -0.3 -0.9
Capital - MAN -9.5 3.2 -2.9 -2.1
Capital - CONS -13.0 3.3 -1.3 -0.7
Capital - PSRV -5.1 1.5 -4.7 -4.4
Capital -GSRV -0.4 -5.7 -0.6 -1.6
RHSDC - CPI -1.4 6.0 -1.0 -0.6
UHSEC - CPI 0.0 7.1 0.4 1.0
GCVTC - CPI -1.9 3.7 -1.3 0.3
Investments 4.1 12.9 4.0 4.4
Exchange Rate 2.2 11.6 0.0 0.0
(C)	 Values
Balance of Trade -63.60 -77.64 -203.36 -207.94
Balance of Payments
Deficit 2.20 11.62 34.64 36.07
Terms of Trade -37.75 -40.56 -35.13 -40.0
(D)	 Quantities
GDP at factor cost 0.0 -0.04 0.0 -0.49
GDP at market prices -0.45 -0.40 -0.26 -0.73
Exports 0.46 1.51 -0.45 -0.90
Imports -6.32 -5.55 -3.62 -3.73
Unskilled labour 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Skilled labour 0.0 -0.13 0.0 -1.77
RHSD - Consumption -1.96 -2.26 -1.92 -2.07
UHSD - Consumption -3.58 -4.82 -3.17 -3.27
GCVTC - Consumption 1.97 -3.54 1.35 -0.28
Investments -6.61 0.0 0.0 0.0
Employment-AGR 0.45 1.15 0.15 0.01
Employment-FOOD 0.26 0.20 -1.08 -2.03
Employment-CON 1.20 2.63 0.28 -0.94
Employment-PEaR
-15.04 -11.93 -14.63 -16.0
Employment-CHSM 1.60 4.95 1.26 -0.10
Employment-MAN
-4.28 1.18 -0.06 -0.84
EMployment -CONS 5.0 0.84 0.74 0.20
Employment -PSRV
-0.93 -0.16 -1.15 -2.00
Employment-GSRV 1.71 -3.36 1.10 -0.05
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and government consumption by 2.26%, 4.82% and 3.54%, respectively.
The effect of the decline in aggregate demand spreads to the sectoral
level and other markets in the economy. One such effect is the
decline in the employment of skilled labour. The model however shows
a different adjustment process for the unskilled labour category.
With the supply of this labour type fixed, change in the real wage
rate clears the market. The increase in the wage of unskilled labour
in this model is solely due to the growth of the agricultural sector
(as shown by increase in employment) in which it is used intensively.
This sector grows relative to the others because it uses less imported
inputs whose prices have gone up.
In this model it is also evident that returns to capital are
high. This is a result of higher employment in the AGR, CON, CHEM,
FOOD, PSRV sectors which raises the capital-labour ratios and hence
profits. The decline in employment and hence profitability in the
public sector is due to a decline in government consumption. On the
other hand, the decline in employment and profitability of the
petroleum sector is explained by the fact that it is a major user
ofimported intermediate inputs.
Given the flexible exchange rates and with the current
account exogeneously fixed in foreign currency in model 2, a high
devaluation is necessary to balance the external account. The 11.6%
devaluation not only reduces the demand for imports but also increases
the competitiveness of domestic exports. The increase in exports
however is not enough to avert an increase in the balance of trade
deficits. The current account deficit also increases, but only by the
rate of devaluation.
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In model 4 the Keynesian multiplier effects associated with
lower aggregate demand are greatly magnified compared to those of
model 2. This can be seen from the higher declines in the growth of
real GDP and employment; which are accompanied by declines in factor
rewards and the price levels. The decline real GDP is also explained
by the leakages arising from the increase in foreign savings,
resulting from fixed nominal exchange rates, which finances the large
trade deficits. Comparing the results of the two models, it is clear
that the type of closure chosen matters.
Under the neoclassical closure factors of production are
fixed and fully employed. In this model growth can only be generated
by reallocation of factors among sectors. The low growth in real GDP
at market prices in model I therefore implies that the gains from such
factor reallocation are minimal. As with the Keynesian closures,
lower aggregate demand leads to lower real GDP, lower general price
levels and lower returns to factors. Low economic growth also
translates to lower pressure to devalue the domestic currency. The
2.2% devaluation contrasts sharply with the 11.6% devaluation of model
2. The effect of the devaluation is to reduce the growth of imports
and increase that of exports. However, as is the case in model 2,
neither the current account nor the balance of trade is improved by
the increase in import prices and devaluation.
The exogeneity of investments in model 3 makes it not a
typical Neoclassical model. In this model imports and investments
are financed by foreign capital inflows represented by the higher
deficits in the balance of trade and the balance of payments. This
moderates the decline in real GDP at market prices. It is also
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noticeable that for most other variables the two neoclassical models
are closely similar. This is true with respect to changes in factor
earnings, price and consumption levels. This is because policy
changes only work through the production side in neoclassical models
and hence are more stable than the Keynesian models. It is still true
however that the choice of external closure matters in the two
neoclassical models.
5.6
	
Conclusion
To conclude, we have shown that model results are sensitive
to the choice closure rules. Specifying a model along neoclassical or
Keynesian lines and alternative external closures lead to different
results. It has also been shown that neoclassical models generate
more stable results than the Keynesian model. This is explained by
the fact that under the neoclassical models adjustments only work
through the production side, and since the factors of production are
fixed the response to policy changes are minimal. In contrast, output
in the Keynesian models is determined through both the production and
consumption sides of the economy. In these models the multiplier
process magnifies the changes in output through changes in employment
and consumption.
It was argued above that the Keynesian model best represents
the structure of the Kenyan economy. We shall therefore use this
model in our empirical analysis. The macroclosure of our model can be
summarised as follows:
(1) Supply of skilled and unskilled labour is assumed fixed; with the
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excess demand for unskilled labour cleared by wage adjustments
while unemployment of skilled labour is allowed through fixed
nominal wage specification. The unskilled labour wage is also
set as a numetaire.
(2) Supply of capital is also fixed, but is sector specific. Returns
to capital are therefore potentially different among sectors.
(3) The exchange rate is assumed fixed; hence given the fixed
relative price, the real exchange rate will be endogeneously
determined. However, unlike most models which allow
unconstrained external borrowing, we assume exogeneously fixed
foreign capital inflows. Capital formation will therefore be
heavily dependent on domestic savings.
(4) Since we find no justifiable reasons for specifying investments
as being determined either exogeneously or endogeneously the
results of both models will be reported.
(5) Government consumption is exogeneously fixed in nominal terms. A
change in government budget will therefore spill over into
aggregate demand.
The implication of these assumptions will become apparent in the next
chapter where they form the basis of the policy experiments. While
the specified model may not fully reflect the structure of the Kenyan
economy we believe that it is realistic enough and appropriate for our
purposes.
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CHAPTER SIX 
S IMULAT ION RESULTS 
6.1
	
Introduction 
This chapter simulates the consequences of trade policy
changes on the Kenyan economy. This is done by running experiments
involving tariff reductions, devaluation of domestic currency and
export subsidies. In practice, these policies are implemented with
the aim of stimulating efficient allocation of resources and hence
higher output and economic growth. The purpose of this Chapter is to
examine the extent to which these results are achieved in our model.
In particular, we analyse the effects of the policy changes on factor
and commodity prices, output and consumption levels, the volume of
trade, and factor allocation among sectors. The policy effects on
macroeconomic aggregates such as price indices, real GDP, trade
balance, and the balance of payments will also be examined.
It is important to reiterate that our model is short-run in
nature; with sector-specific capital and mobile labour. However, the
total supply of both factors is fixed. The model is also comparative
static. This means that issues normally associated with dynamic
models such as the adjustment costs and hence the timing and the
sequencing of liberalisation do not arise. For most part, the
simulations are made under the assumption of perfect competition and
constant returns to scale in production. Commodity markets are
cleared by prices, but other markets, for example, labour and external
markets are cleared depending on the assumed closure rule.This applies
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to the simulation results reported in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. In
Section 6.2 the results of tariff reductions are reported, while those
of devaluation and export subsidies are reported in Section 6.3.
Alternative simulations which take into account the effects of
quantitative restrictions and the deviations from marginal cost
pricing are also made. Section 6.4 reports the results involving the
effects of import controls. With import quantities fixed under a
fixed exchange rate regime some price mechanism will adjust to clear
the excess demand for imports. It is usual to model changes in import
premia as the clearing mechanism. In this study we simulate the
effect of exogenous increase or decrease in the volume of imports on
the domestic economy. This endogenises import price changes which
clear the excess demand for imports. In Section 6.5 results involving
mark-up prices are reported. The production technology and price
formation in this model differs from those of the other sections.
This specification allows us to examine the implication of deviation
from the competitive system.
6.2
	 Model Results from Tariff Reductions
It was shown in Chapter 3 that with qualitative models
unambiguous effects of tariff reductions could only be obtained by
assuming that imports were either competitive or non-competitive.
This is largely because such models cannot take into account the role
of import shares and the elasticities of substitution between imported
and domestic goods. Since empirical models incorporate these features
these problems do not arise. For example, the elasticities of
substitution in effect define the competitiveness and therefore the
relative changes in demand for domestic and imported goods due to
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tariff reductions. The interpretation of our results therefore avoids
the problems associated with the qualitative models.
In this section we simulate the effects of trade
liberalisation in the form of a 50 percent tariff reduction on all
imported goods. Four simulations (El-E4) characterised by different
macroclosures are carried out. Experiment El is a Keynesian model;
with unskilled labour market assumed to clear through wage adjustments
while quantity adjustments clear the market for skilled labour. It
also assumes endogenous investments, government consumption fixed in
nominal terms, a fixed exchange rate and exogenous capital inflows.
Experiment E2 while retaining the labour market closures and exogenous
capital inflows of El assumes fixed real government consumption,
exogenous investments and a flexible exchange rate regime. The
exogenous investments in this case rely mainly on domestic savings.
E3 retains the assumptions of E2 except that it assumes a fixed
exchange rate and endogenous foreign capital inflows. This means that
domestic savings are supplemented by foreign savings in the
determination of investments.
Experiment E4 is a typical neoclassical model. All factor
supplies are assumed fixed with wages clearing the labour markets. It
also assumes a flexible exchange rate regime and fixed capital inflows.
Government consumption is fixed in real terms and investments are
assumed to be endogenously determined by domestic savings. The price
system is therefore the major market clearing mechanism in this
experiment.
As argued elsewhere in this thesis, the Keynesian closures
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represent the most realistic features of the Kenyan economy. The
three Keynesian models are therefore simulated in order to examine how
changes in assumptions about the structure of the economy and agents
behaviour affect the results. This is important because changes in
some closures in effect represent changes in policy. In our cases
this is true with respect to the changes in the specifications of
government consumption and exchange rate. Since we have no firm a
priori justification for favouring either of the two investment
closures, El and E3 are run for comparative purposes. The static
nature of the model and the sector-specificity of capital would seem
to favour the assumption of exogeneity of capital. However, it seems
realistic to allow for the possibility that the desired level of
investment may not be realised even within one period. E2 has been
run not only to examine the implications of a flexible exchange rate
regime, but also for comparison with the neoclassical E4.
Table 6.1 gives a summary of the changes in some
macroeconomic aggregates from the four experiments. To start with,
the growth of GDP in all the simulations is not remarkable.
Furthermore, it differs with the type of closure. What is noteworthy
is the similarity of GDP changes between El and E4. This result
can be traced to the changes in employment in the two experiments. In
the case of E4, the low or no growth is a manifestation of fixed
factors. On the other hand, given fixed quantities of unskilled
labour in El, tariff reductions lead to a 0.01% reduction in the
employment of skilled labour. This negative growth in employment, by•
reducing the growth of output, leads the Keynesian closure to behave
like the neoclassical closure E4.
TABLE 6.1
Change (from Base Values) in Macroeconomic AggregatesPercentage
Due to 50% Tariff Reductions
(A)	 Prices El	 E2	 E3	 E4
GDP at Factor Cost
	 -0.1	 9.4	 1.7
	 2.6
GDP at Market Price
	 -2.7
	
6.9	
-0.9	 0.0
Exports	
-0.4	 12.1	
-0.8	 2.7
Imports	 0.0	 13.8	
-0.1	 3.2
Exchange Rate	 0.0	 13.8	 0.0	 3.2
Rural Household - CPI
	 -2.0	 9.6	 0.3	 0.8
Urban Household - CPI
	 -2.7
	
7.0	
-1.1
	 0.0
Government - CPI	
-1.2	 4.1	
-0.3
	 1.3
Investments - CPI	
-4.6
	
6.6	
-3.0	
-1.7
Unskilled Labour Wage
	 -0.4	 13.0	 2.3
	 2.6
Skilled Labour Wage 	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 2.2
(B)	 Values
Balance of Trade 0.12	 -16.52
	 -139.21
	
-3.31
Balance of Payments 0.0	 13.79
	 31.58	 3.21
Terms of Trade -37.75	 -40.56
	 -35.13	
-34.0
(C)	 Quantities
GDP at Factor Cost 	 0.0	 1.49	 0.31	 0.0
GDP at Market Prices 	 0.0	 1.50	 0.46	 0.03
Exports	 1.11	 3.34	 0.67	 1.35
Imports	 0.69	 2.24	 3.58	 0.89
Rural Household Consumption	 1.81	 1.90	 1.80	 1.74
Urban Household Consumption	 2.68	 1.70	 2.74	 2.39
Government Consumption	 1.17	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
Investments	 -8.47	 0.0	 0.0	 -6.88
Unskilled Labour
	
0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
Skilled Labour	 -0.01	 5.38	 1.12	 0.0
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The growth of GDP in experiments E2 and E3 is clearly due to
the overall growth of employment. In the case of E2, Keynesian
multiplier effects lead to a higher increase in demand for labour;
which leads to an increase in employment of skilled labour by 5.38
percent. However, because of the low elasticities of substitution
between unskilled and skilled labour, the increase in employment is
only possible with a 13 percent increase in the wage of unskilled
labour. This leads to the 9.4 percent increase in the GDP deflator at
factor cost. The inflationary situation arising from the increase in
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wage costs and the 13.8 percent devaluation moderates the growth of
GDP which would otherwise be higher due to the increase in employment.
In contrast to E2, the relatively lower increase in employment in E3
is the main contributor to the lower growth in GDP. This is largely a
result of the external closure which by introducing leakages reduces
the Keynesian multiplier effects. In other words, the increase in
imports reduces the aggregate demand for domestic goods and hence
economic growth.
The effect of trade liberalisation on consumer prices and
hence on the levels of consumption is apparent in all the experiments.
Notice that urban household consumer prices are lower than those of
rural households. This is reflected in the higher consumption levels
of urban households relative to rural households. This difference is
due to the fact that tariff reductions imply lower prices of imported
goods; a high proportion of which are consumed by urban households.
As will become clear shortly, liberalisation increases the prices of
agricultural goods which are mainly consumed by rural households.
This explains the relatively higher rural household CPI and hence
lower consumption. It is also clear from Table 6.1 that the
devaluations in E2 and EA translate into higher CPIs. This effect is
most pronounced in E2 where rural and urban household CPIs rise by 9.6
and 7.0 percent, respectively. Note that in this case urban household
consumption is relatively lower. Contrary to the other cases
devaluation here increases import prices to the extent of lowering the
real demand of the urban households. The inflationary nature of E2
however dampens the consumption of both households.
In El, with government consumption fixed in nominal terms, a
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lower CPI leads to higher consumption. In the rest of the experiments
the consumption is fixed in real terms, so that the level of
consumption is maintained at any given prices primarily by savings
adjustment. Since the government consumes only one commodity,
government services, its consumer price index will always be equal to
the price of this commodity.
Changes in investment demand depend on the assumed
macroclosures. The endogeneity of investments in El and E4 means that
the increase in consumption and hence decline in savings reduces the
volume of investments. The fall in the demand for investments is
reflected by the decline in the investments price indices in the two
experiments. On the other hand, with fixed real investments in E2 and
E3,some other adjustment mechanism must close the system. In E2 where
the Keynesian multiplier effects dominate, this happens through
increased output and savings. The high price increases in this model
lead to lower real wages of skilled labour which in turn generate
higher employment and hence higher output. Savings by rural and urban
households, and by companies rise by 11.69% and 8.81% and 12.97%,
respectively. This, together with the 13.79% increase in foreign
savings, helps to finance the desired investments. The losses in
tariff revenue from the policy change together with increased
government consumption however leads to a 10% decline in government
savings. In the case of E3 households' and company savings go up by
around 2%, while government savings decline by 37.4%. Investments are
therefore mainly financed by a 31.58% increase in foreign savings.
This is particularly so given that there are hardly any Keynesian
multiplier effects in this experiment. The slow growth in output
together with the higher consumption levels generate lower savings
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compared to E2. Note also that the increase in foreign capital
contribute to the lower price of domestic investments.
Table 6.1 also shows changes in aggregate exports and
imports, balance of trade and balance of payments. In general,
changes in these variables depend on the type of external closure used.
In experiments E2 and E4 with flexible exchange rate regimes, tariff
reductions lead to the devaluation of the Kenya Shilling. As imports
become cheaper the domestic currency appreciates to balance the
current account. The devaluation is higher in the case of E2 because
the higher demand associated with the Keynesian multiplier effects
would otherwise lead to higher imports. In both experiments, the
effect of devaluation is to improve export performance. This however
does not lead to an improvement in the balance of trade. What would
appear surprising is that, even with the specification of fixed
capital inflows, foreign savings (BOP) rise in the two experiments.
This result arises from the fact that devaluation raises the domestic
currency values of foreign capital inflows and payments. In El with a
fixed exchange rate this does not occur and the current account is
balanced. Meanwhile, in experiment E3, endogenous capital inflows
under a fixed change rate regime generates the opposite results. The
relatively high increase in the volume of imports and the low
increase in exports, results in a large decline in balance of trade
and deterioration of BOP deficits.
Table 6.2 shows returns to factors and employment levels in
each sector. It should be emphasised that sectoral wage rates
reflects the proportion of unskilled labour employed in each sector.
For example, with unskilled labour mainly employed in the agricultural
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sector, the 0.4 percent decline in unskilled labour wage in El (Table
6.1) is fully reflected in the decline of the aggregate wage rate in
the sector. Lower wage decline in the other sectors reflects a lower
proportion of unskilled labour employed in them. This pattern is
repeated in the other experiments where higher labour demand increases
wages in all the sectors. It is also worth emphasising that with the
nominal wages of skilled labour fixed in the Keynesian closures,
changes in the price level will lead to changes in real wages and
hence the overall level of employment.
As shown in Table 6.1 the employment level of skilled labour
depends on real wage movements; for example, decreasing with the
increases in real wage in El and increasing with the decline in real
wages E2 and E3. A more interesting pattern of changes employment
levels emerges at the sectoral level. Changes in the aggregate
sectoral employment in all the cases reflect intersectoral resource
allocation. It is usually argued that tariff reduction, bylowering
protection reduces activity in the import competing sectors, leading
to unemployment. On the other hand, export oriented sectors will
experience increased employment and output. This is supported by the
results in Table 6.2. On the whole, employment rises in GSRV and in
the export oriented sectors AGR, PEAR, PSRV and CHEM. EMployment
however declines in the highly protected sectors CON, MAN, and in the
non-traded sector CONS.
The differences in the sectoral employment levels result in
differences in profitability among the sectors. It is evident from
Table 6.2 that those sectors with positive growth in employment also
show increased returns to capital. This result conforms to the
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TABLE 6.2 
Percentage Changes (from Base Values) in Factor Prices and Employment
Due to 50% Tariff Reduction 
(A)	 Factor Prices
El E2 E3 E4
Wage - agriculture -0.4 12.7 2.2 2.6
Wage - foods -0.1 4.8 0.8 2.3
Wage - consumer goods
-0.1 5.7 1.0 2.3
Wage - petroleum -0.1 3.8 0.7 2.3
Wage - chemical -0.1 3.1 0.5 2.2
Wage - manufactures -0.1 4.3 0.8 2.3
Wage - construction
-0.1 4.7 0.8 2.3
Wage - private services
-0.1 5.1 0.9 2.3
Wage - government services -0.1 2.6 0.5 2.2
Capital - agriculture -0.4 14.6 2.4 2.8
Capital - foods 0.4 8.7 0.1 2.9
Capital - consumer goods -1.5 11.2 -0.4 1.4
Capital - petroleum 18.2 37.9 21.7 22.3
Capital - chemicals -0.7 18.0 2.4 3.1
Capital - manufactures -8.1 8.6 -0.3 -0.4
Capital - construction -5.2 5.3 1.0 -10.5
Capital - private services 1.5 12.9 3.4 4.3
Capital - government services 2.4 3.5 0.8 2.5
(B)
	
Employment
Employment - AGR
-0.01 1.21 0.14 0.13
Employment - FOOD 0.41 2.82 -0.55 0.41
Employment - CON -1.0 3.90 -1.04 -0.68
Employment - PETR 13.41 22.78 15.26 14.07
Employment - CHEM
-0.28 6.98 0.09 0.42
Employment - MAN
-5.64 2.88 -0.75 -4.38
Employment - CONS
-7.87 0.28 0.08 -6.49
Employment - PSRV 0.97 4.40 1.49 1.14
Employment - GSRV 1.22 0.43 0.16 0.14
predictions of sector-specific models; whereby sectors experiencing
increases in labour employment will have higher capital-labour ratios
and hence increases in returns to capital. This result indicates that
trade liberalisation will, in general, increase the profitability of
export oriented sectors and lower the profitability of highly
protected and non-traded sectors.
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The changes in employment and profitability will be carried
over to changes in activity and cohuodity prices and quantities in
each sector. The effect of trade liberalisation on the prices and
quantities, are given in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. In all, there are five
prices to consider. These are prices for gross output, domestic and
composite commodities, imports and exports. The effect of trade
policy on each of these prices crucially depends on how it is formed.
In Chapter 4 the formation of the various prices is discussed.
At the risk of being repetitive we provide a brief summary
of how these prices are formed. As shown in Chapter 3 the formation
of gross price (3.8) is specified as:
PXi = PN. +
	
a. .P.	 (6.1)1	 4. 31 j
This shows that gross prices are made up of net prices and intermediate
costs. Changes in PXi
 can therefore be traced to the changes in PNi
through changes in factor prices, and changes in composite prices (P.)
through changes in domestic (PD) and import prices (PM) . It was
also shown in Chapter 3 that the assumption of imperfect substitutability
between gross output sales for domestic and export market means that PXi
is an average sales price and hence will lie between PDi and PEi
wherePE.is the domestic currency price of exports. Similarly, the1
ArmingtonassumptionimpliesthattheP.is an aggregation of domestic
and import prices; and will lie between the two prices. For policy
purposes it is important to bear in mind that these prices (except
PXi ) are valued at market prices. For instance PD. , PE. , Pm. 1
are inclusive of domestic indirect taxes, export taxes (or subsidies)
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and import duties, respectively. It is through the change in these
commodity taxes as a result of policy change that activity and
commodity prices and hence output change. We now examine the effect
of tariff reductions on the prices and quantities of gross output and
the commodities.
The effect of tariff reductions on domestic prices depend on
sectoral import shares and the elasticities of substitution between
imported and domestic goods. Higher import shares and elasticities of
substitution will generate a greater price response. With higher
elasticities of substitution it is much easier to substitute imports
for domestic supplies; so that tariff reductions will lower domestic
prices through lower demand. The level of price changes also depends
on the initial tariff rate in each sector. Those sectors with high
tariff rates will experience greater price reductions.
Table 6.3 shows the percentage change in the prices of gross
output and the various commodities due to trade liberalisation.
As a result of fixed exchange rates tariff reductions lead to a
similar decline in import prices in El and E3. However, it is also
evident that in all the experiments price response is greater for
those imports with the highest tariff rates. This is true for
commodities, FOOD, CON, PEXR, MAN and CHEM whose tariff rates are
22.8, 28.2, 17.8, 15.4 percent, respectively. The commodities AGR,
PSRV and GSRV which face low or no duties (that is, 6.0, 0.0, 3.2
percent, respectively) and have low import shares, show little price
response. Although PEIR has a high import ratio the fall in its
import price is moderated by the low elasticity of substitution (0.66).
In a similar way AGR, FOOD and CON, though they have low import
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TABLE 6.3 
Percentage Changes (from Base Values) in Activity and Commodity Prices 
Due to 50% Tariff Reduction
El E2 E3 E4
ACTIVITY - AGR
-0.7 12.7 1.9 2.3
ACTIVITY - FOOD
-1.8 9.0 0.0 0.9
ACTIVITY - CON
-3.8 6.1 -2.5 -0.1
ACTIVITY - PETR
-7.2 5.3
-6.5 -4.3
ACTIVITY - CHEM
-2.9 8.8
-1.3 0.0
ACTIVITY - MAN
-4.6 6.0 -2.9 -1.7
ACTIVITY - CONS
-4.5 5.5 -2.6
-1.6
ACTIVITY - PSRV
-1.3 7.3 0.1 1.4
ACTIVITY - GSRV
-1.1 3.8 -0.3 1.3
DOMESTIC - AGR
-0.8 12.6 2.3 2.1
DOMESTIC - FOOD
-2.0 8.6 0.0 0.7
DOMESTIC - CON
-4.3 5.2 -2.9
-1.6
DOMESTIC - PEAR
-10.6 1.6 -9.6
-7.8
DOMESTIC - CHEM
-4.0 7.2 -1.7
-1.1
DOMESTIC - MAN
-5.2 5.2 -3.2 -2.3
DOMESTIC - CONS
-4.5 5.5 -2.6
-1.6
DOMESTIC - PSRV
-1.6 6.0 0.4 0.9
DOMESTIC - GSRV
-1.1 3.8 -0.3 1.3
IMPORTED - AGR
-2.9 10.5 -2.9 0.2
IMPORTED - FOOD
-9.3 3.2
-9.3
-6.3
IMPORTED - CON
-11.0 1.3 -11.0
-8.1
EMPORTED - PEER
-7.6 5.2
-7.6 -4.6
IMPORTED - CHEM
IMPORTED - MAN
-4.1
-6.7
9.2
6.2
-4.1
-6.7
-1.0
-3.7
IMPORTED - PSRV 0.0 13.8 0.0 3.2
EMPORTED - GSRV
-1.6 12.0 -1.6 1.6
COMPOSITE - AGR
-0.9 12.5 2.1 2.0
COMPOSITE - FOOD
-2.5 8.2 -0.6 0.2
COMPOSITE - CON
-6.3 4.0
-5.3 -3.5
COMPOSITE - PEAR
-8.9 3.7
-8.4 -5.9
COMPOSITE - CHEM
-4.1 8.0 -2.7
-1.1
COMPOSITE - MAN
-6.0 5.7 -5.2
-3.1
COMPOSITE - CONS
-4.5 5.5
-2.6 -1.6
COMPOSITE - PSRV
-1.4 6.7 0.3 1.1
COMPOSITE - GSRV
-1.2 4.1
-0.3 1.3
EXPORTED - AGR
-0.2 13.0 0.6 2.9
EXPORTED - FOOD
-0.4 12.5 0.1 2.7
EXPORTED - CON
-0.4 12.1 -0.2 2.7
EXPORTED - PEAR
-1.2 11.8 -1.3 1.9
EXPORTED - CHEM
-0.1 12.9 -0.1 3.0
EXPORTED - MAN 0.5 12.9 -0.1 3.6
EXPORTED - PSRV
-0.5 11.2
-0.5 2.5
EXPORTED - GSRV
-1.5 10.7 -0.2 2.6
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ratios, show larger than expected declines in their import prices due
to the high elasticities of substitution. The reductions in import
prices in experiments E2 and E4 are offset by an equal amount of
devaluation. For PSRV, which faces no tariff charges the import price
goes up by the exact amount of the devaluation. Notice however that
unlike E2, the devaluation in E4 is not high enough to fully offset
the decline in import prices of those sectors with the highest tariff
rates.
The effect of trade liberalisation on activity and commodity
prices does not easily fit into the dependent economy type results.
This is because our aggregations do not conform to the tradability
associated with such models. However, it is clear that the effect of
trade policy on the cost of production determine the changes in
activity (gross) prices. For instance, in experiment El tariff
reductions lead to lower composite prices and hence lower prices of
intermediate inputs. Together with lower wage costs, this lowers
activity prices. The decline in activity prices are however moderated
by devaluations in those experiments with flexible exchange rate
regimes. In E2 the impact of tariff reforms are fully offset by
devaluation. Notice however that in E3 and E4 those sectors which use
a high proportion of imported intermediates; notably CON, PEAR, CHEM
and MAN have lower activity prices. On the other hand, the prices of
AGR, FOOD, PSRV and GSRV do not reflect the changes in intermediate
prices because they are low users of imported intermediates. Higher
prices of these goods are mainly a result of higher labour costs.
Changes in domestic prices are closely related to the
changes in activity prices. However, by reducing the domestic demand
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for the import competing goods, tariff reduction induces further
decline in the domestic prices of these goods. This is true in most
cases for CON, PEAR and CHEM. In most experiments the lower prices of
MAN and CONS are due to lower capital goods prices arising from a
decline in investment demand.
Notice that because of the assumption of production
differentiation between domestic output and imports, and between
domestic consumption and exports, their prices diverge. As predicted
activity prices, being the average sales prices, lie between domestic
and export prices. Similarly, composite prices lie between imported
and domestic prices. In traditional models domestic and world prices
would differ only by the amount of trade taxes.
The effects of trade reform on quantities are shown in Table
6.4. To begin with, we examine the effect of tariff reductions on
commodity imports. Notice that for E2, despite the multiplier
effects, devaluation moderates the increase in import demand. The
high import prices of PSRV and GSRV associated with the devaluation,
actually reduce imports of these commodities. All imports are
positive and high in E3 because they are financed by foreign savings.
The lower import demands of CHEM and MAN in El and E4 are a result of
the lower aggregate demand generated by the policy change.
The changes in gross output mirror the change in sectoral
employment as shown in Table 6.2. In all the experiments those
sectors with increasing levels of employment, namely, AGR, FOOD, PEER,
PSRV and GSRV show increases in gross output; while those with
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TABLE 6.4 
Percentages Changes (from Base Values) in Activity and Commodity
Quantities due to 50% Tariff Reduction 
El E2 E3 E4
ACTIVITY - AGR 0.0 0.85 0.10 0.09
ACTIVITY - FOOD 0.17 1.14 -0.22 0.17
ACTIVITY - CON
-0.63 2.46 -0.66 -0.43
ACTIVITY - PEzR 4.02 6.84 4.54 4.29
ACTIVITY - CHEM
-0.11 2.54 0.34 0.16
ACTIVITY - MAN
-3.57 1.78 -0.47 -2.76
ACTIVITY - CONS
-6.74 0.23 0.07 -5.55
ACTIVITY - PSRV 0.58 2.62 0.89 0.69
ACTIVITY - GSRV 1.21 0.42 0.16 0.14
DOMESTIC - AGR
-0.12 0.79 0.41 -0.04
DOMESTIC - ECM 0.03 0.83 -0.23 0.00
DOMESTIC - CON
-1.03 1.78 -0.93 -0.87
DOMESTIC - PEER 3.05 5.89 3.69 3.33
DOMESTIC - CHEM
-0.39 2.17 0.23 -0.13
DOMESTIC - MAN
-3.71 1.60 -0.55 -2.90
DOMESTIC - CONS
-6.74 0.23 0.07 -5.55
DOMESTIC - PSRV 0.51 2.30 0.94 0.58
DOMESTIC - GSRV 1.21 0.42 0.16 0.14
IMPORTED - AGR 4.12 4.59 11.34 3.66
IMPORTED - FOOD 12.23 8.74 15.47 11.47
IMPORTED - CON 10.43 7.72 12.92 9.93
IMPORTED - PETR 0.79 3.49 2.18 1.06
IMPORTED - CHD1
-0.38 0.96 1.85 -0.24
IMPORTED - MAN
-2.67 1.02 1.89 -1.94
IMPORTED - PSRV
-0.28 -1.27 1.13 -0.53
IMPORTED - GSRV 1.43 -3.33 0.81 -0.01
COMPOSITE - AGR
-0.01 0.88 0.67 0.05
COMPOSITE - FOOD 0.76 1.31 0.70 0.68
COMPOSITE - CON 2.15 3.45 2.90 2.14
COMPOSITE - PhiR 1.73 4.49 2.81 2.00
COMPOSITE - CHEM
-0.39 1.66 0.90 -0.18
COMPOSiTE - MAN
-3.14 1.28 0.79 -2.37
COMPOSITE - CONS
-6.74 0.23 0.07 0.60
COMPOSITE - PSRV 0.44 1.96 0.96 0.48
COMPOSITE - GSRV 1.21 0.28 0.18 0.13
EXPORTED - AGR 0.34 1.06 -0.86 0.52
EXPORTED - FOOD 1.26 3.53 -0.20 1.49
EXPORTED - CON 1.93 6.80 1.09 2.35
EXPORTED - PETR 5.66 8.45 5.99 5.93
EXPORTED - CHEM 0.61 3.50 0.62 0.90
EXPORTED - MAN
-2.30 3.42 0.26 -1.49
EXPORTED - PSRV 0.78 3.53 0.73 0.98
EXPORTED - GSRV 1.08 2.08 0.17 0.50
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declining employment, CON, CHEM, MAN and CONS show declining output.
As discussed above these output changes are reflections of the changes
in the cost structure. It is clear from these results that tariff
reductions will stimulate the growth of the export oriented sectors
and those which rely heavily on imported intermediates.
The demand for domestic goods depends on relative prices and
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported
commodities. While a lower aggregate demand in El, E3 and E4
depresses the demand for domestic goods; the increase in import demand
through lower relative prices plays a major role. Notice, for
example, that because of high elasticity of substitution increase in
import demand is highest for AGR, FOOD and CON. On the other hand,
the domestic demand for these goods is either declining or low. On
the other hand, low substitutability between domestic and imported
1:11ER, PSRV and GSRV holds up the domestic demand for these goods. The
decline in aggregate investment demand explains the lower domestic
demand for MAN and CONS. The Keynesian multiplier effect in E2
increases the demand and gross output of all commodities.
The response of export supply to trade liberalisation is
quite straightforward. In experiments El and E3 the decline in
domestic prices of exports leads to an improved competitiveness and
therefore increased quantity of exports. Exceptions are the price
increases of MAN in El and AGR and FOOD in E3 which reduce the volume
of exports of these commodities. For experiments E2 and E4
devaluation increases the domestic currency price of exports and hence
export quantities. It is therefore clear, as concluded earlier using
aggregate results, that tariff reductions improve Kenya's export
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performance.
We now summarise the effects of the trade policy simulations
on the Kenyan economy. To start with, trade liberalisation does not
generate high economic growth in all the experiments. In the case of
the neoclassical closure this is explained by the fact that the
stimulative effect of the demand side are not allowed. However, the
low GDP growth associated with the Keynesian closures, especially El
which we have argued best represents the Kenyan economy, is
particularly striking. It appears that with investments specified
to adjust to available savings and with foreign borrowing constraints,
tariff reductions will depress the economy. The low gains from trade
liberalisation however would seem to be in line with those normally
obtained from traditional models. In models of developed countries
gains from trade liberalisation are usually less than 1% of GDP.
These results are usually justified by the argument that tariffs in
such countries are relatively low. Since the base tariff rates in our
SAM data are low, a similar argument could be used to explain the low
gains from liberalisation in our model. However, the original SAM
data understates the tariff rates and therefore the gains from
trade liberalisation are understated. The assumptions of product
differentiation in our model provide another possible explaination for
the lower effect of policy change on GNP. As it was argued earlier,
the use of the Armington and (-Li functions by reducing the link
between domestic and world prices reduces the domestic price response
to policy change; and therefore understates the gains from the policy
change. Furthermore, the simulations do not take into account the
role of quantitative restrictions which have been found in some
studies to account for large changes in growth of GDP.
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The tariff reforms by reducing consumer prices lead to
higher consumption. In the savings driven experiments consumption
increases at the expense of investments and therefore depresses the
economy. For the experiments with exogenous investments (E2 and E3)
the increase in demand stimulates some economic growth. The two
results underline the importance of the choice of investments-savings
closure in CGE models. Since there is no agreed explanation of
investment behaviour in IDICS the controversy about the choice of the
closure continues. While most studies assume exogenous investments
for short-run models, we have argued that this assumption may not be
realistic for economies faced with external shocks. For this reason
we report the results of the two closures throughout.
On the whole, trade liberalisation worsens both the balance
of trade and the current account deficits. This should be expected
given that lower tariffs encourage increased imports. However, the
policy change by lowering the cost of production also stimulates
export growth. But it is only in those cases where the current
account is exogenously fixed that the export growth comes close to
closing the balance of trade deficits.
At the sectoral level, it is shown that the exportable
sectors and those using a high proportion of imported intermediates
are stimulated. This leads to higher employment and profitability in
these sectors. On the other hand the more highly protected sectors
contract. In this sense it can be argued that in general trade
liberalisation stimulates export oriented sectors at the expense of
the protected sectors.
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6.3	 Devaluation and Subsidies
In this section we examine the implications of the use of
devaluation and export subsidies as trade policy instruments. These
policies are used for export promotion; and additionally in the case
of devaluation for stabilisation. Their effects on the economy
however go beyond the usual intended purposes. While there is a
consensus about the consequences of export subsidies, the debate on
the macroeconomic effects of devaluation is fraught with controversy.
Under the INIF-World Bank supported economic liberalisation
programmes, the common recommendation for devaluation is premised on
its efficiency as a policy tool for stabilisation and export promotion
purposes. The basis of such recommendations follow from the
traditional models of devaluation. In these models, typified by the
dependent economy model, the effectiveness of devaluation lies in its
expenditure reduction and switching effects. A discussion of the
effectiveness and critique of devaluation is provided in Chapter 3.
This discussion can be summarised as follows; by changing relative
prices, for example increasing prices of traded relative to non-traded
goods, devaluation increases production of export and reduces import
demand. This results in internal and external balance. On the other
hand, the structuralist argie that the income effects of devaluation
in LDCs are larger than the substitution effects and therefore lead to
reduction in output. In what follows we examine the effects of
devaluation on the Kenyan economy.
To determine the effects of devaluation two simulations
involving a 20% devaluation are run. The two experiments differ by
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the specification of the savings investment closure. E5 is savings
driven while E6 is investments driven. Foreign capital inflows are
also exogenously fixed in E5 thus minimising their role in financing
investments.
The macroeconomic effects of the policy change are shown in
Table 6.5. As expected devaluation leads to higher domestic prices.
However, contrary to the predictions of the structuralist models, the
policy change does not result in lower output. In both experiments
the growth of GDP, although low, is positive. This result can be
explained by the size of export demand elasticities (11) used in this
study. Taylor (1983) and Ahluwalia and Lysy (1981) show that
devaluation will have contractionary effects when export elasticities
are low (normally below 0.5). To understand why our results differ
from those predicted by structuralists we first note that increase in
consumer prices reduces household and government consumption. With
high fl , the increase in export earnings due to devaluation more
than offsets the decline in consumption; resulting in higher GDP. At
lower 11 , the increase in export earnings would not be enough to
offset the depressive effects of lower consumption.
It is clear that the investments-savings closure determine
GDP growth rates and the price levels in the two experiments. With
investment exogenously fixed in E6, the increase in savings associated
with lower consumption has little effect in stimulating the economy.
To the contrary the increased levels of employment contribute to the
relatively higher GDP in E5. This growth is attributable to the usual
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TABLE 6.5 
Percentage Change in Macroeconomic Aggregates Due to 20% Devaluation
(A)	 Prices E5 E6
GDP at Factor Cost 12.9 9.6
GDP at Market Price 13.5 10.3
Exports 18.1 17.6
Imports 20.0 20.00
Rural Household - CPI 15.8 11.8
Urban Household - CPI 13.5 10.4
Government - CPI 7.2 5.7
Investments 16.8 13.7
Unskilled Labour 17.8 13.3
Skilled Labour Wage 0.00 0.00
(B)	 Values
Balance of Trade -32.83 226.03
Balance of Payments 20.00
-49.32
Terms of Trade -7.80
-9.80
(C)	 Quantities
GDP at Factor Cost 1.56 0.83
GDP at Market Prices 1.61 0.60
Exports 3.44 4.01
Imports 2.54 -2.98
Rural Household Consumption -0.08 -0.19
Urban Household Consumption -2.10
-2.45
Government Consumption -6.75 -5.43
Investments 15.14 0.00
Unskilled Labour 0.00 0.00
Skilled Labour 5.65 3.01
Keynesian effects. For example, the increase in price level lowers
the real wage of skilled labour leading to 5.65% increases in
employment in this labour group. The 17.8% increase in the wage
unskilled labour implies a general increase in demand for aggregate
labour.
Using the level of consumption as a measure of welfare, it
is clear that devaluation reduces the household's welfare. The higher
decline of urban household's consumption is a result of the fact that
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they consume a larger share of imported goods. This phenomenon
explains why the urban sectors are normally the strongest pressure
group against devaluation in LDCs.
Devaluation increases the volume of exports in both
experiments. However, in E5 increased exports does not offset the
rise in imports and hence does not improve the balance of trade. On
the other hand, the rise in domestic prices of imports in E6 (together
with lower aggregate demand) lowers the volume of imports and thus
improves the balance of trade. With the current account exogenously
fixed in E5 the balance of payments deficit rises by the amount of
the devaluation. On the other hand, the balance of payments position
improves by 49.32% in E6 because of lower imports.
The sectoral returns to factors and changes in employment
levels are shown in Table 6.6. On the whole the policy change
increases employment in all the sectors. The exception is government
employment which declines because of lower government consumption.
The increase in demand for investments in E5 leads to the high
employment in MAN and CONS sectors. It is clear that the increase in
demand for labour increases wage rates in all the sectors. Returns to
capital follow the predictions of the sector-specific model. Higher
employment leads to increased profitability in each sector. The
factorial income distribution arising from devaluation is therefore
favourable to unskilled labour and capital (except government capital).
However, with the skilled wage fixed in nominal terms, it will have
fallen in real terms with the rise in prices.
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TABLE 6.6 
Percentage Change in Factor Prices and Etployment Due to 20% 
Devaluation 
(A)	 Factor Prices E5 E6
Wage - AGR 17.4 13.0
Wage - FOOD 6.4 4.9
Wage - CON 7.7 5.8
Wage - PEIR 5.1 3.8
Wage - CHEM 4.2 3.1
Wage - MAN 5.8 4.3
Wage - CONS 6.4 4.8
Wage - PSRV 6.9 5.2
Wage - GSRV 3.5 2.7
Capital - AGR 20.1 15.7
Capital - FOOD 10.3 10.3
Capital - ON 17.7 14.8
Capital - PETR 24.6 17.1
Capital - CHEM 29.1 21.7
Capital - MAN 29.9 9.7
Capital - CONS 41.9 7.2
Capital - PSRV 15.0 11.1
Capital - GSRV
-8.30 -6.8
(B)	 Employment
Employment - AGR 1.74 1.77
Employment - FOOD 2.68 3.88
Employment - CON 6.91 6.37
Employment - PEER 13.67 9.41
Employment - CHEM 11.35 8.64
Employment - MAN 15.45 3.58
Employment - CONS 15.52 1.16
Employment - PSRV 4.47 3.35
Employment - GSRV
-5.89 -4.75
Table 6.7 shows the changes in activity and commodity prices.
The price changes are quite predictable. Devaluation increases import
prices which, through increased composite prices, lead to higher
intermediate inputs costs. Together with increased factor prices the
higher intermediate prices lead to higher activity prices. The
increase in domestic prices reflect not only the high costs of
production, but also the pass through of the higher import prices into
the domestic markets. Since export and import prices are denominated
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TABLE 6.7 
Percentage Change in Activity and Commodity Prices Due to 20% 
Devaluation
E5 E6
ACTIVITY - AGR 17.9 13.67
ACTIVITY - FOOD 14.7 11.36
ACTIVITY - CON 14.3 11.82
AcTryrry - PhiR 19.5 18.21
ACTIVITY - CHEM 17.5 13.97
ACTIVITY - MAN 16.3 12.50
ACTIVITY - CONS 15.3 11.75
ACTIVITY - PSRV 11.8 9.18
ACTIVITY - GSRV 6.9 5.34
DOMESTIC - AGR 17.7 12.45
DOMESTIC - FOOD 14.2 10.53
DOMESTIC - CON 13.6 10.88
DOMESTIC - a:FR 19.9 17.65
DOMESTIC - CEET4 16.9 12.03
DOMESTIC - MAN 16.2 11.80
DOMESTIC - CONS 15.3 11.75
DOMESTIC - PSRV 10.0 6.43
DOMESTIC - GSRV 6.8 5.26
IMPORTED	 AGR 20.0 20.00
IMPORTED - FOOD 20.0 20.00
IMPORTED - CON 20.0 20.00
IMPORTED - PETR 20.0 20.00
IMPORTED - CHEM 20.0 20.00
IMPORTED-MAN 20.0 20.00
IMPORTED - PSRV 20.0 20.00
IMPORTED - GSRV 20.0 20.00
EXPORTED- ACR 18.7 17.19
• mu) - FOOD 18.6 17.73
EXPORTED - CON 18.2 17.91
EXPORTED - PhiR 19.0 19.19
EXPORTED - CHBM 18.9 18.90
EXPORTED - MAN 17.6 19.04
EXPORTED - PSRV 17.0 17.06
EXPORTED - GSRV 23.8 21.88
in domestic currency values they should stimulate increased production
for export and a decline in imports.
The effects of the policy change on quantities shown in
Table 6.8. In general devaluation reduces the volume of import,
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TABLE 6.8 
Percentage Change in Activity and Courodity Quantities Due to 20%
Devaluation
E5 E6
ACTIVITY - AGR 1.22 1.24
ACTIVITY - FOOD 1.08 1.55
ACTIVITY - CON 4.32 3.99
ACTIVITY - PETR 4.09 2.87
ACTIVITY - CHEM 4.04 3.12
ACTIVITY - MAN 9.26 2.22
ACTIVITY - CONS 12.83 0.98
ACTIVITY - PSRV 2.65 1.99
ACTIVITY - GSRV -5.84 -4.70
DOMESTIC - AGR 1.07 0.45
DOMESTIC - FOOD 0.75 0.99
DOMESTIC - CON 3.91 3.33
DOMESTIC - PEAR 4.16 2.75
DOMESTIC - CHEM 3.92 2.68
LCNESTIC - MAN 9.23 2.06
DOMESTIC - CONS 12.83 0.98
DOMESTIC - PSRV 2.24 1.35
DOMESTIC - GSRV -5.86 -4.72
IMPORTED - ACR -2.79 -11.79
IMPORTED - FOOD -6.41 -10.73
IMPORTED - CON -4.24 -8.23
IMPORTED - PETR 4.07 1.42
EMPORTFD - CHEM 2.14 -1.87
IMPORTED - MAN 6.94 -2.60
IMPORTED - PSRV -2.10 -4.56
IMPORTED - GSRV -11.19 -10.76
EXPORTED - AGR 1.69 3.61
EXPORTED - FOOD 3.62 5.89
EXPORTED - CON 7.02 8.21
EXPORTED - PEAR 3.97 3.08
EXPORTED - CHEM 4.35 4.22
EXPORTED - MAN 9.56 3.67
EXPORTED - PSRV 3.82 3.79
EXPORTED - GSRV -2.32 -1.16
although imports of PETR, CHEM and MAN remain positive in E5. The
increases in the imports of these commodities, especially MAN, is due
to the higher aggregate demand in E5; and in particular the increase
in aggregate investment. The increase in real gross output reflects
the changes in sectoral employment. The increase in the domestic
currency price of exports increases the volume of exports in both
simulations. It is also clear that the higher domestic demand is met
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by increased consumption of domestic output.
To summarise, devaluation of domestic currency leads to
higher prices, but because of high export demand elasticities does not
induce contraction of the economy. The policy leads to higher
employment and profitability and therefore real gross output rises.
The higher prices reduce household and government consumption. This
in turn leads to higher savings and therefore contribute to increased
investments. The effect of the policy change on the balance of trade
and the balance of payments depends on the macroclosure and the
resulting implication on aggregate demand. In the case of an
investment driven model E5, devaluation increases aggregate demand.
This results in higher import demand and therefore deficits in both
the balance of trade and payments. The opposite result applies in the
savings driven model E6. That is, lower aggregate demand leads to
lower imports and hence improvement in both external accounts.
At the sectoral level higher prices reduce the volume of
imports and increase exports. In both experiments higher employment
levels increase gross output. It is also clear that by raising the
relative prices of imports, devaluation encourages the substitution of
domestic commodities for imports. However, as stated above it is only
in E6 where the substitution effect is greater than the income
effects, thus resulting in the balance of trade.
We now turn to the analysis of the effect of export
subsidies. An export subsidy by lowering the foreign currency price
of exports increases the competitiveness of domestic products. In
practice, the use of subsidies in LDCs for trade policy purposes is
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fraught with difficulties. Firstly, LDC8 who use subsidies to promote
exports risk being subjected to countervailing duties in developed
countries. Secondly, most LDCs face serious revenue constraints and
therefore may not be able to provide subsidies sufficient to offset
the anti-export bias associated with other policies. Furthermore,
some of these countries may be administratively constrained so that
even the available subsidies may not be channelled to the most
efficient users. In our experiments we shall only be concerned with
the efficacy of subsidies. The political economy type issues just
sketched will not be evaluated.
The effects of export subsidies are simulated by a 20
percent subsidy to all exports; or equivalently a 20 percent negative
tax on exports. As in the previous case the results of the two
investments-savings macroclosures are reported, where E7 and E8 are
savings and investments driven models, respectively.
As shown in Table 6.9 the effect of the export subsidy is to
reduce export prices by 3.6% and 3.0% in experiments E7 and E8,
respectively. This stimulates production for export. A rise in
employment is necessary to facilitate increased exports. This is
reflected in the 5.38% and 8.70% increase in employment of skilled
labour and the 17.0% and 23.4% increase in unskilled labour wage in
the two experiments. The high labour costs contribute to the higher
GDP deflators at factor cost.
Export subsidies, by increasing export earnings, increases
the households' real incomes. This increases real consumption by
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TABLE 6.9 
Percentage Change in Macroeconomic Aggregates Due to 20% Export
Subsidy 
(A)	 Prices E7 E8
GDP at Factor Cost 12.9 17.5
GDP at Market Price 3.7 8.2
Exports
-3.6 -3.0
Imports 0.00 0.00
Rural Household - CPI 8.7 14.2
Urban Household - CPI 3.7 7.9
Government - CPI 2.9 4.9
Investments 1.0 5.2
Unskilled Labour 17.0 23.4
Skilled Labour Wage 0.00 0.00
(B)	 Values
Balance of Trade 166.66 -244.37
Balance of Payments 0.00 91.84
Terms of Trade
-18.616 -15.42
(C)	 Quantities
GDP at Factor Cost 1.48 2.40
GDP at Market Prices 1.16 2.53
Exports 8.50 7.53
Imports 1.01 9.70
Rural Household Consumption 5.86 5.87
Urban Household Consumption 6.65 6.80
Government Consumption -2.79
-4.68
investments
-23.28 0.00
Unskilled Labour 0.00 0.00
Skilled Labour 5.38 8.70
between 6-7% by both households. The decline in government
consumption arises from the diversion of funds to finance subsidies
and higher consumer prices. With lower savings investments decline in
E7. On the other hand, the increase in foreign savings associated
with E8 finances the desired investments and hence explains the higher
rise in GDP.
In E7, the current account is exogenously fixed and
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therefore balances; while the 8.50% increase in the volume of exports
and the relatively small increase in imports lead to the 166.7%
improvement in the balance of trade. To the contrary, the 9.7%
increase in imports overshadows the 7.53% increase in exports and
leads to deficits in both the balance of trade and the balance of
payments in E8.
Table 6.10 shows the changes in factor rewards and
employment arising from the policy change. The increase in demand for
labour is reflected in the increase in employment in most of the
sectors. The increase in wages in all the sectors is also a
reflection of high labour demand. Notice that low investment demand
in E7 accounts for the decline in employment in MAN and CONS sectors;
while in decline in government consumption leads to lower employment
in the public sector in both models. It is also clear that
profitability in each sector depends on the level of employment.
Higher investment in E8 accounts for the higher employment and factor
payments.
The effect of export subsidies will be to reduce export
prices. Where domestic and exported goods are assumed to be perfect
substitutes, changes in domestic prices will be similar to those of
exports. However, under imperfect substitutability this will not be
the case; as domestic prices will be determined by the changes in
aggregate demand arising from the policy change. In particular,
changes in domestic prices will depend on the price elasticity of
export demand, the elasticity of transformation and the share of
exports in gross output in each sector.
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TABLE 6.10 
Percentage Change in Factor Prices and Employment Due to 20% Export
Subsidy 
(A)	 Factor Prices E7 E8
Wage - AGR 16.6 22.9
Wage - FOOD 6.2 8.4
Wage - CON 7.3 10.0
Wage - PEZR 4.9 6.6
Wage - CHEM 4.0 5.4
Wage - MAN 5.5 7.5
Wage - CONS 6.1 8.3
Wage - PSRV 6.6 9.0
Wage - GSRV 3.4 4.6
Capital - AGR 19.7 25.6
Capital - FOOD 18.9 18.1
Capital - CON 25.2 28.7
Capital - a-LH 108.8 120.4
Capital - CHEM 23.7 33.5
Capital - MAN -9.7 18.9
Capital - CONS -32.3 10.1
Capital - PSRV 21.1 26.5
Capital - GSRV -0.6 -2.9
(B)	 Employment
Employment - AGR 1.95 1.63
Employment - FOOD 8.86 6.66
Employment - CON 12.26 12.45
Employment - PEfR 67.63 72.41
Employment - CHEM 9.05 12.52
Employment - MAN -9.83 7.26
Employment - CONS -20.10 0.82
Employment - PSRV 7.91 9.31
Employment - GSRV -1.96 -3.63
These expectations are confirmed in Tables 6.11 and 6.12.
Export subsidies reduce the foreign currency price of exports and
hence increase export demand. The high increases in the exports of
FOOD, CON and PEER are not only a result of high demand elasticities,
but also a result of the relatively high transformation elasticities
which makes it easy to switch resources into production for export.
The moderate response by the export oriented ACR and PSRV are a result
of low demand and transformation elasticities, respectively.
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TABLE 6.11 
Percentage Change in Activity and Commodity Prices Due to 20% Export
Subsidy 
E7 E8
ACTIVITY - AGR 16.0 22.02
ACTIVITY - FOOD 9.1 13.63
ACTIVITY - CON 5.0 8.26
ACTIVITY - PEilt 0.5 2.42
ACTIVITY - CHM 6.3 10.97
ACTIVITY - MAN -0.4 5.05
ACTIVITY - CONS -0.7 4.26
ACTIVITY - PSRV 7.5 11.22
ACTIVITY - GSRV 3.14 5.18
DOMESTIC - AGR 14.2 21.58
DOMESTIC - FOOD 7.6 12.58
DOMESTIC - CON 2.6 6.27
DOMESTIC - PE1R -10.5 -7.50
DOMESTIC - CHEM -0.5 0.14
DOMESTIC - MAN -3.2 3.14
DOMESTIC - CONS -0.7 4.26
DOMESTIC - PSRV 3.4 8.42
DOMESTIC - GSRV 3.0 5.09
IMPORTED - AGR 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - FOOD 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - CON 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - PEER 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - CHM 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - MAN 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - PSRV 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED	 GSRV 0.00 0.00
EXPORTED - AGR -3.1 -1.30
EXPORTED - FOOD -3.6 -2.57
EXPORTED - CON -3.8 -3.41
EXPORTED - PEER -4.3 -4.37
EXPORTED - CHM -1.5 -1.53
EXPORTED - MAN 0.2 -1.81
EXPORTED - PSRV -4.6 -4.59
EXPORTED - GSRV -2.82 -0.65
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TABLE 6.12 
Percentage Change in Activity and Commodity Quantities Due to 20%
Export Subsidy 
E7 E8
ACTIVITY - AGR 1.37 1.15
ACTIVITY - FOOD 3.50 2.65
ACTIVITY - CON 7.58 7.70
ACTIVITY - PETR 16.73 17.65
ACTIVITY - CHEM 3.27 4.43
ACTIVITY - MAN -6.30 4.45
ACTIVITY - CONS -17.55 0.69
ACTIVITY - PSRV 4.65 5.44
ACTIVITY - GSRV -1.94 -3.60
DOMESTIC - AGR 0.23 0.87
DOMESTIC - FOOD 2.41 1.92
DOMESTIC - CON 5.69 6.21
DOMESTIC - PhiR 13.37 14.69
DOMESTIC - CHEM 1.59 3.27
DOMESTIC - MAN -6.97 3.97
DOVESTIC - CONS -17.55 0.69
DOMESTIC - PSRV 3.64 4.77
DOMESTIC - GSRV -1.96 -3.62
IMPORTED - AGR 30.79 49.11
IMPORTED - FOOD 14.23 21.71
IMPORTED - CON 9.82 16.36
IMPORTED - PETR 5.32 8.94
IMPORTED - CHEM 1.27 7.42
IMPORTED - MAN -8.98 6.11
IMPORTED - PSRV
-5.40 9.09
IMPORTED - GSRV -0.51 -1.20
EXPORTED - AGR 4.77 1.99
EXPORTED - FOOD 11.55 8.13
EXPORTED - CON 19.06 16.88
EXPORTED - PEiR 21.91 22.28
EXPORTED - CHEM 7.13 7.17
EXPORTED - MAN -0.78 8.59
EXPORTED - PSRV 7.38 7.30
EXPORTED - GSRV 2.17 0.49
The effect of increased exports is to reduce the supply of
gross output to the domestic market. This leads to an excess demand
of the affected commodities. The excess demand is cleared through
higher domestic prices (Table 6.1) and increased imports (Table 6.2).
Notice that for exogeneously fixed investment in E8, aggregate demand
is higher hence the price and quantity effects of the policy change
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are magnified.
Higher domestic prices also translate into higher activity
prices. This encourages domestic production, especially in E8. As is
the case in other experiments with endogenously determined
investments, the lower output of MAN and CONS in E7 is a result of
lower investments. Export subsidies, by reducing the government
budget, also reduce the production and domestic consumption of GSRV.
To summarise, export subsidies generate more favourable
results compared to devaluation. Subsidies lead to higher GDP,
employment, profitability and exports. More importantly, household
consumption increases with subsidies. In this sense this policy
improves household welfare compared to devaluation. It would
therefore appear that where appropriate export subsidies should be
favoured over devaluation as a trade policy instrument. In practise
however, especially in LDCs, revenue constraints limit the use of
subsidies for export promotion.
6.4	 Quantitative Restrictions 
Up to this Point simulations have been done with the
assumption that prices clear the product markets. However, it was
shown in Chapter 2 that quantitative restrictions (QRs) have been
important trade policy instruments in Kenya. It was argued that QRs
have been used not only as a means of protecting domestic industry but
also for balance of payments purposes. It was also shown that one of
the goals of the trade liberalisation program began in 1980 has been
the reduction and eventual elimination of QRs. In this Section we
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simulate the economic effects of QRs.
In empirical models of QRs, two types of import controls are
normally distinguished; quantity and premium rationing. In the former
importers acquire product-specific licenses which cannot be resold.
The later system assumes existence of a market for licenses so that
quota holders can resell their licenses at a premium. This system
leads to unproductive rent seeking behaviour. Quantity rationing, on
the other hand, does not encourage rent seeking. It is assumed that
the quota holders earn some rent only in so far as the price of their
imports (inclusive of tariffs) is below what they are willing to pay
(that is, the market clearing price at a given quota). Since there
have not been cases of official or unofficial markets for quotas in
Kenya we confine ourselves to this case.
Dervis et al. (1982) is one of the first studies to model
the welfare effects of QRs. As discussed in Chapter 3, Grais et al.
(1986) found that removal of QRs resulted in large gains in real GNP.
Condon et al. (1984) arrived at similar results. Using Kenyan data,
Gunning (1979) simulated the effect of QRs by increasing imports of
non-food manufactures by 30% in a twelve sector model. He found that
trade liberalisation reduced the profitability of the industrial
sector. It also lowered domestic savings and favoured rural
households at the expense of urban households.
To simulate the effects of QRs, imports are firstly
exogenously fixed at their base values; and then the specification
RENT of HERCULES is used to model changes in QRs in the presence of
rents. It should be stressed that, unlike Grais et al. and Condon et
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al., we are not modelling rent seeking activities. Our model is akin
to those of Levy (1987) and Gunning (1979). Models which incorporate
rent seeking activities use estimated premiums to simulate the effects
of QRs. In our model the deviations of imports from their base
values, are used as a proxy for changes in import controls.
The cell accounts of the SAM associated with the
specification rent collects the rent arising from quota rationing. We
assume that quotas are only binding in five sectors: FOOD, CON, PETR,
CHEM and MAN. We also assume that the rents accrue only to companies
and are therefore paid to company income accounts in the SAM. This
specification will affect income distribution and hence will have
consumption and investment consequences. For instance, changes in the
value of rents will directly affect company savings, and its income
transfers to the other institutions and ROW.
This specification is also used to model the consequences of
import compression. Although this phenomenon has not always been
considered as a policy instrument it is widely used by LDCS facing
balance of payments problems. Helleiner (1986), Khan and Knight
(1988), and Besley and Collier (1989) have demonstrated that
import compression can have serious negative effects on LDC economies.
These include lower economic growth, higher unemployment and poor
export performance. The problems arise especially where imports
consist mainly of intermediate inputs. For example, import
compression increases the rent inclusive price of imports and hence
composite prices. This in turn increases intermediate costs and
therefore lowers output. The opposite effect arises where import
controls are relaxed.
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To simulate effects of the changes in import controls two
experiments are run involving a 5 percent increase and reduction of
imports (E9 and E10), respectively. They respectively represent
reduction in QRs and import compression. Table 6.13 shows the
macroeconomic results of the two experiments. As noted above changes
in import quantities affect domestic prices through changes in
intermediate prices. This is especially evident in the changes of GDP
deflators. In E9 an increase in import quotas reduces domestic prices.
However, this only leads to a small increase in the overall growth of
GDP. This can be explained in several ways. Firstly, an increase in
imports reduces rents by KE94.11m. Since rent is part of value added
this contributes to a depressed GDP growth. Secondly, the effect of
aggregate demand on the growth of GDP is minimised by the decline in
investment demand. It is however notable that lower consumer prices
raise household and government consumption. Urban households however
benefit more than rural household from the policy change because they
consume a higher proportion of imported goods. The
increase in government consumption also benefit mostly the urban
households. Overall, the policy improves the welfare of urban
households relative to rural households.
The consequences of experiment E9 are clearly opposite to
those of E10. The aggregate price level and consumer prices rise thus
reducing aggregate demand. Notice however that urban household
consumption declines the most with import compression. Lower
consumption leads to increased savings and hence higher investment
levels. Despite the increased rents and investment demand, lower
aggregate demand depresses economic growth. The decline in the
204
TABLE 6.13 
Percentage Change in Macroeconomic Aggregates Due to 5% Changes in
Imports Quotas 
(A)	 Prices E9 El0
GDP at Factor Cost
-11.0 12.3
GDP at Market Price
-10.5 12.2
Exports
-1.6 1.8
Imports 0.0 0.0
Rural Household - CPI
-7.9 8.3
Urban Household - CPI
-10.2 11.6
Government - CPI -4.1 4.9
Investments
-19.3 23.5
Unskilled Labour
-3.0 1.5
Skilled Labour 0.0 0.0
(B)	 Values
Balance of Trade -39.33 31.63
Balance of Payments 0.0 0.0
Terms of Trade -7.93 7.99
(C)	 Quantities
GDP at Factor Cost 0.18 -0.61
GDP at Market Prices 0.17 -0.97
Exports 4.39 -4.66
Imports 3.63 -3.72
Rural Household Consumption 1.02 -1.44
Urban Household Consumption 4.02 -4.58
Government Consumption 4.26 -4.71
Investments -11.99 8.56
Unskilled Labour 0.0 0.0
Skilled Labour 0.66 -2.20
employment of skilled labour also contributes to the decline in
output.
The two experiments have different effects on trade
aggregates. Lower export prices improve export performance in E9
while the opposite is true in E10. However, lower export prices also
lead to a deterioration in the terms of trade in E9. It is clear that
the relaxation of import controls leads to a trade deficit, while
import compression improves the balance of trade. The improvement of
the balance of trade in El0 shows the effectiveness of import controls
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in dealing with trade deficits. In both experiments foreign capital
inflow is exogenously fixed hence the balance of payments accounts do
not change.
The effect of the policy change on factor returns and
employment are shown Table 6.14. Resource allocation arising from
TABLE 6.14 
Percentage Changes in Factor Prices and Employment Due to 5% Change in
Import Quotas 
(A) Prices E9 El0
Wage - AGR -3.0 1.5
Wage - FOOD -1.1 0.6
Wage - CON -1.4 0.7
Wage - PEAR -0.9 0.5
Wage - CIRT4 -0.7 0.4
Wage - MAN
-1.0 0.5
Wage - CONS -1.1 0.6
Wage - PSRV -1.2 0.6
Capital - AGR -0.6 0.3
Capital - FOOD -4.3 3.3
Capital - CON 3.2 -5.1
Capital - PETR 3.0 -6.3
Capital - CHEM 86.6 -48.3
Capital - MAN -5.8 2.2
Capital - CONS -13.4 9.3
Capital - PSRV -26.5 21.0
Capital - GSRV 7.5 -8.6
(B) Employment
Employment - AGR -1.01 1.32
Employment - FOOD 3.31 -4.28
Employment - CON 3.28 -5.24
Employment - PETR 60.74 -39.26
Employment - CHEM -2.58 0.91
Employment - MAN -8.91 6.04
Employment - CONS -13.81 9.69
Employment - PSRV 1.69 -3.18
Employment - GSRV 4.02 -4.54
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increase in import quotas in E9 benefit those sectors, (PETR, CON and
FOOD), which use imported intermediate inputs intensively; and also
GSRV and PSRV. The declines in employment in MAN and CONS is linked
to lower investment demand. Accordingly, profitability goes up for
those sectors with increased employment and declines in those where
unemployment increases. The pattern of factor returns and employment
in El0 is the opposite to those of E9.
The implication of the policy changes on sectoral prices and
quantities are shown in Tables 6.15 and 6.16. It is clear that
changes in import quotas have a high effect on commodities prices. In
E9 higher imports reduce domestic prices via increase in supply. The
increase in intermediate inputs (and at lower prices) lead to higher
gross output of FOOD, CON and PR sectors. This explains the
increase in employment in these sectors. On the other hand, the
higher import competition reduces domestic demand and gross output of
AGR. Lower investment demand results in lower output of MAN and CONS.
However, the lower cost of production in E9, by reducing export
prices, results in increased volume of exports.
As before, lower import quotas generate opposite results to
those from higher quotas. Experiment El0 shows that lower imports
lead to higher prices. This leads to lower output in the import
• dependent sectors; and higher output in the less dependent sector AGR,
while the growth in MAN and CONS sectors is due to higher investments.
Higher prices also reduce the volume of exports.
To summarise, it has been shown that in the presence of
quota rationing, liberalisation in the form of quota increases does
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not lead to significant growth of GDP. This is because the policy
reduces quota rents which are a component of GDP. The reduction in
domestic prices associated with the increase in import supply
encourages consumption. By lowering savings this reduces investment
demand and hence contributes to lower economic growth. The increase
in consumption however implies increased household welfare. The lower
consumption of rural households reflects the fact that they consume a
lower proportion of imported goods. It is also a result of lower
TABLE 6.15 
Percentage Change in Activity and Commodity Prices 
Due to 5% Change in Import Quotas 
E9 El0
ACTTVTTY - AGR
-4.43 3.62
ACTIVITY - FOOD
-7.04 7.62
ACTIVITY - CON
-9.54 11.27
ACTIVITY - PLIR
-20.75 29.32
ACTIVITY - CHEM
-12.54 15.40
ACTIVITY - MAN
-18.00 22.15
ACTIVITY - CONS
ACTIVITY - PSRV
ACTIVITY - GSRV
DOMESTIC - AGR
DOMESTIC - FOOD
DOMESTIC - CON
DOMESTIC - PETR
DOMESTIC - CHEM
DOMESTIC - MAN
-15.85
-5.77
-4.23
-5.51
-7.72
-10.75
-30.46
-17.37
20.79
6.85
5.13
4.53
8.32
12.59
57.43
21.02
DOMESTIC - CONS -19.99 24.41
DCVESTIC - PSRV -15.85 20.79
DOMESTIC - GSRV -7.28 8.48
EXPORTED - AGR -4.23 5.12
EXPORTED - FOOD -1.19 0.78
EXPORTED - CON -1.80 1.97
EXPORTED - PETR
a • RTED - CHEM
-1.81
-4.14
2.20
5.42
EXPORla) - MAN -0.49 0.68
EXPORTED - PSRV 0.19 0.29
EXPORTED - GSRV -1.41 2.09
-4.86 6.02
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TABLE 6.16 
Percentage Change in Activity and Commodity Quantities Due to 5%
Change in Import Quotas 
E13 E14
ACTIVITY - AGR -0.71 0.93
ACTIVITY - FOOD 1.33 -1.78
ACTIVITY - CON 2.07 -3.38
ACTIVITY - PEIR 15.35 -15.43
ACTIVITY - CHEM
-1.0 0.34
ACTIVITY - MAN
-5.70 3.71
ACTIVITY - CONS
-11.94 8.08
ACTIVITY - PSRV 1.01 -1.94
ACTIVITY - GSRV 3.97 -4.49
DOMESTIC - AGR
-1.55 1.59
DOMESTIC - FOOD 0.78 -1.30
DOMESTIC - CON 1.04 -2.51
DOMESTIC - PEIR 11.65 -12.81
DOMESTIC - CHEM
-2.39 1.55
DOMESTIC - MAN
-6.28 4.19
DOMESTIC - CONS
-11.94 8.08
DOMESTIC - PSRV 0.60 -1.56
DOMESTIC - GSRV 3.98 -4.49
IMPORTED - AGR
-12.10 11.00
IMPORTED- FOOD 5.00 -5.00
IMPORTED - CON 5.00 -5.00
IMPORTED - PETR 5.00 -5.00
IMPORTED - CHEM 5.00 -5.00
IMPORTED - MAN 5.00 -5.00
IMPORTED - PSRV
-3.13 2.53
IMPORTED - GSRV 1.75 -2.08
EXPORTED	 AGR 1.80 -1.16
EXPORTED - FOOD 5.59 -5.67
EXPORTED	 CON 8.54 -9.34
EXPORTED - PETR 20.97 -21.13
EXPORTED - CHEM 2.25 -3.02
FXPOftTED - MAN
-0.85 -1.28
EXPORTED - PSRV 2.16 -3.05
EXPORTED - GSRV 3.80 -4.29
income, as shown by the decline in the agricultural wage which mainly
accrues to the rural sector.
Although import compression improves the balance of trade
and terms of trade by reducing imports and increasing export prices;
it results in poor export performance. Higher prices also reduce
aggregate demand; which despite increased investment (due to higher
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savings and rents), lead to a decline in GDP. Import compression, by
reducing imported intermediate inputs, also contribute to the decline
in GDP. The gross output of the imported dependent sectors are the
most affected.
6.5	 Markup Pricing
Our model has so far only assumed that firms combine labour
and capital in CES technology to form value added; which in turn
combines with intermediate inputs in Leontief technology to form gross
output. Under minimisation these assumptions imply that factors are
paid their marginal products, so that prices are set equal to marginal
cost. However, one of the features of the structuralist models is
that firms do not follow the marginal cost pricing, but in fact use
mark-up pricing rules in setting their prices. This assumption is
justified by widespread existence of excess capacity and oligopolistic
market structures in LDCs.
Under the mark-up pricing rule, gross output prices take the
form:
(6.2)PX =	 +	 + a..P.)1 L. 13 1	 L.- 31 31	 3
wherePX.is the gross output price in sector i , Ti is the mark-up
rate,w.is the wage rate and P, is the intermediate (composite) price.
The coefficients a.. and a. i. are the labour-output and input-output
ratios, respectively. The term O.:a—W. + a..P.) is the average variableij 1	 L.- 31 j1
cost, while T.(7a..W. + a..P.) is the return to capital in sector1	 13 1	 31 31	 3
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i. It is therefore clear from (6.2) that returns to capital are mark-
ups over the variable costs. In our model we assume that this mark-up
rate is constant so that the change in gross output price will only
depend on changes in labour and intermediate input costs.
Under the markup pricing rule capital is paid (profit rate)
a fixed share of the total value of gross output. The technology
underlying production with markups is such that capital and labour are
no longer substitutable. It is therefore assumed that firms minimise
production costs by combining labour and aggregate intermediate inputs
in fixed proportions; where intermediate inputs are still aggregated
in fixed coefficients. This technology means that the marginal cost
of production is constant and supply will depend on average costs and
aggregate demand.
We assume that the FOOD, CON, PETR, CHEM and MAN sectors
follow the markup pricing rule, while the rest of the sectors use
marginal cost pricing rules. The implication of markup pricing is
examined by repeating the experiment involving a 20% subsidy on all
exports. This experiment (E15) assumes exogenous investments,
therefore its results are compared with those of E8 of the previous
section.
As noted earlier, the initial effect of the export subsidy
is to increase export demand. It is clear however from Tables 6.17-
6.20 that the results of E15 differ from those of E8. Furthermore,
the results for those sectors with markup pricing specification differ
from those with marginal cost pricing. To explain these differences
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TABLE 6.17 
Percentage Change in Macroeconomic Aggregates 
With Mark-up Pricing 
(A)	 Prices E8 E15
GDP at Factor Cost 17.5 17.1
GDP at Market Price 8.2 7.5
Exports -3.0 -4.0
Imports 0.00 0.0
Rural Household - CPI 14.2 14.5
Urban Household - CPI 7.9 7.6
Government - CPI 4.9 4.9
Investments 5.2 4.1
Unskilled Labour 23.4 25.1
Skilled Labour 0.00 0.00
(B)	 Values
Balance of Trade -244.37 -222.70
Balance of Payments 91.84 86.92
Terms of Trade -15.42 -20.83
(C)	 Quantities
GDP at Factor Cost 2.40 3.36
GDP at Market Prices 2.53 3.66
Exports 7.53 11.64
Imports 9.70 12.29
Rural Household Consumption 5.87 6.58
Urban Household Consumption 6.80 7.97
Government Consumption -4.68 -4.57
Investments 0.00 0.0
Unskilled Labour 0.00 0.0
Skilled Labour 8.70 9.70
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TABLE 6.18 
Percentage Changes in Factor Prices and Employment With Mark-up
Pricing 
(A) Prices E8 E15
Wage - ACR 22.9 24.5
Wage - FOOD 8.4 9.0
Wage - CON 10.0 10.7
Wage - PEIrk 6.6 7.1
Wage - CHEM 5.4 5.8
Wage - MAN 7.5 8.0
Wage - CONS 8.3 8.9
Wage - PSRV 9.0 9.7
Wage - GRSV 4.6 4.9
Capital - AGR 25.6 27.5
Capital - FOOD 18.1 0.00
Capital - CON 28.7 0.00
Capital - PETR 120.4 0.00
Capital - CHEM 33.5 0.00
Capital - MAN 18.9 0.00
Capital - CONS 10.1 12.6
Capital - PSRV 26.5 30.3
Capital - CSRV
-2.9 -2.20
(B) Employment
Employment - AGR 1.63 1.79
Employment - FOOD 6.66 3.68
Employment - CON 12.45 13.52
Employment - PETR 72.41 43.81
Employment - CHEM 12.52 11.17
Employment - MAN 7.26 7.10
Employment - CONS 0.82 1.68
Employment - PSRV 9.31 10.88
Employment - GSRV -3.63 -3.45
first note that under the markup pricing rule increased production is
possible at constant marginal cost. However, in the marginal cost
pricing case, marginal cost is an increasing function of output.
Therefore in E15, the increase in demand for exports can be met
without cost increases. This is shown in Table 6.19 where the change
in activity prices in E15 are much lower than those of E8. Notice
also that the activity prices of marginal cost pricing sectors are
much higher than those of the markup pricing sectors. The relative
differences in activity prices is reflected by the changes in gross
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TABLE 6.19 
Percentage Change in Activity and Commodity Prices with Mark-Up
Pricing 
E8 E15
ACTIVITY - AGR 22.02 17.76
ACTIVITY - FOOD 13.63 8.43
ACTIVITY - CON 8.26 1.89
ACTIVITY - PhTR 2.42 -9.19
ACTIVITY - CHEM 10.97 0.93
ACTIVITY - MAN 5.05 0.45
ACTIVITY - CONS 4.26 -1.66
ACTIVITY - PSRV 11.22 8.31
ACTIVITY - GSRV 5.18 3.11
DOMESTIC - AGR 21.58 16.43
DOMESTIC - ECOD 12.58 6.88
DOMESTIC - CON 6.27 -0.82
DOMESTIC - PETR -7.50 -23.01
DOMESTIC - CHEM 0.14 -7.35
DOMESTIC - MAN 3.14 -2.26
DOMESTIC - CONS 4.26 -1.66
DOMESTIC - PSRV 8.42 4.63
DOMESTIC - GSRV 5.09 3.02
IMPORTED - AGR 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - FOOD 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - CON 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - PETR 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - CHEM 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - MAN 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - PSRV 0.00 0.00
IMPORTED - GSRV 0.00 0.00
EXPORTED - AGR -1.3 -2.58
EXPORTED - FOOD -2.57 -3.97
EXPORTED - CON -3.41 -5.12
EXPORTED - PETR -4.37 -8.60
EXPORTED - CHEM -1.53 -2.89
EXPORTED - MAN -1.81 0.12
EXPORTED - PSRV -4.59 -4.93
EXPORTED - GSRV -0.65 -2.85
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TABLE 6.20 
Percentage Change in Activity and Commodity Quantities with Mark-up
Pricing 
E8 E15
ACTTVITY - AM. 1.15 1.26
Acrrvrry - FOOD 2.65 3.68
ACTIVITY - CON 7.70 13.52
Acrrvrry - PEER 17.65 43.81
ACTIVITY - CHUM 4.43 11.17
ACTIVITY - MAN 4.45 7.10
ACTIVITY - CONS 0.69 1.42
ACTIVITY - PSRV 5.44 6.33
ACTIVITY - GSRV -3.60 -3.42
DCMESTIC - AGR 0.87 1.18
ccmEsric - FOOD 1.92 2.95
DOMESTIC - CON 6.21 11.65
DOMESTIC - PETH 14.69 38.43
DOMESTIC - CHEM 3.27 9.28
DOMESTIC - MAN 3.97 6.54
DOMESTIC - CONS 0.69 1.42
DOMESTIC - PSRV 4.77 5.75
DOMESTIC - GSRV -3.62 -3.43
IMPORTED - AGR 49.11 53.59
IMPORTED - FOOD 21.71 22.32
IMPORTED - CON 16.36 15.60
IMPORTED - PETR 8.94 18.29
IMPORTED - CHEM 7.42 7.16
IMPORTED - MAN 6.11 6.65
IMPORTED - PSRV 9.09 10.62
IMPORTED - GSRV -1.20 -1.07
EXPORTED - AGR 1.99 1.51
EXPORTED - FOOD 8.13 9.22
EXPORTED - CON 16.88 24.98
EXPORTED - PEAR 22.28 51.79
EXPORTED - CHal 7.17 15.49
EXPORTED - MAN 8.59 11.90
EXPORTED - PSRV 7.30 7.95
EXPORTED - GSRV 0.49 0.66
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output in Table 6.20; where the output is highest in the markup
pricing sectors.
Notice also that given the increase in aggregate demand, the
increase in exports implies relatively lower supply to the domestic
market. This explains the large increases in sectoral imports in
Table 6.20. As before, the high increases in imports is due to the
high elasticities of substitution and transformation in ACP, FOOD, CON
and PhaR sectors. Higher imports also account for lower domestic
prices in the import competing sectors.
Table 6.18 shows the changes in returns to factors and
employment levels. Apart from the agricultural wage, there is little
difference between the wage changes in El5 and E8. This is because
with 98 percent of unskilled labour employed in the agricultural
sector, the 25.1 percent increase is unskilled labour wage (Table
6.17) is almost fully reflected in the change in the sectors' wage.
The higher returns to capital in those sectors without markup pricing
reflects higher employment.
In conclusion, it has been shown that taking into account
the alternative pricing rules affects trade policy results. In
particular, modeling mark-up pricing rules generate higher real GDP
growth, employment levels, household consumption and export
performance compared to the marginal cost pricing model.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
The object of this thesis has been to determine the impact
of trade liberalisation on the Kenyan economy. The effects of tariff
reduction, devaluation and export subsidies were simulated. In
addition, the consequences of quantitative restrictions and markup
pricing were simulated. To obtain the widest possible implication of
the policy changes, the experiments have been run with alternative
closure rules.
Although several policies are in practise simultaneously
implemented we have made no attempt to simulate the effects of a
combination of policies. This is primarily because our objective has
not been to model actual policy changes. While it would be realistic
to model such a process, the risk is that the generated results may be
difficult to interpret. In other words, the model may turn out to be
a "black box" in which it is difficult to determine what drives the
model results. The advantage of the approach we have taken is that it
provides a direct link between parameter changes and the model results.
This minimises the ambiguity of the model results.
In all, fifteen experiments have been run. No attempt will
be made to provide a summary and policy implications of all the
results. We shall instead concentrate in providing the main results
and conclusions.
The model results show that the gains from tariff
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reductions, in terms of GDP growth, are minimal. This is true for
both neoclassical and Keynesian models. While these results are in
line with those of the literature, they are explained by different
factors. The small gains from tariff reductions, especially in
developed economies, are normally argued to be due to low tariffs.
Although the tariff rates are underestimated in our data it is
unlikely that they are the major driving force behind our results.
Quantitative restrictions and the assumption of product
differentiation are some of the explanatory factors.
It is also shown that tariff reductions increase household
consumption. However, this occurs at the expense of investments.
Lower investment provides another explanation for lower growth of GDP.
At the sectoral level, the policy change leads to increase in exports.
But as expected it also induces contraction in the import-competing
sectors.
The effect of the devaluation of domestic currency, as
should be expected is inflationary. However, contrary to the
structuralists predictions it does not lead to the contraction of the
economy. This is explained by the high elasticities of export demand
specified in our model. The policy change however reduces household
consumption.
It turns out that the effect of devaluation on the balance
of trade depends on the macroclosure. With endogenous investments,
increase in savings due to lower consumption leads to increased
investment. This increases import demand for investment goods and
therefore contribute to a deterioration in the balance of trade. On
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the contrary, lower aggregate demand leads to lower imports and hence
an improvement in the balance of trade when investment is exogenously
fixed. As expected the policy change also improves export
performance.
The effect of export subsidies are closely similar to those
of devaluation. However, unlike devaluation they improve household
welfare through higher consumption. By directly benefiting the export
sectors they generate greater growth in these sectors and therefore
higher employment and export volume. The effect of export subsidies
are also less inflationary than devaluation.
The policy change involving quantitative restrictions has
been modelled as changes in the volume of imports. While this may not
be the best way of modelling quota restrictions the results are quite
instructive. It is shown that the relaxation of quota restrictions
does not contribute to higher GDP. This is because the policy change
reduces rents which are part of GDP. It also leads to lower
investment, through increased consumption, and therefore contributes
to lower GDP.
Import compression, on the other hand, depress the economy.
The inflationary nature of this policy not only reduces aggregate
demand but also leads to higher cost of production. However, it
improves the balance of trade. This therefore shows why import
controls are widely used to deal with the balance of payments problems
in LDCs; albeit at a high cost to the economy.
The model also shows that incorporating markup pricing rules
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generate different results from the marginal cost pricing rule. In
particular, the model with markup pricing show higher real GDP,
resource utilisation, aggregate consumption and export performance.
The assumption of excess capacity allows increased output without any
inflationary effects or deterioration in the external account.
The income distributional effects of policy changes are not
straightforward in our model. To start with, the model only handles
functional distribution of income. This means that the model results
cannot be used to address the issue of income inequality associated
with trade liberalisation. In most of our experiments unskilled
labour gain from policy changes. However, with the Keynesian closure
assumed in our model the growth of the economy is always at the
expense of skilled labour. This is because increases in GDP results
from increased employment which is only possible with lower real wages.
Any redistribution of income towards unskilled labour will favour
rural households since this factor is almost exclusively employed in
agriculture. It should be noted also that since we assume sector-
specific capital, the policy effects on the demand for aggregate
labour will determine payments to capital. Capital will therefore
gain from policies that induce greater employment through lower real
wages of skilled labour.
The results of our model have to be interpreted with the
weaknesses of CGE models in mind. It is clear that the model results
depend on model closure and the assumed elasticities. This means that
the model results reflect the assumptions about the structure of the
economy. For this reason the generalisation of the results is
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limited.
The static nature of the model also limits the usefulness of
the model in analysing structural adjustment problems which are
dynamic in nature. This criticism also applies to the fact that the
model only specifies the real side of the economy. Incorporating
financial and monetary aspects to the model would facilitate a better
understanding of the adjustment processes.
It can be concluded however that despite these weaknesses
the model enables us to examine important aspects of trade
liberalisation. The model results show clearly how the economy
responds to policy changes. This characteristic of the model is
important for policy formulation.
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FCCIINC/IES 
CHAFFER 'INNO
1/	 For a recent critique and alternatives to the traditional
trade policies see °camp° (1986) and Evans (1989).
2/	 See Hirschman (1968) for analysis of the different phases
of ISI policies.
3/ The seriousness of the economic problems facing LDCs sub-
Saharan African countries is reflected by the concern the
region has received from the World Bank and other donors.
See for example, World Bank (1983, 1984, 1986, 1989a,
1989b).
4/	 The mission however argued that this type of protection
should be given only to selected industries and for short
periods.
5/	 See 1966/70 Development Plan, p.235.
6/	 See 1970/74 Development Plan, p.320.
7/	 The IBRD (1987) study is quoted in Sharpley and Lewis
(1988).
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8/	 Kenya's first structural adjustment loan was approved in
March 1980 and the second was approved in July 1982. Kenya
has also benefitted from the sectoral -adjustment credits
provided under the Special Facility for sub-Saharan Africa.
A loan worth US $40m. to finance the agricultural sector
was approved in June 1986.
9/	 The IMF approved standby credits in 1979, 1980, 1982, 1983
and 1985. The first three standbys were cancelled before
they expired because Kenya exceeded IMF ceilings. In
February 1988 Kenya reached an agreement with the IMF for a
loan worth SDR 175.2 million to be drawn in two stages. SDR
85m is to be drawn during the first 18 months under a
stand-by agreement and the rest, SDR 90.2m, is to be drawn
over three years (with SDR 28.4m available immediately)
under the Structural Adjustment Facility.
10/	 See Sessional Paper No.4, Kenya (1982).
11/	 See Sessional Paper No.4, Kenya (1982).
12/	 See Budget Speech of 1982/83.
13/	 The Nominal Effective Exchange Rates (NR) are calculated
following Rhomberg (1976). Formally:
7
NEERt = . E (xkj/Exkj ) XPkj3=1
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where:
Xkj = Kenya's exports to country j
XRki
 = XRi/XRk
and
XR. = value of one unit of trading-partner j currency in
3 terms the numeraire currency (the dollar)
XRk = unit value of the dollar in terms of the Kenya
shilling
XRk is expressed as an index number relative to the baseper iod 1980. To obtain the real effective exchange rate
index (REER), NEER is deflated by a trade weighted relative
price.
REERt
 = NEERt
TWPt
7
where	 TWPt =	 (x,K./EKX,.) CP
Ikt3	 33 =1	 WP lit
CPIkt = Kenya's consumer price index at period t.
WPIjt = country j's wholesale price index at period t.
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CHAPTER THREE
1/	 In both cases we are only confining ourselves to changes in
real product wages. Changes in real consumption wage would
be ambiguous because they depend on the weights of the
workers' consumption basket of the two goods.
2/	 To model product differentiation between exports and
domestic demands de Melo and Robinson use a logistic supply
curve discussed in Dervis et al. (1982, pp.228-230) instead
of CET functions. de Melo and Robinson (1989) argue that
the two specifications yield similar results for small
changes around equilibrium.
CHAPTER FOUR
1/	 See Kenya (1981)
2/	 See Kenya (1979)
3/	 An alternative method of reducing the SAM is that of
apportionment introduced by Pyatt (1985, 1989).
4/	 Column equation is yi = yi (p, y; 0, n)
5/ It is this property that led Drud, Grais and Pyatt to refer
to the model underlying (4.2) as being in transactions-value
(TV) form.
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GIAPIM FIVE
1/
	
Other parameters which can be endogenously determined
but are normally exogenously set for policy experiments
include taxes, exchange rates, and factor quantities.
2/	 See Srinivasan and Whalley (1986) and Shoven and Whalley
(1984) for a summary of these problems.
3/	 See Taylor (1979) and Deaton and Milellbauer (1980) for a
thorough discussion and derivation of LES parameters.
4/	 Different types of models and closure rules are discussed
below.
5/	 Of course even when the number of equations and variables in
the system have been equated Walras' Law implies one more
equation (defining the numeraire) needs to be added to the
system. Therefore 12 variables are actually fixed in the
model.
6/	 See Adelman and Robinson (1988), Lluch (1979) and Robinson
(1989).
7/	 Note that in both models 1 and 2 the real exchange rate is
the relative price of tradeables and non-tradeables.
8/	 See also Fallon (1985) and The World Bank (1983).
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APPENDIX
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This appendix contains the HERCULES representation of our
model. As explained before, HERCULES was developed for use in solving
SAM-based CGE models. The system has its origin in Drud et al. (1986)
and its application is described in detail in Drud and Kendrick (1986).
In this section we provide a brief sketch of how our model has been
defined, calibrated and then solved.
To start with lines 5-115 define the accounts of the SAM and
the acronyms used in the model. The accounts are self-explanatory,
but the acronyms require some explanation. The acronyms are
abbreviations of key words used to specify the model. For example, ME'
defines market factors used in domestic production, NP is a price
fixed as numeraire, CES defines CES production function and so on.
The SAM is defined in lines 116-281. Notice that the SAM is
not square. This is because accounts with zero elements have been
eliminated. This has no modelling implications since GAMs does not
store zeros. However, it reduces the number of input lines and
therefore makes the input file easier to read.
Lines 365-530 define the specification Table. This is
exactly the SAM defined above but with the numerical cell elements
replaced by acronyms. The acronyms here define a behavioural equation
for each non-zero cell of the SAM and the derived behavioural (price)
equation for household consumption and production (activity) accounts.
Equations which are identities are also specified; for example, the
cell equations where values are defined by multiplying prices with
quantities and accounts with quantities only. Examples of such
accounts are the consumption and commodity accounts, respectively.
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The specification Table, by defining the behavioural equations in each
cell, therefore forms the essence of TV-approach to modelling.
The determination of the values in each cell can be deduced
from the column specification. For instance, in column six of row 367
Rural household consumption functions are specified in LES form
between rows 375-383; in column three of row 386 the distribution of
government income to domestic institutions is exogenously fixed in
domestic currency (TEXO) in rows 387-390, but transfers to ROW are
fixed in foreign currency (FEXO). The allocation of income to
consumption and savings are however specified as residuals (UNSPEC).
The rest of the specifications follow closely the model specified in
Chapter Four.
The SAMS accounts are specified (in column TYPE) in the
Account Table (row 283-363). For example, unskilled (ULBRD) and
skilled labour (SLBRD) are defined as market factors and hence will
have price and quantity; but domestic skilled labour (SLBRF) employed
abroad are defined as non-market factor (NMF) and therefore will only
have values. Similarly ACT define activity and commodity accounts and
INST and INSTC define institutional income and consumption accounts,
respectively. Recall that for modelling purposes it is necessary to
separate institutions' income and consumption accounts. The rest of
the specifications TAX and ROW define indirect taxes and the rest of
the world accounts, respectively.
The Account Table is also important for defining the
closures and parameterisation of the model. The model closures are
defined in the column labelled FIX. It is shown that unskilled labour
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is fixed in quantities (Q), while skilled labour wage is fixed in
nominal terms (NP). Rows 297-305 define the sector specificity of
capital and the nominal exchange rate is fixed in row 363.
The columns labelled SIGMA and SIGMAR specify the
elasticities of substitution and transformation, respectively. For
example, the elasticities of substitution between the two labour types
are shown in rows 288-296; and the elasticities of substitution
between imported and domestic commodities are shown in rows 346-354.
Similarly, rows 320-328 show the elasticities of substitution between
value added and intermediate inputs and the elasticities of
transformation between domestic and export sales. However, not all
the required elasticities are contained in the Account Table. The
export demand elasticities (ETA) are specified in lines 537-40. The
SIGMAC Table (lines 541-580) contain the elasticities required for the
two-stage CES production functions. The elasticities of substitution
specified in the SIGMAC Table are those necessary for the production
functions represented by the activity accounts in lines 403-447. They
show that at the first level aggregate labour and capital combine to
form value added in each sector; and on the same level intermediates
combine to form aggregate intermediate input. Notice that to form
value added labour and capital combine with similar elasticity of
substitution. The same applies to intermediates, but because we
assume these inputs combine with a Leontief technology (zero
elasticity) a special specification (EPS) is used to represent zeros
since as stated above they cannot be stored GAMS. Finally, in the top
level value added combines with aggregate intermediates according to
Leontief technology. The elasticities of substitution for these
functions are specified as SIGMA in the Account Table (lines 320-328).
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In lines 585-643, the parameters for the LES functions of
rural and urban households are defined. These include the marginal
budget shares (lines 585-605) obtained from expenditure surveys, the
assumed committed expenditure shares (lines 606-607) and the estimated
committed expenditures, discretionary expenditures, income and price
elasticities (lines 624-641).
The experiment is specified in lines 682-683 and solved in
line 684. Notice that the experiment involves 100% tariff reductions.
The model therefore allows for large changes in policy.
The first results are shown on page 255 and represent LES
results defined in lines 631 and 643. These results were discussed in
Chapter Five. It is shown on pages 256-257 that the SAM is balanced.
The row and column totals in each account are the same.
The counting of equations and variables of the model is
shown in page 258. The model has 791 variables and 780 equations;
therefore it is made determinate by fixing 11 variables and the
numeraire. The base solution is shown in pages 259-261 and the model
solution from page 262 onwards. To determine the policy effects, the
model results is compared with the base results. The interpretation
of the results are easy to follow. Drud and Kendrick (1986) provides
the most complete discussed to such interpretations.
The actual results of our study are shown in pages 277-228.
These are the results which involved experiments on tariff reductions
(pp.277 -278), devaluation (pp.279 -80), subsidies (pp.281 -282),
urNeve"14's	 2_ a 0 )
increase4and mark up pricing (pp.287 -288).
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